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ABSTRACT

This project makes interventions in recent critical discussions in American
Studies about being and (un)belonging, civility and anti-sociality, and the
affective responses to the foreclosure of democratic promise. Reading across the
genres of American Romanticism -- the convent tale, the reform novel, and the
romance -- I analyze often-overlooked feminized figures that do not subscribe to
the dominant models of representation and inclusion in antebellum America.
These figures represent violent reactions against the dominant disciplinary
institutions (e.g. marriage, motherhood, domesticity, slavery) that impoverish
their lives, albeit to varying degrees. Their reactions are often the result of the
characters’ over-identification with that which dominant culture deems antisocial
and pathological, the symptoms that need to be suppressed so that a “healthy”
sociality can emerge. These characters often strategize within outmoded,
premodern systems of punishment (e.g. the convent and plantation), where the
interiorization of their lives defined by an emerging disciplinary culture is shortcircuited. Embodying negative affects and desires, the figures I analyze seek to
bring down the institutions that limit democracy’s potential to social reform. This
project finds at the center of American Romanticism not only a critique of these
institutions and
x

the subjectivities that perpetuate them, but also an articulation of the period’s
imaginative potential to redefine subjectivity, eroticism, and sociality.
To be sure, I am not invested in rescuing feminized subjects from charges
of violence, aggression, and cruelty as simply justified responses to patriarchal
violence and injustice. Rather than perpetuating mainstream feminism’s implicit
belief in the idea that women are essentially nonviolent, and that if only power is
rejected, a utopic, nonviolent society will come into existence, this project, in
contrast, engages feminized “monstrous” agents of violence more invested in
pulling down the dominant institutions, identities, and modes of association that
condition their social existence. I read acts of eroticized violence in these literary
texts as instantiating other ways of being and associating. Embodying negative
intensity and aggression in opposition to the disabling affects of sympathetic
fellow feeling encouraged by dominant disciplinary institutions, these figures offer
glimpses, however unsustained, of other possibilities and intimacies not tied to
romanticized notions of democratic community or conventional familial models.
Drawing on recent developments in queer theory and archival research,
Cruel Sorority reconceptualizes the ways that dominant models of being and
belonging have been analyzed in nineteenth-century American literary and
sexuality studies. The antisocial turn in queer theory has enabled me to put into
perspective what the archival records as an undercurrent of less than civil
dissatisfaction with the ways that intimacy is organized in antebellum America. I
focus attention on feminized figures at odds with the story of reform and
xi

assimilation that many critics tell about antebellum America, for example, the
reform of institutions like marriage via property ownership and divorce. Although
some of my chapters focus on marginal figures, this project operates under the
logic that the exception proves the rule.
The cruel sorority (existing beyond and in defiance to the category of
woman) that makes up this project is not interested in reform but in
transformative change. Taking a lead from the characters this study engages,
this project not interested in a narrow definition of justice. I tackle the following
questions: What does it mean to reimagine the social, and reject the institutions
that govern our lives? Reject the dominant script of maturity? Refuse
assimilation? That the figures in this study most likely embody what is often read
as negative behavior is no surprise; these characters are seen as antisocial only
because they break with the heteronormative logic that informs the dominant
culture and its attendant institutions that organize bodies and property. From
Maria Monk to Nathaniel Hawthorne to Elizabeth Stoddard, this project traces the
persistence of the drive for new acts of creation in the face of democracy’s
unfulfilled promises. The figures I analyze compellingly submit to the vertigo of
the unknown, with no script, “legend” or “myth” to teach them how to live in the
world. They are, one and all, dazzling examples of dizzying inventiveness to the
end.
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CHAPTER ONE
CRUEL SORORITY, OR, FEMINIZING
ENJOYMENT IN AMERICAN ROMANCE

The family, conventional sexuality, and gender are at the
top of my hit list.
Pat Califia, Public Sex: The Culture of Radical
Sex
First of all, their New World, diasporic plight marked a
theft of the body—a willful and violent (and unimaginable
from this distance) severing of the captive body from its
motive will, its active desire. Under these conditions, we
lose at least gender difference in the outcome, and the
female body and the male body become a territory of
cultural and political maneuver, not at all gender-related,
gender-specific.
Hortense J. Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s
Maybe: An American Grammar Book”

I.
In the anonymous short story “The Man Who Thought Himself A Woman”
(1857), published in The Knickerbocker, we find in the cross-dressing protagonist
the limit and potential of American freedom. Descending from a line of eccentric
men, a great-grandfather who left his wife and children in order to
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live alone, a grandfather who refused to kill any living creature and wore
nineteenth-century America’s version of a technicolor dream coat, and a father
who banished his children from the house so he had more room for his beloved
book collection, Japhet Colbones only truly lives at night, when he is able to
dress as a woman, holding imaginary tea parties and knitting circles. Even
though his wife and two live-in sisters learn of his secret life and only seem to
mind that he steals their clothes, Japhet commits suicide, hanging himself in full
high femme drag, leaving the room set up for a funereal (or a party, as his son
and daughter read the scene). His only request is that his family bury him as they
found him, dressed to the nines in gown, bonnet, heels, gloves, and jewelry,
leaving out no accessory. The wife and sisters honor his request.
The Colbones represent a perverse genealogy. Whether choosing to live
without family (great-grandfather), seeking a fabulous, life-affirming existence
(grandfather), living the life of the mind (father), or living publicly as a woman
(Japhet), the Colbones embody a patriarchal line at odds with the one we have
come to know, representing a desire to live differently in the world, beyond
prescribed models of adulthood. With the exception of Japhet, his ancestors find
a way to live life publicly, rainbow coat and all, on their own terms without
compromise. In his suicide note, Japhet expresses his inability to do so, writing,
“I think I am a woman. I have been seven years making me a perfect suit of
garments for my sex. As I have passed so long, falsely, for a man, I am
ashamed to show myself in my true colors; therefore, I hang myself” (610). In

3
Japhet, we meet antebellum America’s limit. The Colbones men can be in the
world insofar as they do not renounce their male identity and symbolicallybestowed phallic authority. Why else won’t his wife and sisters confront him
when they espy him playing dress up and mining feminine gestures before the
mirror? Amused by the sight, wife and sisters become keepers of the open secret
that is his closeted existence.1 Accepting of his eccentricities and enjoyment as
long as they remain private, the Colbones women become complicit in
maintaining the public illusion of male identity and its attendant organizing
function in the household. The sorority Japhet might have found with the women
in his life never materializes because the fantasy that structures scoiety becomes
more important to them than the reality of their situation. The burden of this
shared secret is what kills Japhet. Why don’t the women violate the silence,
embrace the unknown, and discover where the acknowledgment of an
unexpected fellow sister takes them? What kind of sociality might form beyond
the script of conventional family and its prescribed gender roles?
This project tells the story of feminized figures (Japhet included) who seek
other ways to be and belong in the world, rejecting and aggressively acting up
and out at the dominant institutions that condition and limit their lives. This is not
the story of reform and assimilation that some critics often tell about antebellum
America, for example, the reform of institutions like marriage via property

1

For a discussion of late nineteenth century same-sex desire as the “open secret” of Western
culture, see Eve Sedgwick’s The Epistemology of the Closest.
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ownership and divorce. Although I focus on marginal figures, this project
operates under the logic that the exception proves the rule. For instance, the fact
that Japhet Colbones cannot live publicly as a woman demonstrates that, despite
the expansive reach of American ideology, belonging is always predicated on
exclusion. This is not to say, as I will show throughout this project, that what
these figures want is to elbow their way into the mainstream of American culture.
Rather, what we find in the paradigmatic scene of Japhet’s staged funereal/party
is the troubling dramatization of a desire, from beyond the grave, to reorganize
the social along different lines. Drawing on a long tradition of ceremonial scenes
involving the mourning of an exceptional woman (I am thinking of those late
eighteenth-century wayward girls, not-so-naive-virgins and coquettes, who resist
and/or over-identify with their gender roles) the anonymous writer of “The Man
Who Thought Himself a Woman” appeals to the readership’s sympathies, not
unlike the way Japhet in death appeals to his neighbors to imagine a world where
an eccentric, feminized man occupies the central position, where queer becomes
the organizing principle.2
II.
It is almost impossible not to read antebellum America’s domestic
sentimentalism, arguably the period’s dominant (popular) mode of literary
expression, as projecting a sympathetic feminine subject/reader suffused with
masochistic affect: from Little Eva’s classic deathbed scene of evangelical self2

Eliza Wharton and Charlotte Temple are cases in point.
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sacrifice to Ellen Montgomery’s bestial desire to be flagellated to Japhet
Colbones’ staged suicide in drag, these transformative scenes of abjection
pervade a consumer culture starved for representations of self-abasement that
promise to flesh out readers’ affectively malnourished souls.3 It is as if
sentimentalism were an object in search of an injured (feminized) subjectivity it
has no trouble finding. Receptive to the pathologized gender implications of this
dynamic, a scandalized feminist criticism never tires of “exposing” the inherently
masochistic psychic structure of woman as a product of sexist patriarchal
fantasies concocted in Freud’s late-Victorian mind -- an exposé I generally agree
with.4 But why, then, is domestic sentimentalism such a popular genre? Critical
feminist responses to the genre still presume a monolithic gender identity
fashioned out of masochism. However, it is possible that the affective spectrum
and gender possibilities in antebellum American domestic fiction are more
complex than the ones critics continue to presume? James Baldwin identified an
inherent cruelty in the tears of the sentimentalist: “Sentimentality, the
ostentatious parading of excessive and spurious emotion, is the mark of
dishonesty, the inability to feel . . . it is always, therefore, the signal of secret and

3

Aside from the famous scene in Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), I am also referencing Susan
Warner’s Wide, Wide, World (1851). Warner’s heroine Ellen Montgomery identifies with the
horse being whipped by her fiancée in order to feel the pleasures denied her in her role as the
angel in the house. With the example if Japhet Colbones, it is clear that by “feminizing” I mean
something that has very little to do with biology.
4

See Sigmund Freud, “Female Sexuality” (1931) and “Femininity” (1932). See Elizabeth Grosz
and Kaja Silverman on Freud and psychoanalysis.
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violent inhumanity, the mask of cruelty.” 5 Taking Baldwin’s lead and expanding
the parameters of sentimental fiction to include other writing by (though not
always) and about women, this project looks at a feminized canon of writing not
to reinscribe women with traditional gender, racial, and affective norms as others
have in the past. While I agree with Baldwin’s attack on the colonizing force of
sentimental sympathy, for him the cruelty at the center of sentimental fiction
belies the insincerity of sympathy, an insincerity allowing for the disavowal of
what can in fact be transformative about this fiction. I want to reconsider the
sadistic strain in domestic fiction, finding in its inherent cruelty a symptom of
patriarchy’s violent process of feminization. This violence is often manifest in
feminized, marginal characters who do not seem to fit domestic fiction’s narrative
coherence, but instead figure as externalized outbursts that threaten routinizing
models of being and belonging. 6
Critical discussions of sentimentalism tend to focus on either its enabling
or disabling self-abasing affects but completely overlook the sadistic strain that
turns those sentimental tears into the exteriorized evidence of our deep heartfelt
humanity. In a review of much recent critical work on masochism in American
culture, Michael Uebel reflects, “in no land has the passion for the rod been as

5

6

See Baldwin’s critique of Uncle Tom’s Cabin in “Everybody’s Protest Novel.”

The trick is to avoid the cycle of ressentiment that Baldwin argues Richard Wright is in engaged
in against Stowe via Bigger Thomas.
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systematically examined and theorized as in America” (389).7 He goes on to ask,
“What makes masochism such a compelling object of study now?” Masochism’s
“now-time” becomes an incitement for “the Left to think the unthinkable, beyond
the reach of commodity, into the realm of the revolutionary” (Uebel 407).
Masochism is not a forfeiture of power, but an attempt to “recuperate it within
different social and libidinal economies” (395). A subject is not worthy of power
unless she/he can imagine her/himself in a state of powerlessness. One form of
masochistic resistance for Uebel is mass fantasy, where an oppressed group
resignifies social suffering “as a prelude to, and in reality a warranty for, the
achievement of future satisfaction” (397). Uebel’s take on masochism follows a
Christian, the-meek-shall-inherit-the-earth logic. In other words, affect (suffering)
precedes justice.
Marianne Noble’s The Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature
(2000) is one such study of the socially and politically promising, world-shattering
force of masochism. Clearly following Jane Tompkins’ lead, Noble reads the
masochistic strain in texts written by women as a “double-edged sword,” one that
articulates oppressive ideologies while at the same time serving as a mode of
expression of female desire (6).8 Taking a provocative, more complex view of

7

8

See Uebel, “Masochism in America” (2002).

Responding to Ann Douglas’ condemnation of the feminization of American culture, Tompkins
finds political, social, and literary value in women’s sentimental writings. For instance, she reads
Eva’s death not as ridiculous camp, as Douglas does, but rather as representing a femalespecific brand of heroic sacrifice, in which Eva’s example represents an alternative to a
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the masochism found in several antebellum texts that foreground the
experiences of women, Noble reads this pleasure in pain as a “form of selfexpression, beautiful—or at least fascinating—once one can see beyond its
weirdness” (4). Working within the constraints of patriarchal culture, women
writers were able to exercise power and experience pleasure.
However, despite the transgressive dimension Noble finds in sentimental
masochism, she implicitly subscribes to the Freudian notion of an inherently
masochistic female subjectivity, thereby overlooking the way sentimentalism
bribes the reader’s perverse enjoyment in someone else’s suffering with the
promise of participatory sympathetic identification (you too will cry), thereby
cloaking the violent sadistic act that makes identification with suffering possible.
That is, she is too quick in translating sadistic acts of aggression into “inverted
form[s] of masochism,” thus short-circuiting a more complex analysis of
sentimental literature and the function of desire and enjoyment in subject
formation (163).9
The pervasive popularity of domestic sentimentalism with women readers
suggests that women identify with the chaste, weepy heroines in these
narratives. Most clearly do. Yet this is not to say that women readers identify

patriarchal, capitalist economy. For Tompkins, women can be empowered through the rejection
of power (which she reads as always already patriarchal), and men can learn from their example.
See Tompkins, Sensational Designs (1986) and Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture
(1977).
9

See Noble, “An Ecstasy of Apprehension” (1998).
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only with masochistic characters, or that the masochistic characters Noble
engages are the only models of feminized agency, enjoyment, and expression in
antebellum novels. In contrast, this study pays critical attention to the violent
underside of feminized culture, engaging the sadistic intensity animating
feminized figures who tear the fabric concealing the violence of sympathetic
identification often overlooked by critics of the period.10
Whether critics find socio-political potential for women in sentimental and
domestic fiction and/or masochism, or argue against its pervasive, infantilizing
gag on those who advocate for an adult-centered sociality and politics, not many
move beyond the critical embrace or outright dismissal of this dominant mode of
literary expression. Even Lauren Berlant, who, unlike Noble, sides with Ann
Douglas’ uncompromising attack on the feminization of American culture, taking
Douglas further in an even more “cruel” rejection of sentimentalism, does not
engage the negative dimension of sentimentality and its potential to bring down
the privatized domestic edifice the genre’s “positive” side invites us to inhabit.
Overlooking the unsympathetic and murderous Cassy in her reading of the

10

For an analysis of female violence and aggression in American literature, see Linda Grasso,
The Artistry of Anger: Black and White Women’s Literature in America, 1820-60 (2002). Grasso
argues that when anger is acknowledged as part of the national tradition, women’s anger is either
ignored or neutralized. She accounts for the disrupting potential of female anger in antebellum
America. However, The Artistry of Anger does not consider the multiple manifestations of anger,
such as violence, sadism, and their attendant enjoyment. Grasso counter-intuitively reads texts
in which women’s anger is implicit, that is, passively manifest in “illness, acts of sacrifice,
supplicating tones, captivity motifs, death, hunger, and emaciated bodies” (7). Such a move,
once again, silences unsympathetic and aggressive female figures, and perpetuates the
traditional feminist strategy of ignoring the negative, intensive energy of fatal women. Like Noble,
Grasso also subscribes to a passive-aggressive understanding of female anger/rage.
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effects and uses of the Uncle Tom’s Cabin archive, Berlant does not allow the
slave woman’s unsentimental negativity to complicate and challenge her analysis
of the archive.11 Cassy is not the only model of cruel, destructive resistance in
American culture overlooked in Berlant’s work. The only women who are given
the chance to address the nation in acts of “diva citizenship” in a pedagogical
attempt to persuade those in power to confront the ongoing injustices of racism
and sexism are those figures who desire to be “proper,” “moral” “women,” such
as Harriet Jacobs, Iola Leroy, and Anita Hill.12
Yet if women who reject upward mobility and the disciplinary effects of
sentimentality were to hijack the airwaves, they most likely would make different
demands (a rare example of such a moment is when convicted killer Eileen
Wornous rants against the court’s disregard for her personal history of rape and
abuse).13 Hortense Spiller’s discussion of Sapphire, the prostitute figure, is a

11

See Berlant, “Poor Eliza” (1998).

12

See Berlant, “The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Notes on Diva Citizenship”
(1997).
13

Berlant casts the moment in which her “divas” have the nation’s attention as desperately
pedagogical, describing Hill’s testimony before the Senate and the American people as “a scene
of teaching and an act of heroic pedagogy, in which the subordinated person feels compelled to
recognize the privileged ones, to believe in their capacity to learn and to change” (“The Queen of
America” 222). Yet the feminized figures of violence this project engages do not represent
moments of heroic pedagogy, but rather moments of sadistic instruction. As Gilles Deleuze
explains, the sadist is not interested in persuasion, but rather in demonstration: "The libertine may
put on an act of trying to convince and persuade . . . But the intention to convince is merely
apparent, for nothing is in fact more alien to the sadist than the wish to convince, to persuade, in
short to educate" (18). The sadist instructor stands in contrast to the masochist educator, not
needing the subject-object relation. Simply put, it’s all about her. She will ask for what she wants
but will not beg or plead or try to override differences in an effort to get her audience to relate to
her experience of suffering. How could an audience of middle class, white women, for example,
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case in point.14 Sapphire, “monstrous,” “castrating” and hence a “female subject
with the power to name,” a product of the “peculiar institution” that legally turned
blacks into not just bodies but flesh, cannot be a wife, mother, or woman. She is
inhuman, and as Spillers argues, rather than force Sapphire into the “ranks of
gendered femaleness,” we do well to heed Sapphire’s lesson of claiming that
monstrosity her culture blindly assigns to her and “rewrite[ing] after all a radically
different text for female empowerment,” one in stark contrast to the pedagogical
act of diva citizenship (229).
Whereas Spillers advocates a strategic embracing of the troubling
monstrosity assigned to black women as one of the few avenues of resistance
open to them in the aftermath of slavery and the destruction of the black family,
Berlant prefers a kind of reform in which black women can effect social change in
the process of becoming respectable liberal citizens. Given Berlant’s alignment of
Jacobs with Leroy and Hill, Jacobs, who also is a slave and therefore not a
woman, can be read as desiring the respectability of a “proper” woman rather
than directing that “monstrous,” inhuman energy against the very nation that
categorized her as such. Any aggressive dissent in Jacobs becomes silenced in
Berlant’s reading: Jacobs’ vexing sexual pleasure, as well as her redeployment
of culturally dominant modes of association and generic forms against her

identify with the “castrating,” “monstrous” Sapphire or Cassy, who certainly do not desire to pass
on Eva’s lesson of self sacrifice?
14

See Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book” (1987).
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“sympathetic,” abolitionist white readers and editor, are transformed in the
pedagogical register of the injured subject.
In my readings of nineteenth-century American texts, written by both
women and men, I will address what feminized sadistic figures, such as Cassy
and Sapphire, desire and how they expose and alter the structures of dominance
that define their existence. Such characters strategize within outmoded,
premodern (e.g. the convent and plantation) systems of punishment, shortcircuiting the interiorization of their lives defined by an emerging disciplinary
culture. 15 Accounting for dissenting figures who either actively reject the models
and identities, namely, marriage/motherhood, available to them in a dominant
culture saturated in sentimental masochism, or who cannot even aspire to belong
and participate in them (e.g. slaves like Jacobs), this project is not invested in
rescuing women from charges of violence, aggression, and cruelty as simply
justified responses to patriarchal violence and injustice. Rather than
perpetuating mainstream feminism’s implicit belief in the idea that women are
essentially nonviolent, this project, in contrast, engages feminized, “monstrous”
symbolic agents of violence more invested in pulling down the dominant
institutions, identities, and modes of association that condition their lives.16 I read
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For a critique of the calculating, more invasive cruelty of disciplinary models, specifically in
reference to the transition from slavery to the supposed “freedom” of African Americans in the
nineteenth century, see Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making
in Nineteenth-Century America. For the broader historical shift in modernity from punishment to
discipline, see Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977).
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acts of eroticized violence as instantiating other ways of being and other ways of
associating. Embodying sadistic intensity and aggression in opposition to the
disabling cruel affects of sentimental masochism, these figures offer glimpses,
however unsustained, of other possibilities and intimacies not tied to
romanticized notions of democratic community or heteronormative familial
models.17
So proceed with caution: these characters are not likable or sympathetic.
They often have no interest in conventional models of community. In fact, they
are straight-up nasty, finding criminal homosociality in infanticide (Maria Monk),
oppositional subjectivities in acts “so perverse” and “malicious” that the author
questions their humanity (Hawthorne’s Pearl), and strategies for survival that
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As Elizabeth Grosz points out, the moment a subject thinks she has escaped power, she is
actually within its grip. Grosz argues that, “Power is not the enemy of feminism but its ally. The
goal of feminism cannot simply involve the dismantling of power, or its equal distribution . . .
Feminists must aim at the reordering of power, not its elimination, that is, at the expedient use of
power and its infinite capacities for transformation and rewriting” (qtd. in Noble 10). Grosz’s
insistence that women get comfortable with power can be found in sex-positive feminism. For
instance, Gayle Rubin’s proud leather identity speaks to productive engagement with the relation
between sex and power. Rubin’s groundbreaking anthropological work on BDSM and fisting
communities among GLBT folk, as well as her defense of pornography against anti-porn feminists
has been an inspiring and influential model for my project. Rubin explores the socially and
politically transformative “reordering of power” played out in lesbian BDSM, for example.
17

This project articulates the important insights of historians John D’Emilio and Estelle B.
Freedman about sexuality in the U.S. In Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America
(1997) they argue, following Foucault’s “repressive hypothesis,” that “The history of American
sexuality is not one of progress from repression to liberation, ignorance to wisdom, or
enslavement to freedom” (xi). For them, “sexuality has been continually reshaped by the
changing nature of the economy, the family, and politics” (xi). Embodiments of feminized sadism
in antebellum America highlight and challenge our twenty-first century impoverished notions of
intimacy/pleasure and check our assumptions about the nation’s sexual past as one marked by
repression.
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often require keeping one’s indecisive sisters-in-the-struggle in line under the
threat of death (Cassy’s intimidation of Emmeline in Uncle Tom’s Cabin).
III.
In order to analyze the dialectical relation between the inherent violence in
the feminization of women and the sadistic acts it engenders, it might be a good
idea to start with that matrix of sentimental, masochistic self-abjection known as
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. In Stowe we are forced to confront the challenge of
theorizing sadism within the context of slavery. One possible objection to
following this course is that the subject is so obvious that it should not require
analysis: slavery was inherently cruel and sadistic. To be sure, my point is not to
radicalize Cassy’s actions. After all, Cassy is nothing but a product of a white
woman’s racist imagination. Stowe must create the cruel Cassy in order to justify
her evangelical crusade. The text would have us believe that Cassy ultimately
succumbs to sentimentality when reunited with her long-lost daughter, whose
evangelical moral example seemingly transforms the disaffected mother into a
loving mother.
In contrast to the reformist, reconciling function the text seems to dictate,
the reading that I am suggesting imagines Cassy as a necessary autonomous
figure constantly “thwarting” Stowe’s interests. If Eva draws readers’ attention to
her lesson of self sacrifice, offering a sense of community, allowing us to
participate as we cry for her, Cassy’s gothic narrative keeps sympathetic readers
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at arm’s length, daring us to try even to relate to the sexual and physical violence
she is subject to. Although Stowe may have written these gothic ruptures to
distance and thus “protect” readers from the violence of Legree’s plantation, the
figure of Cassy instead turns this protection for the delicate ears of white (mostly
female) readers into a warning, a “don’t you dare identify/colonize” moment of
textual distancing. The moments of terror are not so much enacted by Cassy in
the narrative but by those sympathetic readers who override important racial
differences in trying to relate to her struggle.18
Making Legree’s plantation a place of horrendous abuse and cruelty not
only allows Stowe an opportunity to imagine alternative sites like the Quaker
Settlement, but Legree’s plantation itself becomes an alternate site where fictive
possibilities and oppositional subjectivities can emerge. As such, I read
Legree’s plantation as what Michel Foucault calls a heterotopia, a space not to
be confused with a utopia, counter- or subculture.19 Heteropias are a “kind of
effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the real sites that can be
found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and
inverted” (Foucault 239). For Foucault, the ship, brothel, and convent are some
examples of heterotopias. These sites are often linked to “slices in time” as they
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In Gothic America: Narrative, History, and Nation (1997) Teresa Goddu reads the reality of
slavery in nineteenth-century American literature within a gothic framework. The horrors of
slavery are revealed through gothic conventions, constantly erupting and disrupting the national
narrative. Yet Goddu neutralizes Cassy’s violence by describing her as a minstrel figure.
19

See Foucault, “Of Other Spaces” (1984).
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“open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies”
(242). They function at full capacity when subjects break with traditional time
operating in dominant culture, presupposing “a system of opening and closing
that both isolates them and makes them penetrable” (243). Entry is either
compulsory or else the subject must submit to rites of initiation.
In Stowe’s novel, Legree’s plantation is a space not of “benevolent”
discipline (e.g. like St. Clare’s plantation), but rather a space of punishment.20 As
such, Legree’s plantation exists out of time, evoking an imminent historical shift
with punishment on its way out: “Legree, like some potentates we read of in
history, governed his plantation by a sort of resolution of forces” (Stowe 354). It
is precisely in this space of naked power that Cassy, immune to disciplinary
forms, can exploit the premodern, fantastic superstitions and fears that haunt
Legree and turn them against him.
If the heterotopic space of the plantation can figure as a space of
unspeakable inhumanity where slave women replicate white brutality in acts of
infanticide that horrified white readers, the convent, also a racialized site in the
American imaginary, represented a place of depravity where white femininity was
held in bondage and at the mercy of monsters posing as saints. What the
convent tale and the plantation novel share thematically is a fascination with an
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Richard Brodhead, drawing on Foucault, argues that modern forms of discipline "replace the
old disciplinary mode with new technologies—less visible but more pervasive, less 'cruel' but
more deeply controlling” (69). See “Sparing the Rod: Discipline and Fiction in Antebellum
America” (1988).
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imprisoned objectivized feminine sexuality whose violation brings forth the
embodiment of innocence in newborns that are yet again made to suffer either by
being sold away from the cruel eyes of the white mistress who searched for her
husband’s features in the face of every child, or in the infanticides that fill the
pages of both genres. Sympathy for beset femininity and its doomed offspring
turns into an outrage against institutions that limit the potential of what Lee
Edelman calls “reproductive futurity.” The horror perpetuated by these
institutions is that the brutalization of innocence in turn manifests itself in further
acts of brutality. Black and white figures are then caught in a perpetual cycle of
violence. The infanticide becomes the figure of potentiality-denied-innocence
whose spectral presence haunts the social dimension of American culture.
Centered on images of fetuses and children, the U.S national symbolic (dominant
institutions and practices) is erected around the spectral figure of the child whose
naiveté and purity are fetishized as objects to be enshrined and desired.21 Critics
like Edelman have recently argued that today’s dominant politics are ideologically
driven by reproductive futurism, a politics of perpetual deferred hope for
“tomorrow’s children,” which discourages political action in the present.22 Both

21

See Berlant, “The Theory of Infantile Citizenship,” and “America, ‘Fat,’ the Fetus” in The Queen
of America Goes to Washington City.
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See Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004). In his defense of the
unmarried, narcissistic pedophobe Scrooge, Edelman poses the following challenge to the GLBT
community: “Why not acknowledge our kinship at last with Scrooge who, unregenerate, refuses
the social imperative to grasp futurity in the form of the Child, for the sake of whom, as the token
of accession to Imaginary wholeness [which the subject can never accomplish], everything else in
the world, by force needed, must give way?” (49). Edelman refreshingly advocates the following
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feminists and queer theorists interested in dislodging the figure of the child from
the center of politics and articulating an adult-centered politics/sociality can find
in nineteenth-century American literature a rich, unsentimentalized archive of
“monstrous” feminized figures whose brutal acts of infanticide symbolically
destroy the oppressive social institutions articulated on behalf of that child. 23
The figure of the Child has been critiqued rightly as instantiating disabling
normative discourses deployed to regulate the already impoverished public lives
of adults in the U.S. Yet despite Berlant’s and Edelman’s convincing arguments,
does “the child” offer anything socially and politically strategic to an adultcentered politics? Although I argue against the dominant forms and logics of
infantile citizenship, in throwing out the proverbial baby with the bathwater, we
might miss the disruptive/dissenting energy associated with children’s selfish

imperative, and it is about time a queer theorist did so as many in our community opt for
heteronormativity, further marginalizing those who are already abjected: “Queers must respond to
the violent force of such constant provocations [of negativity, of pathology, and most importantly,
of death] not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order’s coherence and integrity, but
also by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which
they stand here anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck
the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the
waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with
small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop” (29).
23

To be sure, I am in no way endorsing infanticide. My reading of it engages its symbolic power
in an attempt to displace the sentimental, spectralized figure of the innocent child which
authorizes the social models that condition the lives of adults. Instances of infanticide in
antebellum literature are difficult, yet important textual moments to engage. The adult woman
does not die so that the infant may live: Cassy “mourned and cried over it [her act of infanticide],”
but she claims that, “it’s one of the few things that I’m glad of, now, I am not sorry to this day”
(Stowe 375). Sethe is not sent back to the Sweet Home plantation because her master,
Schoolteacher, believes her insane for killing her infant daughter. Later in the text, inspired by her
daughter Denver’s jealously of Beloved, Sethe taps into her own selfish energy in order to let her
guilt, and Beloved, be exorcised from the spiteful 124. In these instances, the dominant script of
the heroine dying at the end of the novel so that the child survives is undermined.
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petulancy. It is precisely this intrinsic “narcissism” that, if left unchecked, might
turn sweet, young girls into child-hating monsters who violently resist the
passage to maturity as defined by dominant culture. This project makes a case
for a latent, selfish immaturity ascribed to young girls and women in nineteenthcentury texts. While infantilization has obviously worked against women, as
patriarchy’s move to de-authorize female agency, the negative energy I identify in
these characters not only actively resists the gendering of proper femininity but
also limns the outlines of a different model of being. Hester Prynne’s obstinacy,
no doubt inspired by her daughter Pearl’s cruelty, Topsy’s intractable “racial
nature,” and Cassandra Morgeson’s oral-anal sadism, all set in motion and make
visible disciplinary models that operate through the double articulation of
infantilization and feminization, while at the same time producing an inassimilable
surplus over and against these dominant twin processes of female subjectivation.
Refusing the passage to adulthood by resisting proper models of being
and association, these characters are symptomatic of nineteenth-century
America’s preoccupation with the efficacy of dominant modes of relationality and
being that organized life and subjectivity, such as marriage and motherhood.
These characters embody an id-like selfishness that short-circuits self-sacrifice to
hetero-normative temporality. Their stubborn demeanors and sadistic acts are
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indicative of resistance to the passage to maturity defined by patriarchal
culture.24
Inhabiting an infantiziling form of social death, these characters are
promised civic maturity through gendering channels of social being and
belonging whose function is to organize and manage the whole of social life.
Read as figures always in need of sentimental reform, these characters overidentify with the negativity ascribed to them by patriarchy in a mad effort to
redefine social existence. Stripped of civic entitlement, such figures inhabit a
space of death, what Julia Stern describes as the crypt in which the socially dead
lie inadequately buried (2).25 Sentimental literature, predominately a feminized
genre, often expresses a deep sense of melancholia, an unfinished process of
grieving, over the unrealized rights and privileges that seemed so promising at
the onset of the democratic project. This process of unfinished mourning
manifests itself in instances of rage and violence that are revealed and veiled by
the heightened feelings and expressions of sentimentality. These sporadic
outbursts bear witness to the violence visited upon the socially dead (slaves,
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See Judith Halberstam on what she coins as “queer temporality” in In a Queer Time and Place:
Transgendered Bodies, Subcultural Lives (2005). Halberstam provides a useful critique of
hetero-temporality and dominant culture’s passage to maturity (marriage, parenthood, retirement,
when adults finally “begin” their lives, and death). However, Halberstam uncritically upholds
subcultures as sites of alternative temporalities and resistance. In contrast, my project is not
interested in glorifying counter- or subcultures as privileged sites of social belonging nor does it
claim that the sadistic feminized figures I consider belong to a sub-or counter-culture despite my
intimation that they make up a cruel sorority.
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See Stern, The Plight of Feeling: Sympathy and Dissent in the Early American Novel (1997).
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freed blacks, Native Americans, women, children, and the poor), showing that the
nation’s “sentimental topsoil” is constantly disturbed by its “gothic bedrock” (4).26
It is precisely in this negative space of death where noncitizens,
particularly the feminized characters that concern me, once bereft of the privilege
of entitlement and the symbolic models that prop up the social, and faced with
what Lacan calls “subjective destitution,” desperately hold onto the pathologized
symptom that identifies them, thus embodying a real threat both to themselves
and the social order. 27 The risk in this project is in finding disruptive potential in
an infantilized femininity without being trapped within that patriarchal articulation.
Yet the dangerous feminization of subjectivity with its attendant infantilization
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Similarly, Russ Castronovo traces civic death to the way that the nation’s founding democratic
principles are articulated as a discourse of death. See his Necro Citizenship (2001). However,
unlike Stern, Castronovo reads the desire for freedom as a kind of death wish. Patrick Henry’s
“liberty or death” is translated as “liberty and death” in the postrevolutionary settlement and thus
the purchase of liberty comes with a heavy price, one that turns citizens and noncitizens into
specters desiring but never achieving the state’s promise.
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The goal of psychoanalysis is to get the patient to achieve subjective destitution by traversing
the fantasy, that is, when the analysand realizes that her/his existence does not depend on
her/his symbolically identified mandate from the big Other. The danger of course is that
subjective destitution might lead to psychosis, so in order to protect her/himself against madness
and the void left after the total destruction of the symbolic universe, the patient holds onto her/his
symptom. Not yet prepared to renounce this pathological formation, the subject suffuses her/his
symptom with enjoyment, transforming symptom to sinthome and thus affording it existence, as
Zizek notes, “not only beyond its interpretation but even beyond fantasy.” For Zizek, “Symptom,
conceived as sinthome [a signifying formation penetrated with enjoyment], is literally our only
substance, the only positive support of our being, the only point that gives consistency to the
subject. In other words, symptom is the way we—the subjects—‘avoid madness,’ the way we
‘choose something (the symptom-formation) instead of nothing (radical psychotic autism, the
destruction of the symbolic universe)’ through the binding of our enjoyment to a certain signifying,
symbolic formation which assures a minimum of consistency to our being-in-the-world” (Sublime
Object 75).
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produces a surplus of enjoyment that could potentially allow for different
subjective formations, pleasures, and sociality.
While being mindful of the pervasiveness of reform in the nineteenth
century, this project makes a case for the ontological primacy of enjoyment as an
organizing principle of the social.28 That is, what brings the apparatus of reform
into being belongs to the realm of the Real but finds articulation in the imaginary,
in literature. That it takes on gothic forms in the texts I read speaks to
enjoyment’s destabilizing potential. By enjoyment, I mean what Lacanian theory
refers to as jouissance, the traumatic trace of existence, what remains after
castration (language acquisition). This slippery, substantial surplus, always
exceeding language’s grasp, frustrates and mobilizes discursive systems that
attempt to come to terms with the existence of this substance. It is important to
note that in and of itself, enjoyment is not subversive or transformative. Rather it
insists on its dumb existence. The symptoms of enjoyment that register in the
texts that make up this project exceed the aims of reform without wholly
subsuming enjoyment’s disruptive potential. Enjoyment exceeds the limits of
discourse, also belonging to the subject’s lived experience in all her density.29 In
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For a discussion of jouissance, see Slavoj Zizek’s The Plague of Fantasies.

As Zizek argues, “Jouissance is thus the ‘place’ of the subject—one is tempted to say: his
‘impossible’ Being-there, Da-Sein; and, for that very reason, the subject is always-already
displaced, out-of-joint, with regard to it. Therein lies the primordial ‘decentrement’ of the Lacanian
subject: much more radical and elementary than the decentrement of the subject with regard to
the ‘big Other,’ the symbolic order which is the external place of the subject’s truth, is the
decentrement with regard to the traumatic Thing-jouissance which the subject can never
‘subjectivize,’ assume, integrate. Jouissance is that notorious heimliche which is simultaneously
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the chapters that follow, I make a case for the transformative possibilities for
imagining the social open to the subject when she over-identifies with that which
dominant culture tells her she ought to reject, suppress, or channel into socially
acceptable forms.
If trauma exceeds the limits of the Symbolic Order (i.e. the social), how,
one might ask, can one found a sustainable alternative sociality to one
predicated on suppression and normative socialization? We might look to the
work of Lynda Hart and Laura Kipnis as a way to begin to answer this question. I
am indebted to Lynda Hart and Laura Kipnis who argue forcefully for both the risk
and transformative potential of over-identifying with those affects and acts that
dominant culture deems “wrong,” “violent,” and “unhealthy,” from S/M (Hart) to
adultery (Kipnis).30 For both critics, a more just, radical sociality can result from
seemingly antisocial behavior. Kipnis describes art’s potential, in the fantasies
put forth in literature, film, and paintings, for instance, to disrupt psychic
structures and therefore alter social structures:
If selves are constituted through networks of institutional, symbolic,
and material everyday practices, then given the homologies
between psychic and social structures, sufficiently disrupting the
the most unheimliche, always-already here and, precisely as such, always-already lost” (Plague
49).
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See Hart, Between the Body and the Flesh: Performing Sadomasochism and Kipnis, Against
Love: A Polemic. For an analysis of the intimacies that come out of addressing and replaying
trauma in safe spaces like the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival, see also Anne Cvetkovich’s
Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures. In keeping with Hart and
Kipnis’ strategy of finding transformative potential in “bad” behavior, Cvetkovich makes a case for
reading both lesbianism and S/M as brilliant solutions to, rather than pathological results of,
rape/incest.
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first, must, in some corresponding way, rattle the latter . . .at the
very least, shaking things up emblematizes the possibilities of
subjective dissidence from symbolic law. (30-1)

In other words, if we challenge and change the fantasy that props up the social,
then we might change the social. For Kipnis, adultery becomes a metaphor for
breaking with the monogamous couple form and re-inventing how a diverse
spectrum of intimacies might look in a world not structured around the
conventional, privatized institution of marriage and family, which serves to
organize bodies and property, often in disabling ways. In this spirit, the texts that
I engage offer up different fantasies, however unsustained and sometimes at
odds with the main line of the story, that challenge both antebellum and
contemporary America’s dominant (and mostly unjust) models for being and
belonging.
Often nonstandard intimacies and families of choice are formed out of
trauma. Given the violence that is at the center of disciplinary institutions like the
family, it is not surprising that many folks do not move through such spaces
without experiencing some form of trauma, whether it is the violence of proper
gendering or more extreme forms like rape/incest. Hart then finds in what often
gets read as pathological behavior like S/M self-empowerment and new forms of
sociality for survivors of trauma. Reading Dorothy Allison’s Bastard Out of
Carolina, Hart argues that the survivor of can reclaim her body, experience
pleasure, and create an empowering sociality by replaying the trauma through
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S/M, which de-dramatizes the violence, and changes the meaning that defines
the act and its power dynamic. Drawing on the language of psychoanalysis, Hart
encourages one to “traverse the fantasy” by over-identifying with the symptom
(here sadism and/or masochism), and resignifying the trauma through repetition.
This requires abandoning one’s prostheses (that prop up the Symbolic and keep
one from changing one’s life), and embracing the free fall into what Hart
describes as the “abyss” (200). Then the social can be reimagined from the
ground up.
I find that Hart’s challenge to confront trauma by over-identifying with what
dominant culture reads as pathological, and Kipnis’ challenge to embrace the
“negative” tendencies women are supposed to reject, from narcissism (instead of
self-hatred), selfishness (instead of self-sacrifice), and cruelty (instead of the
desire to be well-regarded) are reverberated in the feminized figures at the center
of this project. These characters move through institutions (albeit experiencing
violence in varying degrees) from the conventional family to marriage to slavery.
What Hart identifies as personal trauma, Stern locates in a broader historical
sense: the failure of the revolution to deliver on its promises. Whereas for her
and critics like Russ Castronovo, subjects remain arrested in states of grief and
civic death, I find in the nation’s gothic bedrock, as represented by fatal figures, a
social radicality and aggressive rejection of the institutions that render subjects
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civically and socially dead and locked in grief and despair over the unfulfilled
promises of the revolution.
The cataclysmic acts that define the texts in this project are encrypted in
gothic conventions. The texts are either vehicles of social reform texts (Awful
Disclosures and Uncle Tom’s Cabin) or flirt with conventions of reform (The
House of Seven Gables and The Morgesons).31 None are gothic novels proper,
yet given that the gothic genre, since the eighteenth century, has signified
excess, transgression, and monstrosity, it is fitting that the terroristic acts and
social radicality that I find in these texts would erupt in gothic conventions.32 The
myths we tell ourselves and accept as “natural” are often reproduced in literature
and contested in gothic fiction; for instance, myths about gender identity that are
used to justify the oppression of women are disrupted in these texts through
gothic conventions that extravagantly reimagine the limits of literature, the social
and history.
Embodying an apocalyptic energy and granting themselves the power
over life and death (usually patriarchy’s providence), these feminized figures
have no desire to aspire to proper white femininity through marriage/motherhood.
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For a study of how the gothic becomes a way for Americans to comprehend and articulate
historical trauma, specifically slavery, see Theresa Goddu, Gothic America: Narrative, History,
and Nation. For Goddu, gothic conventions have a historical referent in New World slavery.
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For an introductory study of the gothic genre, both American and European, see Fred Botting,
Gothic, and for a discussion of monstrous women in the eighteenth century (the predecessors of
my feminized figures) that draws on gothic conventions and sensibility, see Adriana Craciun’s
Fatal Women of Romanticism. I am indebted to Craciun for encouraging my interest in these
dangerous figures and the transformative potential they embody.
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They become monstrous in the process. Because this project centers on fiction
by (though not always) and about what the dominant culture reads a feminized
figures, the gothic, much like its more respectable cousin the social reform novel,
becomes a perfect vehicle for both unleashing and then containing female
(sexual) monstrosity (as we see in the sexually omnivorous and socially
imaginative character Lucy in Bram Stoker’s Dracula).33 It would seem that given
such a dynamic, the law requires transgression as its supplement, both feeding
off of one another in a perpetual loop of containment and subversion. However,
rather than perpetuate the cat-and-mouse logic of containment/subversion, I find
a stronger intervention in figures who over-identify with their symptom of
enjoyment, enacting in the process an eclipse of self and world that holds the
potential for bringing into being realities not yet imagined. I find in them a radical
sociality at odds with emerging disciplinary institutions that impoverish public life.
These moments are encrypted in gothic conventions that, in keeping with the
genre, temporally dislocate us (evoking the Old World and its culture of
punishment, at odds with emerging disciplinary culture), giving us alternatives to
dominant institutions.
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Unable to choose one husband from three promising suitors, Lucy asks Mina why a woman
must only choose one husband (111). Lucy gets her wish when all three suitors give her blood
transfusions to keep her alive after she is “bitten” by Dracula. Here we have a fantastic moment
as Dracula and the suitors all exchange their fluids in Lucy. In order to stay alive, Lucy needs all
of the suitors that she can get. One simply will not do. A more chaste version of this dynamic we
find in The House of Seven Gables on when Alice Pyncheon spends the night with Matthew
Maule (her master) and his new bride.
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The content and form of the project’s texts are in keeping with one
another: both embody a flamboyant, over-the-top “aesthetic of the extreme,” to
use Lauren Berlant’s term (Introduction to Intimacy 5). The eroticized acts I
analyze, grounded in negativity (violence), allow for incipient forms of contact.
Berlant terms these unconventional intimacies not sanctioned by dominant
institutions “minor intimacies,” arguing that
desires for intimacy that bypass the couple or the life narratives it
generates have no alternative plots. Let alone few laws and stable
spaces in culture in which to clarify and to cultivate them. What
happens to . . .the glances, gestures, encounters, collaborations,
or fantasies that have no canon? As with minor literatures, minor
intimacies have been forced to develop aesthetics of the extreme to
push these spaces into being by way of small and grand gestures.
(5)
The over-the-top acts of aggression that inform the texts represent Berlant’s
“aesthetics of the extreme,” which bring minor intimacies into being. Nonstandard intimacies become occasions for rethinking the social beyond the
predictable conventions most antebellum fiction give us. Many of the texts that
this project engages are written in a jagged, abrupt style, like Maria Monk’s Awful
Disclosures and Elizabeth Stoddard’s The Morgesons, a style best suited to
convey non-standard intimacies and pleasures not easily articulated.
As with the expression of minor intimacies, minor characters often embody
an extreme, over-the-top intensity. In my Hawthorne chapter, I read his infamous
“daughters,” the marginal characters Pearl and Alice Pyncheon, as the figures
that he takes the most risks with. In my chapter on Uncle Tom’s Cabin, I read
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Stowe as taking the most risks with the marginal Cassy (as I discussed earlier).
The transformative potential in these texts is found in their secondary and tertiary
characters that act the most aggressively and refuse to compromise in their
vision.34 These characters often go unnoticed. The minor character, unlike the
more three-dimensional protagonist, contains a single-minded intensity in her
flatness. These writers take less risks with their protagonists, who are more
“complex and “ambivalent,” often tortured by their own moral stasis and
unwillingness or inability to act. For instance, Tom, a product of discipline,
submits to his “benevolent” master but Cassy scares Legree to death and burns
down the plantation.
As I read The Scarlet Letter, The House of Seven Gables, and Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, I was taken with the minor characters and found that I did not have
to read “marginal” antebellum texts to find moments of subversion. I found in
canonical works such as these a radicality embodied in the minor characters at
odds with the sometimes reformist (Stowe) and always compromising
(Hawthorne) main line of the texts. Inspired by Tom Stoppard, I read these
classic texts against the grain through their minor characters, turning the
narratives inside out by focusing on the text’s almost “hidden” transformative
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On the importance of minor characters in the nineteenth-century novel, see Alex Woloch, The
One VS. The Many: Minor Character and the Space of the Protagonist in the Novel. Although
often dismissed by literary theory, Woloch seeks to redefine literary characterization in terms of a
“distributional matrix,” “how the discrete representation of any specific individual is intertwined
with the narrative’s continual apportioning of attention to different characters who jostle for limited
space within the same fictive universe” (14).
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vision often overlooked by critics. Sometimes they become completely different
stories than the ones critics have been telling about the novels, as in the ways in
which Cassy gives us a radical vision at odds with Stowe’s brand of sentimental
reform—when read through Cassy, Uncle Tom’s Cabin becomes a different
book.
As my analysis of minor characters attests to, my main critical strategy in
this project is close reading; the claims that I make about the social radicality of
these antebellum texts is found in the novels themselves. Although I use
contemporary queer theory as a way to enrich my analysis of the fiction, I am in
no ways forcing queer theory onto the texts. All of the evidence is found in the
texts themselves. That these textual examples resonate with queer theory only
speaks to how close we are to antebellum America: what we desire, imagine,
hope for, the ways in which we want to see our world remade. Our historical
moments rub up against one another. This kind of “temporal drag,” this historical
“touching” are phrases that queer theorists like Elizabeth Freeman and Carolyn
Dinshaw (respectively) have come up with for theorizing the ways in which our
desires as queers in contemporary America speak to the desires of those queers
in centuries past, for Freeman, nineteenth-century America, and for Dinshaw,
Medieval England.35 In some ways, the antebellum figures that I engage can be
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See Freeman, “Packing History, Count(er)ing Generations,” Dinshaw, Getting Medieval, Karma
Lochrie Heterosyncrasies: Female Sexuality When Normal Wasn’t (another queer study of the
Middle Ages), and Christopher Nealon, Foundings: Lesbian and Gay Historical Emotion Before
Stonewall. See the 2009 issue of ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance edited by
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called what Christopher Nealon terms “foundlings,” a term for “queer disaffiliation
from and desire for family, nation, and history” (2). Rejecting and often times
working to destroy the dominant institutions that impoverish their lives, the figures
I center this project around represent a yearning for other ways of being and
belonging not structured around conventional notions of family and nation. That
their desires speak to ours connects us affectively and historically to antebellum
America. To use Joan Copjec’s phrase, “historicity must not be ceded to
historists” (X).36 For Copjec, the “official” historical archive does not account for
enjoyment. Foreclosed from the symbolic register, enjoyment manifests itself in
symptoms (i.e. the minor characters I read), symptoms emplotted in gothic
conventions that figure as “alien, anachronistic figures, specters from the past
and harbingers of the future” (ix). The gothic becomes a vehicle for the
articulation and legibility of these symptoms of enjoyment.
What follows is a brief summary of each chapters. I read both canonical
and non-canonical texts written by both men and women, although the texts that
Christopher Castiglia and Christopher Looby, dedicated to new work on sexuality studies and
nineteenth-century America.
36

Copjec argues, “For the incomplete—and permanently so—accessibility of any moment to
itself, its partial absence from itself, forbids historicism’s motivating premise: that the past must be
understood in its own terms. This is a simple impossibility: no historical moment can be
comprehended in its own terms; the circuit of self-recognition or coincidence with itself which
would enable such comprehension is deflected by an investment that cannot be recuperated for
self-knowledge. This impossibility causes each historical moment to flood with alien,
anachronistic figures, specters from the past and harbingers of the future. Historicity is what
issues from this inevitable and constitutive misapprehension of ourselves—from what Freud
would call the latency must not be positivized, as though something lay dormant but already
formed in the past, and simply waited to emerge at some future time; this would indeed be a
continuist notion. Instead, latency designates our inaccessibility to ourselves” (ix). See Copjec’s
Introduction to Supposing the Subject.
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fall in the latter category like Awful Disclosures and The Morgesons are being
taught and written about with more regularity now than they were a decade ago. I
read each in chronological order of publication, finding the most imaginative
potential and fantastic social visions in the earlier texts. However, as the century
progresses, we witness the worldview and horizon of possibilities becoming
foreclosed.37
IV.
Engaging its exuberant fantasies, Chapter Two, “Bad Habits,” reads Maria
Monk’s convent tale Awful Disclosures: of the Hotel Dieu Nunnery (1836) within
the context of antebellum, anti-Catholic literature that pulled double duty as both
sentimental reform and pornography, what David Reynolds describes as “dark
reform.” Drawing on the conventions of sentimental literature, convent tales
often required audiences to sympathize with the plight of the helpless nun at the
hands of her cruel Catholic captors. However, having once "escaped" from such
an awful place, Monk returns to the convent only to "escape" and return again,
thus setting up a cyclic narrative pattern. This chapter will engage Monk’s
penchant for repetition made manifest in her desire to return to the scene of
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Ann Douglas argues that the drive to re-imagine the socio-political context that informs Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, for example, is not present in Stowe’s later novels. The lack of change in dominant
culture, specifically its ongoing unjust treatment of women, turned Stowe “bitter” (Douglas 244).
The “little girl” whose work surpassed that of her minister father (Lyman Beecher) and brother
(Henry Ward Beecher) abandons her ethical work to write novels that center on “the scene of
man abject under feminine rule” (244). Her horizon of possibilities narrows as her characters
become solely concerned with domestic tyranny rather than effecting change on a large scale.
See The Feminization of American Culture.
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debasement. Querying why, if dominant antebellum culture is a space saturated
with sentimental self-abasement, as Noble has argued, Monk would need to
return to the convent in order to experience the pleasures of abjection, this
chapter explores the darker side of sympathy for the captive nun. With its
endless catalogue of punishments and the clear absence of moral judgment,
Awful Disclosures is at odds with the sentimental strain in most reform literature.
Throughout the narrative, Monk refuses to play the victim's role, relishing
instead her position as the agent of punishment, thereby thwarting the logic and
language of sentimental reform, which tends to rely on the reader's sympathy
with the abject. Rejecting the affective trope of persuasion for the task of
describing, in a sexually charged way, the vicious and violent behavior of women
in the convent, Monk's Sadean world exposes in its over-the-top theatricality the
power dynamic that renders the "angel in the house" at the negative pole in the
spectrum of power.
I then argue that it is not abjection that Monk desires but the expression of
sadistic rage. Monk’s narrative tells a queer story of possible homosociality
grounded in infanticide. In repeated acts of sadistic cruelty, Awful Disclosures
chokes the life out of the angelic child whose often-martyred death binds the
community of sentimental mourners. Monk’s sorority is predicated on deaths that
reveal the violence at the heart of the sentimental tradition. Rejecting both
marriage and motherhood, she is able to find a homosocial community in the
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convent where discipline is laid bare as cruel punishment, a system and logic in
which she can exercise agency. I read this narrative of convent life as a
heterotopic discursive space where same-sex bonds are established through
eroticized acts of rage and aggression that are encrypted in gothic conventions.
More than just anti-Catholic propaganda, Awful Disclosures creates a fantastic
space where agency is re-imagined.
Chapter Three, “Hawthorne’s Unwanted ‘Daughters,’” reads the
characters of Pearl in The Scarlet Letter (1851) and Alice Pyncheon in The
House of Seven Gables (1853) as progenies who cannot or will not fit within an
idealized version of domestic familial “bliss.” Literary analysis has not paid much
attention to young girls in antebellum texts, yet as discussed earlier, the
petulancy these characters embody offers an elementary critique of a sanitized
sociality, thereby forcing us to rethink the forms and logics that chart the passage
to adulthood for U.S. women. Both embody a narcissistic selfishness that
feminists and queer theorists should not disregard in their critique of the figure of
the Child. In some respects, Pearl emerges as a better feminist model than
Hester does. For example, Hawthorne describes Pearl’s violence (e.g. throwing
stones at boys who shame Hester) as “so perverse” and “malicious” that he
questions her humanity. Refusing to internalize abjection in her active defense of
her mother, Pearl “laugh[s] anew . . . like a thing incapable and unintelligent of
human sorrow” (91). When Hester mourns her loss of community, Pearl
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“frown[s], clench[es] her fists, and harden[s] her small features into a stern,
unsympathizing look of discontent,” as if intuiting her mother’s pathetic desire to
belong to a community that will not accept her. Pearl’s sadistic, instructive
resistance to Hester’s mournful tears thereby checks the desire to subscribe to
the infantilizing lure of national belonging and the empty promises of heteroconventionality.
If Pearl represents an almost savage anomaly, Alice Pyncheon, in
contrast, seems like an obedient, dutiful daughter. Resisting her impending
marriage arranged by her father to a European nobleman, Alice “falls” under the
spell of her father’s enemy, Matthew Maule, allowing herself not to be used as a
pawn in her father’s plan to marry her off in exchange for the symbolic capital of
nobility. An active agent in her own seduction, Alice takes herself out of the
triangulated traffic in women that leaves her with very few options.38 Sabotaging
reproductive futurism, she avoids the forms, logics, and pleasures of patriarchal
culture, opting instead to stay within the heterotopic space of the ancient
Pyncheon house.39 Along with Hepzibah and Clifford, Alice short-circuits the
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For a comprehensive analysis, from Levi-Strauss to Lacan, of the ways in which men have
traded women as token of exchange through dominant institutions to solidify patriarchal power,
see Gayle Rubin’s “Traffic in Women.” For an analysis of the homosocial bonds between men
often routed through a nonsexual relationship with a woman, see Eve Sedgwick’s Between Men:
English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire.
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Christopher Castiglia reads the Pyncheon family garden (where Alice’s erotically-charged
posies grow) in a similar vein. With its “lawless plants,” the garden is in a liminal space in nature
for deviants, queers, and nonconformists outside the home but not in the public sphere. See
Interior States: Institutional Consciousness and the Inner life of Democracy in the Antebellum
United States (2008).
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passage to “proper” adulthood as defined by her father. Yet, her relationship with
Maule comes to an end when he succumbs to the pressures of heteronormativity
and marries.40 Their farewell, however, bares traces of an alternative to the
heterosexual couple form. In a striking scene, Maule and his new bride spend
their wedding night with Alice, yet the possibility of another way of associating is
foreclosed when Alice dies the next morning. However, her spirit lingers
indefinitely in the Pyncheon house until Holgrave and Phoebe marry, bringing
about the spirit’s final exorcism.
In Chapter Four I read the logic of sentimental romance against itself in
Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) by foregrounding one of Stowe‘s minor characters, the
slave woman Cassy. The unsympathetic and murderous Cassy has been
overlooked in readings of the novel, not allowing Stowe’s fantasy of a slave
woman to work against the author’s predominant interpellative, sympathetic logic.
Yet Cassy, though marginal, is a magnet of intensive energy. Reading the novel
through Cassy turns the text inside out; it is no longer the Christ-like Tom at the
center of the story (who is already reformed) but rather the terrifying and
electrifying Cassy (she violently resists Stowe’s brand of disciplinary intimacy and
40

Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner inaugurate the term heteronormativty in their seminal
queer theory essay, “Sex in Public” (1998). They define heteronormativity as “the institutions,
structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only
coherent—that is, organized as a sexuality—but also privileged. Its coherence is always
provisional, and its privilege can take several (sometimes contradictory forms) forms: unmarked,
as the basic idiom of the personal and the social: or marked as a natural state; or projected as an
ideal or moral accomplishment . . . Contexts that have little visible relation to sex practice, such
as life narrative and generational identity, can be heternormative in this sense, while in other
contexts forms of sex between men and women might not be heteronormative.
Heteronormativity is thus a concept distinct from heterosexuality” (312).
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even at he novel’s end is not fully “reformed” like Tom). No wonder critics who
are not quite sure what to do with her reduce her to a minstrel figure. If
contemporary critics can domesticate Stowe’s novel by ignoring the sadistic
Cassy, we do well to turn our attention to a contemporary rewriting of Uncle
Tom’s Cabin from Cassy’s perspective. Only then might we come to terms with
the text’s truly transformative potential.
Chapter Five, “There’s No Place Like Home?,” reads Elizabeth Stoddard’s
recently discovered novel The Morgesons (1862). Cassandra Morgeson, an
older version of Pearl, is incredibly self-centered. She selfishly refuses the empty
conventionality that posits equality as the healthy norm of human relations.
Unless she is on top, Cassandra won’t play. Anticipating Virginia Woolf’s edict
that women must choke the life out of “the angel in the house” (their mothers),
Cassandra dis-identifies with her passive mother and overly identifies with her
father’s phallic power. Sometimes enabling models are found in unlikely places:
in this case, in patriarchy. As an embodiment of a Nietzschean “will to power,”
Cassandra represents a murderous energy that allows her to experience erotic
pleasure when her romantic love interests are symbolically castrated or killed off.
Her sadistic acts return the erotic to the body in a familial setting that seeks to
disembody sexuality. In other words, strategizing within a position of limited
privilege, Cassandra’s actions remain within the domestic. Her sadistic cruelty
has none of the metaphysical overtones one finds in Hawthorne’s Alice or the
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more sensationally aggrandized acts of Maria Monk. Rather than strike out on
her own and embrace the free fall of a life outside of the very institutions that she
has spent her childhood violently defining herself against, Cassandra ultimately
compromises. Turning her back on pleasure and invention, Cassy settles for the
security of heteronormativity by owning her father’s house and marrying the man
of her choice.
V.
As I argue in my last chapter, most critics of The Morgesons remain
content telling the story of conventional models of self-determination for women,
mainly marriage, property acquisition, and divorce. These are the most often
engaged examples of female empowerment in antebellum America. However, as
this Introduction has made clear, these texts trouble the fantasy of an expansive
notion of American democracy. The figures I analyze here are not interested in
reform but in transformative change. Reform an institution like marriage, an
institution that by its very definition must exclud many to privilege some? No.
Taking a lead from the characters this study engages, I am not interested in a
narrow definition of justice. This project gives rise to the following questions:
What does it mean to reimagine the social, and reject the institutions that govern
our lives? Fly in the face of the dominant script of maturity? Refuse assimilation?
In order to embrace the free fall required when one chooses to live without the
prosthetics of conventionality, in order to truly embrace one’s freedom without
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compromise, one must be fearless, and risk being dismissed as crazy, immature,
rude, extravagant, self-destructive, and selfish. That the characters in this study
most likely embody what is often read as negative behavior is no surprise; these
figures are seen as antisocial only because they break with the heteronormative
logic that informs the Symbolic Order.
Short-circuiting the fantasy that props up the Symbolic Order entails a
symbolic suicidal gesture that can be transformative, as Hart reads the survivor’s
over-identification with the trauma via S/M.41 By this I mean a self-annihilating act
that suspends the subject’s relation to the social fictions that animate her being in
society. Well-schooled in existentialist philosophy, queer writer James Baldwin
understood that in order to build something new, one often has to free oneself
from the weight of history, short circuit tradition, and strike out in a new direction.
For Baldwin, Richard Wright was unproductively caught up in a symbolic agon
with the great white mother, Harriet Beecher Stowe. In contrast, Baldwin refused
to get caught up in a bad argument, one that would lead to the resignifying of old
categories and the assimilationist logic of the American dream. This, according
to Baldwin, called for an act of freedom grounded in the subject, equally
liberating and terrifying:
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Not to be confused with Japhet Colbones’s suicide, which works more like a plea for
acceptance after his death. The true act, in psychoanalytic terms, changes the coordinates of the
Symbolic Order that prop up the fiction of the self. That is why it is the subject who traverses the
fantasy, not the self, who, in contrast, needs all kinds of social prostheses to maintain her place in
the social.
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From this void—ourselves—it is the function of society to protect
us; but it is only this void, our unknown selves, demanding forever,
a new act of creation, which can save us. (Baldwin 21)

Baldwin finds among his contemporaries an unproductive engagement with the
past. Specifically, he identifies in Wright’s response to Stowe not enough
distance from the racial politics of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Wright, according to
Baldwin, remains caught in a tragic conflict where his heroes remain victims of
the racist legacy his society inherited from the antebellum past. The persistence
of this conflict is symptomatic of a fear of the dissolution of the bonds and
institutions that make up modern society. Society, Baldwin reminds us, “is held
together by our need; we bind it together with legend, myth, coercion, fearing that
without it we will be hurled into the void, within which, like the earth before the
Word was spoken, the foundations of society are hidden” (21). Baldwin’s void is
Hart’s abyss; both require courage and invention. Baldwin bravely calls for a
break with the historic cycle that reproduces the categories, bonds, and
institutions that regulate our lives. His romantic language inaugurates an
ontogenetic call for people to draw on that “unknown” part of themselves, that
eternal reservoir of creative potential, and fashion for themselves a new world.
While I understand the desire to break with the past, this project predates
the provenance of his transformative vision to mid-nineteenth-century America,
when authors like Maria Monk, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Harriet Beecher Stowe,
Elizabeth Stoddard, and the anonymous author of The Knickerbocker story
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expressed a similar faith in the transformative potential that constitutes the void
that is the subject. From Maria Monk to Cassandra Morgeson, this project traces
the persistence of that drive for new acts of creation that have the power to save
us. The figures I analyze in this study compellingly submit to the vertigo of the
free fall, not fearing the lure of a void with no script, “legend” or “myth” to teach
them how to live in the world— one and all, dazzling examples of dizzying
inventiveness to the end.

CHAPTER TWO
BAD HABITS

Emerging from an abyss, and re-entering
it—that is life.
Emily Dickinson, from Letter 1024
I.
Maria Monk’s 1836 convent tale, Awful Disclosures of the Hotel Dieu
Nunnery in Montreal, is American anti-Catholic literature at its most fabulous,
giving us a catalog (one that might make even Sade blush) of beatings,
whippings, same sex acts, infanticide, grueling religious exercises, over-the-top
displays of devotion, and sororal pranks that exceeds the aims of anti-catholic
reform literature.42 If Monk’s tale recalls passages from Sade’s aristocratic
excesses, it also resonates with contemporary readers familiar with the writings
on S/M subcultures by of Pat(rick) Califia, Gayle Rubin, Geoff Maines, and
Dorothy Allison, all of whom emphasize the ways in which S/M empowers and
even saved their lives. Monk describes many acts that would not be considered,
at least by these contemporary S/M practitioners and theorists, as awful. In its
days, Awful Disclosures performed this kind of temporal dislocation. It linked
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Given that the authorship of this book is questionable, references to Monk in this essay will
signify the persona in the book, not the author, unless otherwise noted.
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well-to-do Protestants with old world, outmoded institutions and beliefs, and
energized a nativist, working-class base which found itself politically and
economically disenfranchised.43
While anti-Catholic literature served many functions, we know that it was
certainly not intended to serve as sex-positive writing. Such exposes were
crafted, often by male ghostwriters, in order to further prop up white patriarchal
Protestant power in the U.S. Critics like Jenny Franchot and Susan Griffin have
argued that convent tales were circulated in order to police young Protestant
women and cleanse the new nation of racial and class difference and anxiety.
The chief cultural and political work of convent tales was to demonize
Catholicism as a religion of European excess and perversion, with convents
figuring as dens of depravity used to not only lure young Protestant girls away
from the influence of domesticity and family, but also to undermine women’s
prominent positions in Protestantism. Griffin argues, "The escaped nun's tale
awfully discloses not only priests' plots and women's prisons, but also the
fundamental weakness of the female self on which the future of American
Protestantism rests,” for the genre worked to undermine the feminization of
American religion (Griffin 1). At the moment where American women were
exercising power and influence over Protestantism, the escaped nun’s narrative
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called the testimony of religious women into doubt by demonstrating that women
should not be trusted with religious choice or authority, and that independent
testimony from women could not stand on its own as proof (Griffin 10).
These narratives aimed to portray women overcome by emotions and
seduced (spiritually and sexually) by Catholicism. Therefore, their testimony
could not be trusted. The escaped nun might beg for forgiveness for what she
was forced to do in the convent, as Monk does, but because she is now a fallen
woman, the power of her testimony is only good as evidence, as Griffin shows,
“evidence that incriminates herself and her sex” (Griffin 10). In Griffin's analysis
of the convent tale, the ruined nun, much like her story, is a pawn in a
triangulated power dynamic between Protestants and Catholics. Griffin disavows
female agency by arguing that the convent tale is used by Protestant patriarchs
to denounce Catholics and police women: hence the text figuring as both
evidence of Catholic corruption, and pornographic trash. Griffin’s argument
short-circuits the more complex fictive and imaginative possibilities inherent in
the construction of such lurid fantasies.
Where as Griffin’s reading of convent tales remains within the narrative of
containment (women as pawns/victims who could not be trusted), Franchot
argues that although these texts were intended to fan the flames of xenophobia
and class resentment, they also proved a powerful device for offering alternative
historical accounts from marginalized voices (women) who through victim’s
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testimony supplanted “the protective and stratified structures of class, religious,
and ethnic antagonisms with a rhetoric of undifferentiated anxiety—indiscriminate
in diagnosis, negligent of boundary, resistant to closure” (154).44 Focusing
mainly on Rebecca Reed’s Six Months in a Convent (1835), which is not at all
pornographic like Monk’s tale, Franchot claims that the escaped nun also
challenges the sentimental conventions laid out in novels like Charlotte Temple,
arguing “she [the escaped nun] violates the sentimental literary conventions of
female victimization (chief among which, if we are to believe Charlotte Temple, is
that one should die rather than speak), by writing an expose that, while claiming
her own continuing need for ‘retirement’ from the world, promptly invades and
manipulates the public arena of the courtroom” (147).45
In keeping with Franchot’s reading of the convent tale as a disruptive form,
my intervention complicates the model of sympathetic reader-identification with
the female victims of Catholic violence; instead, the almost palpable (sadistic)
enjoyment animating these texts betrays a perverse strain in antebellum
American fiction completely at odds with the much-discussed figures of
44

Although she does argue that the genre gave women a voice, Franchot’s chapter on the
convent tale is chiefly concerned with the ways in which Catholicism served as a scapegoat for
class tensions between Scots-Presbyterian bricklayers and the Protestant, largely Unitarian elite,
and how such tensions manifested themselves in the burning of Boston’s Ursuline convent in
1834 (where many daughters of the Protestant elite received an aristocratic French education).
Franchot argues that, “to the working-class mob of Scots-Presbyterians, Catholics and Unitarians
had formed an upper-class combination against Congregationalism” (138). Americans who
feared that Jacksonian democracy could not prevent “mobocracy” and encourage self-discipline
in the American male saw “the nun and the American worker as joint figures of unrest” (140).
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of being the riot leaders of the Ursuline convent attack. All of the men were acquitted (140).
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sentimentality. If we only read convent tales as female reform and as narratives
of victimization, in other words as social texts, we miss engaging them as literary
artifacts, which aside from their social function, thrilled readers with spectacular
accounts of perverse sex acts, disregard of proper gender and sexual identity,
and rejection of conventional kinship models and property relations, in other
words, as imaginative constructs that redefine the coordinates of people’s
everyday lives. Literary critics who read the convent tale as serving only the
negative purpose of scaring women into marriage/motherhood, inciting class
antagonisms, infecting Protestant America with racial difference, and stunting
democracy, overlook the fantastic social fantasies the genre also embodies,
fantasies that make a mess of antebellum America’s dominant life narrative of
marriage and parenthood (with purpose of maintaining national, racial, and class
sameness).
For instance, I read the acts of infanticide described by Monk not solely as
anti-Catholic propaganda, but rather as a symbolic rejection of everything
oppressive to women in antebellum America, representing freedom from the
necessity to generate issue for the transmission of property and the perpetuation
of Protestant values. In contrast, Monk’s narrative tells a story of homosociality
grounded in infanticide: the rite of initiation in the convent and simultaneously the
covenant that makes the nuns members of a sorority. What could be crueler
than killing an infant? What could be a greater rejection of domesticity and
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motherhood in a culture saturated with sentimentality structured around the figure
of the Child?

My reading of Awful Disclosures then challenges and enriches the

limited historical and literary narrative we tell about anti-Catholic texts. Any
Inventiveness, pleasure, affective and erotic connection, sense of community,
bodies in proximity, and homoeroticism/sociality, which are at the center of Awful
Disclosures, are continually overlooked in most readings of this text. Through
close reading, I hope to restore the affective dimension of the text, the historical
density of enjoyment that, while articulated in a nativist, racist, and sexist form,
nonetheless betrays a perverse and fabulous imaginary at odds with bourgeois
propriety. What I am suggesting here is that the reformer is also a pervert, a
pervert in the sense that the disciplinary structure that the reformer wants to bring
into being is ultimately animated by a substratum of enjoyment that cannot be
wholly exorcised: enjoyment is the substantial ghost in the machine of reform.
The real Maria Monk’s life is emblematic of the subject of reform and of the
need for a transformative vision of what antebellum America could look like. That
anti-Catholicism become a wedge issue used to cement religious, class, and
ethnic ideological homogeneity does not detract from the conditions that brought
into being the kinds of fictive imaginaries that found expression in texts like Awful
Disclosures. The real Monk’s part in the crafting of this narrative probably stems
from her own necessity as a working class woman, who as the record shows,
prostituted herself to survive in New York City’s Five Points, finds an opportunity
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to lend her name to the anti-Catholic cause as a way to change her life.46 Monk’s
life was just as scandalous as her convent tale but devoid of text’s transformative
potential. She was a prostitute and single mother who somehow teamed up with
the Reverend J.J. Slocum, who penned her supposed experience in the convent.
During this period, Monk and her male companion, the Reverend William K.
Hoyt, circulated among the New York Protestant elite and were freely admitted
into respectable homes as Monk openly confessed the awful crimes of the Dieu
Nunnery (Schultz xvii). She was convincing enough in her story and attractive
enough to almost elicit a marriage proposal from Samuel E.B. Morse, the
mayoral candidate for New York City (Schultz xvii). Awful Disclosures was finally
published in January 1836 by a dummy publishing company set up by Harper
Brothers—Howe and Bates—because the dignified Harper Brothers did not want
to publish pornographic material under its imprint (Schultz xvii).
After its publication, wild rumors circulated about the validity of the text's
claims: Monk had both supporters and detractors. After inspections of the Dieu
Nunnery failed to validate any of her claims, she disappeared from the scene as
the scandal—and her fame—faded away. If this unwed mother and prostitute
participated in Reverend Slocum’s plan to write a fictional, sensational account of
a Canadian convent for fame and money, she briefly enjoyed some of the former
and none of the latter. After the birth of her second bastard child, and after being
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arrested in a brothel for robbing a John, Monk disappeared from public life and in
1849 died a sordid death in a New York prison at the age of thirty-two (Griffin 9).
If we take into account the historical Monk, it becomes clear that her life speaks
to the lack of options for women. As a prostitute and a single mother, crafting a
convent tale was one of her only means of securing some money and position.
Aware of the anti-Catholic sentiment in the U.S., she saw an opportunity to make
money beyond sex work.
Yet despite the tale of woman-done-wrong-by-man Monk’s personal life
story seems to echo, I would like to consider another historical narrative, one
based on the fictional persona and fantasies found in the text. Through close
reading, by focusing attention on the pattern of “escape” and return that
structures the text, it becomes clear that our (fictional) heroine prefers the
pleasures and power convent life affords her over a woman’s usual “choice” of
marriage/motherhood (more on this to come). Given that Awful Disclosures sold
over 300,000 copies, it clear that readers found something alluring about this
fantasy as well.
Best sellers, anti-Catholic texts clearly offered readers more than simple
outrage against their Catholic neighbors and queer religious practices: these
highly popular texts doubled as cautionary tale and pornography, designed to
both instruct and allure, belonging to the category of literature described by David
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Reynolds as “dark reform.” 47 It is hard to believe that the text was consumed
solely by horrified onlookers, or that they did not also become participants,
affectively and imaginatively plugging into the fantasies offered up. The split
nature of this porn/reform, this double articulation of containment and subversion,
instantiates what Christopher Castiglia describes as the genre’s social
ambivalence (92). For Castiglia, the convent tale articulates anxieties about
institutionalism in antebellum America (92). Catholicism was seen as “both
hyper-and inadequately institutional” (93). While I agree with much of what
Castiglia argues about the space of the convent as a case study for displaced
concerns about the increasing regulatory processes and disciplinary modes of
identification in the culture at large, I am interested in teasing out the kernel of
enjoyment that lies at the heart of the convent’s gothic imaginary. By reading the
convent tale as a literary artifact first and a social text second, I engage the
underside of antebellum America’s disciplinary consciousness and confront head
on what brings programmatic reform into being.
While being mindful of the pervasiveness of reform in the nineteenth
century, this chapter makes a case for the ontological primacy of enjoyment as
an organizing principle of the social.48 That is, what brings the apparatus of
reform into being belongs to the realm of the Real but finds articulation in the
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imaginary, in literature. That it takes on gothic forms speaks to its destabilizing
potential. By enjoyment, I mean what Lacanian theory refers to as jouissance,
the traumatic trace of existence, what remains after castration (language
acquisition). This slippery, substantial surplus, always exceeding language’s
grasp, frustrates and mobilizes discursive systems in an attempt to come to
terms with its existence. It is important to note that in and of itself, enjoyment is
not subversive or transformative. Rather it insists on its dumb existence. From
the eyes of the Protestant zealot, Catholics are seen to embody this disgusting
substance, this enjoyment manifest in their reverence for hierarchy, pathological
dependence on priests, and unquestioned belief in superstition. In Monk’s tale,
the symptoms of enjoyment register in those aspects of the narrative that exceed
the aims of reform (e.g. jokes, pranks, beatings, suffocations, and infanticide, to
name a few) and bring it into being without wholly subsuming enjoyment’s
disruptive potential. Enjoyment exceeds the limits of discourse, also belonging to
the subject’s lived experience in all her density.49 If Monk’s tale attests to
anything, it is the transformative possibilities open to the subject when she overidentifies with that which the dominant culture tells her she ought to reject. The
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rest of this chapter is an attempt to come to terms with the symptoms of
enjoyment in the context of antebellum anti-Catholic reform.
We might start by assuming the apostate’s role in one’s own discipline and
commit the unpardonable sin of ahistoricism and look to the ways that
pornography has been intelligently and imaginatively interpreted by our best
critics. Pornography today is billion-dollar industry; clearly, Americans have
always loved their porn, convent tale or DVD. One edition of Awful Disclosures
sold today is marketed as erotica, complete with a cover featuring a woman in a
nun’s headdress and nothing else. Besides the obvious, what is it about porn that
draws us to it? Laura Kipnis reads porngraphy not as social realism as anti-porn
feminists have done, but rather as science fiction, a hopeful genre that embodies
flamboyant fantasies about how the world might look, where bodies are reimagined, erogenous zone remapped, sexual and social arrangements pushed to
extremes and continually refigured.50 Awful Disclosures does just this, which is
why teaching it alongside Califia and Allison, which I have done in the past, is
pedagogically and conceptually rewarding. Rather than limit readings of the
convent tale to an anti-Catholicism encouraged by Protestant patriarchs,
manifesting itself in rare, extreme acts like the burning of Boston’s Ursuline
convent in 1834 to everyday, banal sexism through controlling young women, I
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find in the homosocial space of the convent an opposition to domesticity’s
reforming function, a fantasy of options for living beyond conventional institutions.
The fantasy that I speak of is inscribed within the gothic conventions the
convent tale exploited with lurid relish. Despite its reformist ends, the elements
of the gothic in the convent tale participate in a fantastic imaginary that would find
later find expression in American Romance. The emergence of the convent tale
coincides with the burgeoning of American Romanticism as a response to
modernization. Defined by the “exploration” of the subject’s interior, Romanticism
sought within the subject the source and solution to the dislocating forces of
modernity, mostly defined in the U.S. by expansive democratization and territorial
expansion. In contract to rapid modernization, the convent tale often depicted an
Old World feudal model against which America defined itself. The convent came
to represent pre-modern, outmoded institutions and principles. It is in this space
of punishment wherein alternatives to modern, “benevolent” disciplinary
institutions were imagined. The convent then represents a heterotopic,
discursive space where same-sex bonds are established through eroticized acts
of rage and aggression that are encrypted in gothic conventions. 51 The premodern, despotic logics operating in the convent short-circuit the interiorization of
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subjects' lives defined by the emerging disciplinary culture. The gothic easily lent
itself to explorations of fantastic accounts, at once temporally and spatially
dislocated, and yet palpably resonant with the lives of antebellum Americans.52
Drawing on gothic and sentimental conventions, convent tales portrayed
nunneries as brothels that would corrupt American women and lure them away
from marriage and motherhood. In her narrative, Monk exposes the “evils” she
encountered as a young novice in the French-Canadian convent. What is odd
about her condemnation of such an awful place is that having once "escaped,”
she returns to the convent only to "escape" and return again, thus setting up a
structural narrative pattern. It is important to note that Monk chooses to return to
the convent after giving marriage and the chance at motherhood a try.
Dissatisfied with romantic attachments and conventional monogamy that demand
self-effacing sacrifice, Monk returns to the convent and immerses herself in its
cycles of cruelty. It is not submission to a husband and sacrifice for children that
Monk desires but rather the expression of sadistic rage directed at
institutionalized modes of association and social being outside the convent. If
Monk claims to disclose what she describes as the “evils” she encounters in the
convent, why when after easily "escaping" on two occasions, does she return?
In what follows, I will account for her penchant to repeat, her desire to return to
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this space of cruelty. This compulsion to repeat of hers betrays the presence of
enjoyment, at once thoughtless and animated of a life experienced as seemingly
bereft of agency.
Given the ubiquitous and wildly popular motif of heroines who experience
varying degrees of self-sacrifice and suffering in much antebellum American
literature, one might assume that Monk fell into a pattern of escape and return
because she enjoyed the pain and degradation she experienced in the convent,
albeit a darker, more extreme version of the sentimental heroine’s trials within the
space of the domestic. Such a reading is in keeping with Marianne Noble’s work
on nineteenth-century women’s sentimental writing. Taking a provocative, more
complex view of the masochism found in several antebellum texts that
foreground the experiences of women, Noble reads this pleasure in pain as a
“form of self-expression, beautiful—or at least fascinating—once one can see
beyond its weirdness” (4). As several feminists have done, masochism can
simply be read as an unhealthy desire encouraged by and formed in response to
the oppression women have historically experienced. Yet drawing on the work of
Emily Dickinson and Susan Warner, Noble reads the masochistic strain in their
texts as a double-edged sword, one that functions as a “discursive agent for the
proliferation of oppressive ideologies and as a rhetorical tool for the exploration
of female desire” (6). Working within the restraints of patriarchal culture, these
women were able to express a broad range of conflicting affects and desires,
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“exploiting a culturally overdetermined form of self-expression for the pleasures
and powers derived from it” (Noble 5).
The heroine of the sentimental text lived in a state of subservience she
strategically derived pleasure from since it enabled her to experience the body
that she was supposed to continually deny. For example, Ellen Montgomery, the
protagonist in Susan Warner's Wide, Wide World, derives pleasure from
watching her future husband whip a horse, imagining herself as the animal. As
Ellen’s desire attests to, there was a desire to ground oneself in one’s body,
rejecting the evanescent experience of the nineteenth-century “angel in the
house,” and thus becoming more in touch with one's baser nature.
Yet, as Noble argues, if dominant culture is a space saturated with
sentimental masochism, why then would Monk need to return to the convent in
order to experience such pleasure? As the text makes clear, is not masochism
that Monk desires but rather the expression of sadistic rage directed at
institutionalized modes of association and social being outside the convent that
reduce women’s pleasure to the kind of masochistic identification that Noble
describes. Monk makes it clear that she dislikes finding herself in a position
where the older nuns “demanded self-debasement before them,” so having
mastered the convent’s power structure (because it is laid bare, unlike its
counterpart in disciplinary culture), she is able to align herself with the Mother
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Superior and the second most powerful sister on the convent, Jane Ray (more on
Jane later), becoming the one who demands the self-debasement of others (57).
While I agree with what Noble has to say about women’s complex
manipulation of masochism in antebellum texts, my reading of Awful Disclosures
reveals Noble’s ultimate subscription to the old psychoanalytic claim that women
are inherently masochistic and only experience pleasure through identification
with the suffering heroine. Although female readers were encouraged to
identified with the Ellen Montgomery types (protagonists are “safer,” more vanilla
characters and as such, readers are often encouraged to identify with them)
surely there were readers who identify with the character who brandishes the
whip, the character who is the active agent in the spectrum power.
Although she sometimes pleads for the reader’s sympathy, a standard
narrative convention in dark reform, such a appeal is undermined and proven as
false by the ways that Monk ultimately refuses to play or derive pleasure from the
victim's role, instead relishing in her position as the agent of punishment as she
enacts eroticized acts of rage and aggression. Refusing to reveal her innermost
feelings, Monk’s tale is devoid of the moral judgment and naval gazing usually
found in social reform texts. Filled with sentences that withhold information,
concealing more than they reveal, “My feelings during the remainder of the day I
shall not attempt to describe” (27). Often Monk refuses to give readers the juicy
details of the depravity she partakes in, stating flatly, “there were other acts
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occasionally proposed and consented to, which I cannot name in a book” (118).
Although Michel Foucault finds in the Catholic confessional a central model for
disciplinary culture’s “benevolent” technique of controlling and managing selves
by putting sex into discourse, Monk simply states that she remains silent in
confession, and is not punished as a result (57). It is only when she confesses
that she is punished, not the other way around, for one would expect refusing to
talk would get one in trouble: “I therefore preferred not to tell my sins to any one
else: and this course I found was preferred by others for the same reasons” (57).
That the other sisters also remain silent reveals that the convent is not a space of
discipline bent on creating docile subjects through the confession of one’s
“deepest,” “darkest” thoughts, intimating one’s depth.53
Awful Disclosures then complicates the ways in which power, fantasy,
identification, pleasure, and sympathy work in antebellum texts that draw on
sentimental conventions. In her narration, Monk thwarts the logic and language
of sentimental reform, which tends to rely on the (female) reader's sympathy with
the abject. Monk rejects the affective trope of moral persuasion (which we see in
Charlotte Temple and Uncle Tom’s Cabin), for the task of describing, in a
sexually charged way (which we see in Sade), the vicious and violent behavior of
women in the convent.
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It is not abjection that Monk desires but the expression of sadistic rage,
and the space of the convent allows her to become an active agent within the
spectrum of power in a way that the space of the domestic does not (as Noble’s
analysis of sentimental masochism ultimately attests to). Dominant institutions
that organize bodies and property (e.g. the conventional family) do not offer
women community with or often times agency as adults as they become
infantilized by their children. The heterotopic space of the convent, existing in
opposition to disciplinary culture, erases gender in a very material way as nuns
don habits and take on the names of saints. The heroine claims her real name is
Maria “Monk,” aligning herself with male religious authority, which speaks to her
desire to represent herself as someone with power. The Mother Superior is
described as “bold and masculine, and sometimes more than that” (10). Whereas
marriage and motherhood solidify proper white femininity, convent life is
predicated upon a process of de-individuation. Through violent acts like
infanticide, the nuns become monstrous and inhuman, saints and gods of a
perverse theology. So yes, those Protestant patriarchs did have something to
fear. Ironically, it was their own anti-Catholic fantasies that ended up presenting
an alternative to the limited options for women in antebellum culture. The
convent becomes space where young women did not have to become (or
remain) women, and, in fact, could exist beyond gender identity all together (as
Monk’s description of her beloved Mother Superior attests to).54
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Monk’s narrative tells a queer story of possible homosociality grounded in
infanticide: in repeated acts of sadistic cruelty, Awful Disclosures chokes the life
out of the angelic child whose often-martyred death binds the community of
sentimental mourners. Monk’s sorority is predicated on deaths that reveal the
violence at the heart of the sentimental tradition. Rejecting both marriage and
motherhood, Monk is able to find a homosocial community in the heterotopic
space of the convent where discipline is laid bare as cruel punishment, a system
and logic in which she can exercise agency. This violence and rejection of proper
(white) femininity turns upside down our dominant conclusions about antebellum
culture.
II.
The alternative options for women, manifest in acts of cruelty, selfishness,
and violence that animate Awful Disclosures, complicate the ways in which
feminists have analyzed identification, pleasure, power, and fantasy in
antebellum writings about women. Caught in a cycle of self-sacrifice and
masochism—whether read as disabling or enabling—critics tend not to allow
other subject positions, desires, and pleasures to complicate what we think we
know about antebellum America. To be sure, Monk’s tale is a fantasy about what
goes on in a “girl-on-girl” space like the convent, not unlike late twentieth century
Mother Superior who incited the riot by “an ill-timed assertiveness that contravened customary
female deference” (Franchot 144). According to trial documents, there was an open dislike of the
Mother Superior based on her “masculine, aristocratic hauteur . . .she was a woman of masculine
appearance and character, high-tempered, resolute, defiant, with stubborn, imperious will”
(Franchot 143).
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soft-core films like Caged Heat (1974). As I wrote earlier, this is not writing that
folks would easily recognize as a proto-feminist/sex-positive. Yet taking Kipnis’
lead, I find in this nineteenth-century porn/reform tale fabulous, wildly imaginative
ways to be and belong in the world that break with disciplinary culture’s dominant
script of domesticity with its privatized, impoverished forms of intimacy and
pleasure.
In Awful Disclosures, the prison becomes a convent. Instead of a cruel
butch warden, Awful Disclosures offers a dom-like Mother Superior, who whips,
brands, gags, and bounds her bottoms. Films like Caged Heat proliferated in the
1970s at the peak of the feminist movement, and worked to contained women’s
homosocial bonds by eroticizing them in disabling ways, not unlike how the
escaped nun’s narrative eroticizes female relations in order to undermine
women’s religious authority in antebellum America. Such a reading encourages
both the film and convent tale to be dismissed simply as patriarchal fantasies that
work to oppress women. Yet Judith Butler’s analysis of pornography,
representation, and violence offers a different way of emplotting such texts.
Butler takes on feminists like anti-porn Andrea Dworkin who believe that the
genre’s sole function is to promote violence against women. As a result of such
claims, anti-porn feminists form dangerous alliances with the conservative right in
its efforts to police any sexual acts, identities, pleasures, and mode of
association that break with heteronormative fantasies about how the social is
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supposed to be organized and how people are supposed to get off. Dworkin’s
argument relies on a reading of pornographic representation as a debasing and
discriminatory action, one that always automatically injures. This supposes a
simple mimetic relation between the real, fantasy, and representation that
assumes the precedence of the real (Butler 106).
Fantasy does not restrict identification to any one position. As Butler
argues, “identification is multiple and shifting, and cannot be confined to ‘me’
alone” (109). Women viewers may identify with the woman in the “debased”
position (who could ever agree on what a “debased” position is?), but they may
identify with the aggressor, or with the entire scene of debasement (114). To
read representation in terms of a simple causal dynamic suppresses the array of
sex acts, identities, and pleasures that Kipnis argues pornographic texts make
possible. Yet as Butler argues, for feminists like Dworkin, there is no
interpretative leeway between the representation, its meanings, and its effects. If
pornographic representations always constitute injury to women, how could
Dworkin, the passive female viewer who only can identify with the “debased”
female in the text, produce an analysis of pornography? Such an epistemology of
pornography equates masculinity with agency and aggression, and femininity
with passivity—thus fixing gender categories (113). To assume this causal
relationship between representation and its viewers leaves no room for
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interpretative distance and prevents muted, injured, and passive women from
offering critical analysis within the field of social power (113).
Awful Disclosures offers a variety of subject positions, as the readers as
well as the protagonist herself identifies with the several positions and pleasures
the convent affords, or as Butler argues, the entire scene of “debasement.” Yes,
convent tales did work to undermine women’s authority, as Griffin argues, but the
text reveals other possibilities and fantasies for the very women it intended to
oppress. Prohibitions both generate and restrict the spectrum of fantasy. Thus,
Awful Disclosures contains the proliferation of vice it aims to denounce. The
undecideability of fantasy resignifies and reappropriates the terms of regulatory
regimes of representation, thereby undoing fixed identity categories. Rather than
simply representing women in subservient positions, Monk’s tale creates a
fantastic space where (female) agency is re-imagined.
The Monk persona occupies multiple positions in the narrative, not only as
spectator and participant, but as a double for the Mother Superior and her friend
Mad Jane Ray, thus complicating simple identification. As a witness to the
degradation of her fellow sisters, she does not identify with their suffering, nor
does she gesture to the reader for sympathy, the expected move in the
sentimental genre; instead, she finds in the enactment of violence something
empowering. Yet Monk never overtly claims to enjoy or dislike punishing and
humiliating others. In fact, whether she is a spectator or participant, there is an
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absence of moral judgment throughout the text. Reflecting on her participation in
smothering of sister Saint Frances, she exhibits only “the confusion of my
thoughts” (62). This amoral stance is characteristic of the narrative. Against the
dominant sentimental strain, she seems either unwilling or unable to reflect on
her actions or those of others. It is as if she were unwilling to look within herself.
If sympathy requires identification with the feeling of others, Monk’s refusal
to be self-reflexive short circuits the economy of sentimental reading. The
heterotopic space of the convent with all of its coldness and cruelty exists in
opposition to the disciplinary institutions based on “warm” and “fuzzy”
sympathetic identification. The convent is a different space from the domestic
where the affects of sentimental fellow feeling—especially in young girls—are
breed. Far from hearth and home, Monk’s characters move through dungeons
and corridors. The domestic space of the drawing room and the convent operate
under different structures and logics of power. The drawing room was a space
where women enjoyed some power. Yet even though the home was a place
where power was constantly negotiated, the drawing room disciplines through
the elaborate routine of enacting domesticity. As Richard Brodhead argues,
modern forms of discipline, "replace the old disciplinary mode with new
technologies—less visible but more pervasive, less 'cruel' but more deeply
controlling" (qtd. in Noble 94). Brodhead's comments on the shift from
punishment to discipline may shed some light on why Monk eventually chooses
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the convent over marriage. She opens her story with an account her parents’
marriage:
My parents were both from Scotland, but had been resident in the
Lower Canada some time before their marriage, which took place in
Montreal, and in that city I have spent most of my life. My father
was an officer under the British Government, and my mother has
enjoyed a pension on that account ever since his death. (Monk 1)
The suturing of marriage to capital is made apparent as Monk includes her
father’s pension in her description of her parents’ marriage. It is significant that
the only time she talks about her parents is in relation to her mother’s financial
independence as a result of her husband’s death. If the only benefit of marriage
for Monk’s mother is money, then Monk’s own marriage offers even fewer
benefits. “Having been a novice for four or five years,” Monk leaves the convent
a second time (16). She finds work as an assistant teacher, and soon marries
(17). However, after a few weeks, she leaves her husband and all she says of
the matter is that she “had the occasion to repent of the step I had taken” (17).
Monk refuses to say much about her marriage. The narrative promises the awful
discloses of convent life, not marriage. Does Monk’s silence on the subject allow
her to leave the binary distinct, does the convent offer something different from
marriage?
In the “Preface” Monk pleas: “It is to be hoped that the reader of the
ensuing narrative will not suppose that it is a fiction, or that the scenes and
persons that I have delineated, had not a real existence” (xv). Although such a
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claim for the reality of the narrative is a common trope in nineteenth-century
fiction, this plea is doing more when juxtaposed with Monk’s silence on marriage.
By not talking about marriage, she avoids drawing a parallel between the convent
and the drawing room. To dissect marriage might collapse the distinction
between the convent and the home, and she wants to highlight the differences
between the two. Although she ultimately ends up leaving the space of violence
and vice, Monk hopes to keep her experiences in the convent alive. There is
something about the coldness and cruelty found in the convent that she wants to
preserve against the sentimental subservience she experienced in her marriage
and outside the convent. By not collapsing the convent/drawing room binary and
emphasizing the radical difference the convent stands for, she is able to undo the
evanescent self housed within the walls of the family home.
Along with her rejection of marriage, Monk also dismisses every aspect of
life outside the convent, including her schooling, trade, and a life of spinsterhood:
“I attended several schools for a short time. But I soon became dissatisfied,
having many and severe trials to endure at home, which my feelings will not
allow me to describe. . . . finding myself thus situated, and not knowing what else
to do, I determined to return to the Convent” (8, 18). Her disavowal of school,
marriage, and refusal to live in any kind of domestic space (not only her
husband’s house but also her mother’s), brings her back to the convent. She
prefers the knowledge and erotic possibilities open to her in the convent over
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traditional schooling and heteronormative sex/sociality. Returning to the convent
is so important to Monk that she keeps her marriage a secret and steals from her
mother’s pension to pay for her re-admission. Even though the Superior waives
her entrance fee, Monk insists on paying. It is clear to her that getting in as a
charity case will put her at a disadvantage. By paying, she preempts being
slotted into a submissive position. This gesture reveals she has learned the
power dynamics in life both in and outside the convent.
The Mother Superior models for Monk a way of being in the world that she
can aspire to. She describes the Superior as, “bold and masculine, and
sometimes more than that, cruel and cold-blooded, in scenes calculated to
overcome any common person . . . I never saw in her any appearance of timidity”
(119). Bold and cruel, the Superior not only complicates simple gender
identification but is herself proof that the convent is a space of pure power,
beyond good and evil, beyond disciplinary institutions where power dynamics are
masked, where subjectivity or identity is unimportant. In keeping with the
convent's economy of punishment, the Superior orders nuns to lick the floor,
drink her bath water, chew glass, and brand and whip themselves. The more
disobedient are bound and gagged or jailed (114). The Superior sometimes
punishes Monk, and sometimes enlists her help in punishing others.
The Superior’s demonstration of violence and existence beyond (gender)
identity places her within the logic of a Sadean universe. The Sadean heroine
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seeks to transcend her body/world and reach a space of pure power beyond
good and evil, what Gilles Deleuze calls, in his reading of Sade, "primary nature"
(27). Much like Juliette and the depraved gang in 120 Days of Sodom, Monk's
nuns seek through the repetition of violent acts to transcend the physical
constraints of secondary nature (the body, the world of institutions and
experience, in psychoanalytic terms, the world of language, the Symbolic) and
exist in a state beyond good and evil (in psychoanalytic terms, the Real—see my
discussion of “enjoyment” above, enjoyment being a symptom of the Real). As in
Sade's work, Awful Disclosures is a long catalogue of violent acts, devoid of
moral judgment. Through repetition, the sadist's chief aim is to transcend the
world of experience and reach primary nature, free from the constraints of
secondary. The sadist is ultimately not interested in orgasm, which is rooted in
the body. Noble’s insights about the subversive edge of the masochism found in
women’s texts, even though it enables women to experience bodily pleasure,
ultimately limits women to their bodies (the paradox of the angel in the house-she is not supposed to have a body yet her culture sees her as only body
because she is expected to reproduce). The sadistic acts in Awful Disclosures
redirect aggression outward and allow for the sisters to exist on a plane of pure
power where identity is undone.
In contrast to the scene in Wide, Wide World where the heroine identifies
with the horse being beaten, occupying the masochistic position and grounding
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herself in secondary nature, women in the convent have the chance to become
sadists, not simply remaining within and subverting the institutions that prop up
the Symbolic but finding another way of being and associating free from the
constraints of proper sex/gender roles. The convent’s logic of punishment allows
Monk to see clearly how its power dynamic works, and she is therefore able to
put herself in an active position of power, one that does not limited to her body, a
position usually only available to men in dominant culture. Emerson’s metaphor
of the “transparent eyeball” is in keeping with Monk’s description of the Mother
Superior and the role she wishes to occupy. This central figure of American
Romanticism (usually associated only with male subjects) is able to be in the
world free from bodily constraints.
Seeking to negate identity through repetitive acts of violence, the sisters
attempt to override all reigns and laws and free themselves "from the necessity to
create, preserve or individuate,” demonstrating this desire by committing
countless infanticides, which are then dumped in the infamous lime pit in the
basement of the convent (Deleuze 42). Monk and Jane Ray come across the
Superior's record of the infanticides, a book that contains the names of nuns and
the dates when their infants were strangled (128). It is important to note that no
name appears twice in the record. Only after the infant is killed by either the nun
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or the Superior does the nun cease to have sex with the priests.55

Infanticide,

then, is the rite of initiation in the convent, and simultaneously the covenant that
makes the nuns members of a sorority. When describing an infanticide, Monk
makes it a point to note that the priest present to baptize the infant first was “a
good-looking European” (99). She is about be a part of an infanticide and she
makes it a point to check out the priest! In a scene that opens in pleasure (her
attraction to he priest), Monk is not a horrified onlooker, but rather someone who
does not take infanticide seriously and is enjoying herself in this social moment.
And apparently Monk is a part of several infanticides, justifying her participation
“merely owing to the accident that I was then present” and “only because I
happened to be in the room at the time” (100). In keeping with her narrative
style, Monk gives a flimsy excuse, for she seems to refuse to ultimately work
hard to convince us of her innocence. She then quickly proceeds to describe the
violent act at hand, with moral judgment absent from the description. If Monk
claims to hate the incidents early on when as a novice she had to “debase”
herself in front of the older nuns, then clearly she will not debase herself to
readers by begging us to understand and forgive her for her participation in these
violent acts.
Although the lime pit is in the convent’s basement, it is not hidden, for
once one walks into the basement, the pile of whiteness it is right “in the middle
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Though phallic power is a prerequisite for nuns to reach primary nature and thereby become
unsexed, that "something more" Monk discerned in the Superior, it is significant that priests are
conspicuously absent from the narrative.

71
of the cellar” (49). The exposed lime pit speaks to the women’s lack of shame for
the act that binds them assisters. When Monk first comes upon the lime pit, she
reacts in her flat, gnomic style, “I can hardly tell how it affected me . . .I had
undergone trials which prevented me from feeling as I should formerly have done
in similar circumstances” (49). This is all that we get: no outrage, no tears, no
overt gesturing toward the reader for sympathy, no desire to flee the convent
immediately. It is important to note that Monk is free to go wherever she pleases;
even though at times she claims that the crafty Superior keeps secrets (and
people) hidden behind locked doors, whenever she comes across one of such
door, it, much like the convent’s front door, is always open (132).
Not every sister in the convent could bring herself to kill an infant, though.
Saint Frances is a case in point. She is killed by the sisters for refusing to
participate in infanticides (60). In the killing of Saint Frances, Monk becomes an
agent of violence, not just a spectator. Much like her description of the
infanticides, she does not care what the audience thinks of her, and makes no
attempt to persuade them of her innocence: "It is not necessary for me to attempt
to excuse myself in this or in any other case. Those who have any disposition to
judge fairly, will exercise their own judgment . . . I, therefore, shall confine
myself, as usual, to the simple narration of facts" (59). Following the Superior's
order, she and the other nuns drag Sister Frances to an apartment upstairs (60).
Monk’s gnomic, non-committal style allows her to move easily between distress
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for what she is about to do to enjoyment in the leadership role she takes in this
act. It is telling that in the narrative, the smothering of Saint Frances is book
ended between incidents where she and Jane Ray play cruel jokes on other nuns
and on each other, both moments simply erupting with laughter (59, 65). In fact,
the most references to the sisters laughing and having fun take place before and
after the smothering. Read between these two passages, all of the laughter
works to de-dramatize any trauma or horror that the smothering scene could
elicit.
As she makes her way to Frances' room, Monk states that she would "give
anything to be allowed to stay where I was" not to have to participate in the
punishment that was about to ensue, yet she is the one leading the group to
Frances's room: "I entered the door, my companions standing behind me" (60).
Taking on a leadership position only speaks to her enthusiasm, regardless of her
claims to the contrary. Monk is also the one who takes on the role of the
Superior, doing all of the talking: "I spoke to her in a compassionate voice, but at
the same time with such a decided manner, that she comprehended my meaning
. . .'Saint Frances, we are sent for you'" (60). Any moments of doubt and pity are
quickly undercut as Monk leads the pack to seize Frances by her "limbs and
clothes" and drags her upstairs to the Superior’s office to be questioned, as
Frances maintains "all the calmness and submission of a lamb" (61). As the
Superior questions Frances about her refusal to commit infanticide, giving her
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one more chance to prove that she is indeed a part of their sorority, Monk feigns
fainting, but then quickly springs to action when the Superior orders Frances'
death by smothering (61).
It is telling that the smothering of Frances takes place on a bed, an
erotically charged site. The pleasure is palpable as the sisters put Frances
between two mattresses and jump up and down, smothering her between the
two. In keeping with its reform/porn logic, this is the all girl, slumber party tickle
fight gone horribly awry. As she helps smother Frances, Monk claims that at
times she was "scarcely conscious." These scenes of shifting emotions, from
sentimentality to murderous rage, speak to their artificiality in the text. The sadist
has no emotion, but she has to pretend she does for her audience. Monk only
pretends half-heartedly; the tone of the narrative is flat, almost devoid of moral
judgment, with the heroine herself opaque, thus making identification for readers
almost impossible. Monk’s narration does not invite sympathetic identification
with the martyrdom of Frances the ways in which Uncle Tom’s Cabin and
Charlotte Temple do.
As they drag Frances to her punishment, Monk writes, “I took hold of her,
too, more gently indeed than some of the rest, yet I encouraged and assisted
them in carrying her” (62). Here we have Monk’s pattern of an attempt at pity
and resistance to violent acts followed by her enthusiastic participation. She
claims that she was gentle with Frances yet “encouraged” the others, revealing
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the leadership role she takes on, despite her claims to the contrary. For example,
as a novice becoming acclimated to convent life, Monk listens to the sisters
describe their sadistic acts, “without any signs of shame or compunction, things
which incriminated themselves” (26). At first, Monk claims to be disturbed by their
actions and the pleasure they take in them, but then “questioned whether I might
not be in the wrong, and felt as if their reasoning might have some just
foundation” (26). Proclaiming just a touch of doubt and disturbance frees Monk
to ultimately do whatever it is that she pleases. Convent life teaches Monk the
art of storytelling, for whenever a friend or family member, someone from the
“wicked world outside the convent” visits, the Superior sends one of the most
talented nuns to engage them, asking, ‘Who can tell a good story this morning?’”
rewarding the sisters ‘in proportion to our ingenuity and success” (43). This is a
favorite task of Monk’s, for she claims to have “learned many a speech, I had
almost said many a sermon; and I was led to believe that it was one of great
importance” (42).
Although a brutal act is obviously being committed here, I do not think the
point is to identify with and cry for this sacrificial lamb, lamenting against the
atrocities committed by the Catholic Church. Rather, by not behaving like meek
lambs and directing the violence of proper gendering inward (as women are
supposed to), the sisters redirect the violence outward, breaking with the
strictures of femininity. Jumping on the bed is something children do, and the
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cruelty and pleasure that structures this scene is in keeping with Freud’s reading
of children as “polymorphous perverse,” a state in which he finds a great
imaginative potential that adults lose as they mature.56 The omnivorous sexual
intensity and curiosity of the child gets funneled into an impoverished notion of
sex as limited to the genitalia, solely reproductive and/or between a
monogamous couple.57 As convent life attests to, the sisters remain
polymorphous perverse, refusing to become “mature” adult women, which is why
Monk chooses to return after having tried to live as a married woman. Rather
than become infantilized in disabling ways, the sisters’ behavior is more in
keeping with the petulant, often times cruel, and imaginative behavior of children,
whose experience in the world, with all of its possibilities, has not yet been
circumscribed by proper adulthood. Yes, infantilization obviously works against
women, as patriarchy’s move to de-authorize female agency, yet the negativity
the sisters embody actively resists the gendering of white femininity and the
practices and institutions that perpetuate and prop it up. Women are expected to
be kind, nurturing, and self-sacrificing, and to act in any other way is to act
monstrous and lose proper femininity in the process. If their culture considers
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them inhuman because of what they reject and what they desire, then it is fitting
that the nuns over-identity with this monstrosity and act accordingly.
If the Mother Superior embodies the cold impersonality of the convent with
its rituals and compulsory behavior, Jane Ray, Monk’s gothic doppelganger,
represents the insertion of the human in the Deleuzan space of coldness and
cruelty. As the trickster who upends the logic of the convent, Jane Ray injects
friendship and human contact into the geometry of the nunnery. Jane models for
Monk how this space of punishment might be subverted. It is important to note,
however, that Jane is a sadistic, and Monk experiences great pleasure in helping
her punish and play cruel jokes on the other nuns. Yet unlike the Superior, Monk
forms an intimacy with Jane that most readers would recognize as human
contact, even though this intimacy is based on their sadism. Monk describes
Jane as a “singular person,” with “two distinct traits of character; a kind
disposition towards such as she chose to prefer, and a pleasure in teasing those
she disliked, or such as had offended her” (34).
Through Jane, Monk can exercise as much violence as she wants without
risk of actual punishment. If Monk feels pity for Saint Frances, she never really
attaches herself to such "submissive lambs." She is more drawn to strong sadist
types, as her relationship with Jane shows. However, their friendship is
conventional because it involves an affective connection that the audience could
relate to, making it an anomaly in the convent. Yet theirs is a connection made
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up of pleasures derived from cruel acts, placing their relationship firmly within the
convent’s logic. For example, Monk writes of their moments together in bed:
"Jane for a time slept opposite to me, and often in the night would rise,
unobserved, and slip into my bed, to talk with me, which she did in a low whisper"
(80). Once in her bed, "Jane would tell me of the tricks she played, and such she
mediated, and sometimes would make me laugh so loud" (80). Monk and Jane’s
relationship encourages readers to rethink what association and human contact
are based on. The intimacy Monk experiences with Jane Ray offers a reprieve
from the highly regimented existence in the convent, but oddly enough binds her
to this space. For readers, Jane represents a foil to Monk’s own opaqueness,
her impenetrability, which Jane, through her quirkiness, is able to pierce. This
bond between the two, as I said, lends a human touch to a book that is otherwise
cold and impersonal, and as a result, signals the insertion of ideology in its
humanist trappings (habits).
Jane becomes a mentor to Monk, enacting almost as much violence as the
Superior. Because Jane appears to be mad, she has license to do as she
pleases: "she would not do so if she were in perfect possession of her reason,"
the older nuns say as they make excuses for Jane’s behavior, for “she behaved
quite differently from the rest, and with a degree of levity irreconcilable with the
rules” (73, 34). The only resemblance Jane has to the other nuns is in her dress
and she does not take a saint's name upon her admission to the convent (12).
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Monk describes Jane's condition as her "customary artfulness": "As soon as she
perceived that the old nun was likely to observe her, she would throw her arms
about, or appear unconscious of what she was doing; falling upon a bed, or
standing stock-still, until exertions had been made to rouse her from her
supposed lethargy" (73). Through her play acting, Jane works the convent to her
advantage: she gets out of doing chores, and is able to punish whomever she
chooses without consequence. Jane has no "fixed place to sleep in," and the
other nuns "were all convinced that is was generally best to yield to her" (74).
This absence of a fixed place points to Jane's pervasive influence in the convent.
For instance, Jane exerts her authority when she seeks revenge on a group
of nuns who complain about one of her pranks. The trick itself is irrelevant (she
switches the nuns’ caps while they sleep), but it is Jane’s reaction to her
informants that is telling. When confronted by an older nun, La Mere, Jane flies
into a rage and chokes her (78). Provoked by the accusation, mostly because her
fellow nuns overlooked her position in the convent's hierarchy and ratted on her,
Jane punishes her informants to reestablish order: “she beat some of her worst
enemies quite severely, and afterward said, that she had intended to kill some of
the rascally informers” (78). Whereas the others nuns are instructed to brand
themselves with irons, whip their own flesh, and are bound and gagged for
several hours for petty offenses, such as whispering during prayers, Jane is not
punished for strangling a head nun (78, 114). Jane escapes punishment because
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her actions reinforce the logic of power at the heart of the convent. Like the
Superior, Jane has a masculine appearance and a cold and cruel nature. Monk's
continuous doubling of characters further blurs the singularity of identity. The
fact that Monk aligns herself with Jane speaks to both her desire to work within
the structure of the convent, but not in a subservient position, and her need for
sororal kinship.
As her gnomic, noncommittal style and close alignment with the Superior and
Jane attest to, there is the dissolution of subjectivity in Monk’s narrative. It is not
an individual subject, then, that Monk identifies with, but rather a process of
power. The two most powerful subjects in the convent, Jane and the Superior,
could very well be the same person at times, and although Jane stands out for
her quirkiness, what Americans prize as “individuality,” it is impossible to tell
whether or not Jane is an actual character or Monk's alter ego. Identification is
multiple and shifting, and cannot be fixed on any one point. The convent is a
space where nuns lose their identity as they disavow their former selves. By
downplaying singularity, the lines that define the subject are blurred and what we
are left with is a dynamic of power. Through repetition and uniformity the convent
unmakes individuality.
The sadistic nuns attempt to negate identity through constant punishment that
provides them with the pleasure of "negating nature within the ego and outside
the ego, and negating the ego itself" (Deleuze 29). They become "something
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more" than male or female. Habit, Monk further points out, "renders us insensible
to the sufferings of others, and careless about our own sins" (122). For the most
part, convent life destroys community building bonds structured around
sympathy, as well as care for the self, opening up the space for another way of
being, one founded on coldness and cruelty. However, unlike Sade's novels of
utter depravity where characters can cut themselves off from the outside world
and do as they please, the space of the convent is not immune from the forces of
dominant culture, as Jane’s moments of warmth and “individuality” reveal.
III.
As Monk acclimates to the cold logic of the convent, and begins to carve a
space for herself within its structure of power, the old Superior mysteriously
disappears. Her replacement is warm and kind: “She walked with much difficulty,
and consequently, exercised a less vigilant oversight of the nuns. She was also
of a timid disposition” (119). Not fearless but fearful, the new Superior could
hardly inspire terror and awe in her wards. Scared of ghosts, the superstitious
Superior asks Monk to sleep in her bedroom (119). One night, the Superior
climbs in Monk's bed, claiming to have seen a ghost. The new Superior's desire
for Monk, her need for the proximity of bodies, define her as different from the old
Superior. She represents a shift in the convent's logic of power. Whereas once it
was ruled under the constant threat of ritualized violence, it now operates under
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the benevolent order of discipline. The new Superior even volunteers Monk for
charitable work in the convent's hospital (120).
Although Monk claims to expose and condemn the atrocities of convent
life, she and the other nuns, particularly Jane, do not welcome the arrival of the
benevolent Superior. The nuns immediately suspect the Bishop of murdering her
predecessor. Jane informs the Bishop, “I’m going to have a hunt in the cellar for
my old Superior” (103). The "my" is telling of her alignment and association with
her mentor. The other nuns hush Jane, but she replies, “My mother used to tell
me ‘never to be afraid of the face of a man’” (103). Jane is described as having
“a disposition to quarrel with nay nun who seemed to be winning the favour of the
Superior. She would never rest until she had brought such a one into some
difficulty” (80). Jane's reverence for the old Superior is echoed by similar
gestures of the other nuns who keep her stray hairs and nail clippings: “One of us
was occasionally called into her room to cut her nails, or dress her hair; and we
would often collect the clippings, and distribute them to each other, or preserve
them with the utmost care” (14). Monk herself wears a bag around her neck in
which she keeps cloth from one of the Superior's old habits. She even held close
to this bag during her marriage, claiming that she, "always relied on the influence
of this little bag" (17). It is significant that as readers we know more of the bag
than we do of her husband.
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Gestures such as these suggest that the nuns preferred the way the old
Superior ran the convent, for they reject the new benevolent Superior because
she represents the world of disciplinary institutions outside the convent that they
have fled. As Monk observes, “it is wonderful that we could have carried our
reverence for the Superior so far as we did” (13). It is clear that the sisters enjoy
a kind of intimacy with their old Superior, a relationship not based on
conventional affects and notions of love. The violence of the convent does not
work to isolate the women from one another (the ways dominant institutions do)
but rather to bring them together as a sorority, albeit a family based on both
cruelty and pleasure.
Shortly after the old Superior disappears, Jane Ray finally experiences
punishment, found "hanging by a cord from a ring in the ceiling, with her head
downward. Her clothes had been tied round with a leathern strap, to keep them
in their place. . . . her face had a very unpleasant appearance, being dark
coloured and swollen by the rushing in of the blood; her hands were tied, and her
mouth stopped with a large gag" (122-3). Like the old Superior, Jane thrives in
the convent under its logic of punishment. At one point, Jane claims "she
expected to be Superior one of those days" (14). Yet now the old order of the
convent has come to an end, and Jane loses her power and influence.
It is only after the cruel Superior disappears, and Monk becomes
pregnant that she "escapes" a third time never to return. The arrival of the new
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Superior coincides with Monk's pregnancy, thus stopping the cycle of punishment
and pleasure that has defined life in the convent until this point. Her pregnancy
grounds her deep into the gender position she rejects when she chooses the
convent over marriage/motherhood. Because she has moved in spaces of
discipline and sentimentality outside and now within the convent, in the end,
sentimentality gets the best of her. Rather than strangling the infant as was
expected of her, she flees: "My desire of escape was partly excited by the fear of
bringing an infant to the murderous hands of my companions" (130). As in other
instances in the text, Monk's language is ambiguous. Why only "partly excited"?
If the convent has become a space of discipline through benevolent charity, why
would Monk be required to kill her infant? Presumably the new Superior would
put an end to these practices. With the disappearance of the old Superior and
Jane's disempowerment, it is clear that the transfer of power from punishment to
discipline is never smooth. The threat of violence always hangs over disciplinary
regimes, as Jane's punishment bears out. Monk's ambivalence is registered
when she claims, "I was occasionally troubled with a desire of escaping the
nunnery, and was much distressed whenever I felt so evil an imagination rise in
my mind" (129). It is clear that up until the end, Monk desires to stay within the
confines of the convent. Thus her pregnancy and the arrival of the new Superior
prompt "evil" thoughts of escape in her mind.

84
So we are left wondering if Monk's cold cruelty was eventually melted by
the sentimental warmth, as embodied by the new Superior, that now pervades
the convent? Were her mentors not successful in amply proving the virtues of
sadistic violence? It was not her mentors' function to persuade her to stay (which
is why Monk finds it easy to leave three times). As Deleuze shows, the sadist is
not interested in persuasion, but rather in demonstration: "The libertine may put
on an act of trying to convince and persuade . . .But the intention to convince is
merely apparent, for nothing is in fact more alien to the sadist than the wish to
convince, to persuade, in short to educate" (18). The sadist instructor stands in
contrast to the masochist educator, not needing the subject-object relation. This
short-circuits the economy of sympathetic identification encouraged by the
literature of the time. This may sound like a radical individualism, reminiscent of
Emerson, but in fact it is a program for the dissolution of the self.
Deleuze’s reading of sadism ultimately leaves the subject impoverished,
coming close to solipsism, where the constant beratement of the masochistic
other within oneself is all that counts. Contra Deleuze, the sisters’ acts of acts of
aggression, redirected outward, are more productive since they have the
destruction of the law as their object. However, what is of value in Deleuze’s
reading of sadism is his resistance to go “inside” the subject, a resistance also in
keeping with the both the formal and affective logic of Awful Disclosures as Monk
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rejects the force of sentimentality, in both her narrative technique and decision to
return again and again to the convent, that define one’s interior.
The old Superior demonstrates a doctrine of destruction that is reflected
in Monk’s own narrative: she abandons persuasion for the task of describing, in a
sexually charged way, vicious and violent behavior of women in the convent.
Perhaps the very act of crafting the narrative, with its endless repetition of
punishments (adding victim upon victim) is an act of sadism itself, an act of
impersonal demonstration. The repetition of punishment overrides the specificity
of any one act, and leaves us with a vague narrative where the personal is not
revealed (we never learn anything intimate about Monk's marriage, for example);
rather, we are left with a catalogue of punishments and the cold logic of cruelty,
which, at times, can be the basis of a radical sociality, one not based on the full
disclosure, fellow feeling, and warm and fuzzy affect that defines “family” in most
antebellum texts. Monk’s sorority gives us another definition of family, albeit one
not for the faint of heart.

CHAPTER THREE
HAWTHORNE’S UNWANTED DAUGHTERS

It may not be that children can’t wait to grow up and have proper
reproductive sex—a comforting belief for the adults; but that, in
Freud’s view, children have discovered, through their immature
sexual constitutions, one truth about sex: that it is about the giving
and getting of certain pleasures, and that civilized notions of
relationship and family merely obscure this. Sex, as for children in
this unlikely Freudian pastoral, issues in nothing but sensual
delight, in appetite regained.
Adam Philips, The Beast in the Nursery

Women are still at war with what their fantasies say and what
Mama said.
Nina Hartley, “Two Good Girls Gone
Bad”
I.
In The Scarlet Letter (1850), Hawthorne describes Hester Prynne’s
daughter Pearl as “so perverse” and “malicious” that he questions her humanity
(82). Closer to nature, Pearl prefers the company of wild animals to that of her
mother. She persistently seeks out the “Black Man” in the forest, Hawthorne’s
racialized figure for the devil, despite Hester’s warning that should she find him,
he will brand her with a scarlet letter of her own (161). Pearl is clearly undaunted
by her mother’s warning. It is as if in seeking out her own scarlet letter, a
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signifier now doubly eroticized by association with her mother’s act and the black
man who would grant it with his touch, as Hester cautions, Pearl seeks to deauthorize the power her mother invests in the letter of the law while
simultaneously schooling herself in the ABCs of sexual agency (162). It is
precisely Pearl’s defiant attitude against Hester’s constant mothering that makes
Pearl a better feminist than the novel’s often-celebrated heroine. Showing no
desire to become the proper (white) lady, who in order to achieve this rank, must
forgo non-normative pleasures by submitting to the symbolic order ministered by
her mother’s heartfelt pleas, Pearl rejects the racialized hierarchy that charts the
path to white femininity in the context of New World slavery.
In response to Hester’s grief over her own slide down the racialized
gender hierarchy, Pearl “frown[s], clench[es] her fists, and harden[s] her small
features into a stern, unsympathizing look of discontent,” as if intuiting her
mother’s pathological desire to belong to a community that will not accept her
(83). Pearl’s sadistic, instructive resistance to Hester’s mournful tears reverses
the parent-child relation, with Pearl admonishing her mother for wanting
something that clearly is not good for her, and further checking Hester’s desire to
subscribe to the infantilizing lure of national belonging and the empty promises of
hetero-conventionality.
In order to understand the gender/sex dynamic in Hawthorne’s novel, we
need to situate it in the context of New World slavery. Hortense J. Spillers’ work
illuminates the ways in which race and gender inter-animate each other. Spillers
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argues that New World slavery “marked a theft of the body—a willful and violent
(and unimaginable from this distance) severing of the captive body from its
motive will, its active desire. Under these conditions, we lose at least gender
difference in the outcome” (“Mama’s Baby” 206).58 Bodies do not just lose
gender difference but become “flesh” under New World slavery (206). The
difference between body and flesh is a “motive will,” the difference between a
“captive” and “liberated subject-position” (206). When bodies are made flesh,
when gender difference is lost as bodies become cargo, a racialized gender
hierarchy emerges in the U.S., with the white, upper to middle class “lady” at the
top of the hierarchy (this identity is solidified through proper
marriage/motherhood), followed by the biracial “woman” (for Spillers, the mythic
“mulatta” figure—the “neither/nor” in the American imaginary), who is then
followed by the black slave, the “female,” at the bottom of the hierarchy.59 This
rigid stratification makes movement on the hierarchy primarily a downward
trajectory.
Yet alternatives to the racialized gender hierarchy and the limited modes
of association and ways of being it reproduces are found in antebellum literature.
Both Pearl and Hawthorne’s other fictive daughter, Alice Pyncheon from The
House of Seven Gables (1851), go against their parents’ plans for them and
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violently reject this racialized gender hierarchy and its attendant institutions,
along with the privileges it would afford them as potential white “ladies.”
Hawthorne’s progenies represent a radical moment in antebellum fiction: a
complete rejection of marriage/motherhood and the racial and gender injustices
these institutions perpetuate.
I am not drawing a simple analogy between the struggles of white middle
class women and slave women in antebellum America. Alice and Pearl do not
suffer from the oppression, “unimaginable from this distance,” to quote Spillers,
of being rendered flesh: rape, forced reproduction, and other physical and
psychic brutalities. Yet I would like to risk what some may read as overriding
important differences: what does it mean that white girls who could have
privileges via marriage/motherhood purposely reject these institutions that would
grant them relatively safe, easy lives? What fascinates me about characters like
Pearl and Alice is that they represent kinds of imaginative and dangerous risktaking that has the potential to tear down a hierarchy oppressive to all women,
albeit to vastly varying degrees. Such a rejection of gender and racial privilege is
so antithetical to antebellum America’s sentimental “women’s culture,” the often
analyzed and celebrated site of socio-political dissent for women during the
period.60 What is ultimately surprising about what Alice and Pearl embody is that
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their strategies, as Hawthorne conceives them, are radically different from neocolonial strategies that infantilize, disempower, and ultimately ship away the
unwanted, newly “liberated” black subject. The latter were popular with
abolitionist women writers like Harriet Beecher Stowe because they ultimately do
not threaten their gender and racial privileges. Both Pearl and Alice strike
against their privilege, not out of a proto-white liberal guilt, but in an effort to
reimagine the conditions for a more just and equitable way of being in the
world.61
Trying to escape “examination” by the governor and his men, Pearl is
described as a “wild, tropical bird, of rich plumage, ready to take flight into the
upper air” (98). The comparison of Pearl to a “wild tropical bird” demarcates her
as an outsider to her New England community. She clearly does not heed of
mandates of the racial gender hierarchy and as the description of her as a wild
creature attests to, Pearl is not on the path to proper white femininity. Her
rejection of racial and gender norms renders her an animal, a point the novel
continually underscores. In order to appreciate today what Hawthorne is doing
uphold racist, sexist hierarchies of power that do not require the “angel in the house” to give up
her class and racial privileges. Strategizing within institutions like marriage/motherhood
perpetuates the generative cycle that ensures that things stay the same. See Noble, The
Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Masochism (2000) and Grasso, The Artistry of Anger:
Black and White Women’s Literature in America, 1820-60 (2002).
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with Pearl, we may want to look ahead at the twentieth century and briefly
consider the closing scene of Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood (1936). Hawthorne’s
description of Pearl’s affinity with the forest animals reverberates in Barnes’
heroine Robin Vote wrestling with a dog in the forest. Whereas Barnes finishes
her novel with a bestialized image, a nihilistic culmination of Enlightenment
civilization, Hawthorne opens his with Pearl as a romanticized version of natural
desire run rampant, something complexly attractive to his Puritanical sensibility.
For Hawthorne, Pearl represented the antithesis not only of Salem’s
unyielding religious codes but closer to his own life in what he experienced as the
drudgery of keeping the Custom House ledgers in order. As he wrote to his wife
Sophia: “I am a machine, and I am surrounded by hundreds of similar machines;-or, rather, all of the business people are so many wheels of one great
machine—and we have no more love or sympathy for one another than if we
were made of wood, brass, or iron, like the wheels or other pieces of complicated
machinery” (qtd. in Arac 144). 62 In opposition to the mechanization of life and
increasingly diminished capacity of artistic expression that Hawthorne mourns in
his letter and in “The Custom House,” he flirts with the idea of Pearl as an
unalloyed organic force unfettered by societal constraints. Whereas for Barnes
the beastialization of humanity is the end of the civilizing process, for Hawthorne,
the lawless nature that Pearl represents signifies untapped possibility for a
reimagining of his immediate social reality.
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Yet Hawthorne could not follow through with conviction what remaining
loyal to Pearl’s anarchic force would lead to. Pearl’s disruptive inhumanity
becomes in the novel a subject of reform, not Pearl’s, but her mother’s as a way
of regaining favor in the eyes of the village elders. Hester, like her creator, cannot
seem to break free from the binds of belonging and association that define who
she is. In “The Custom House,” Hawthorne writes about his inability to leave
home: “My doom was on me. It was not the first time, nor the second, that I had
gone away,--as it seemed, permanently,--but yet returned, like the bad halfpenny; or as if Salem were for me the inevitable center of the universe” (14).
Hawthorne’s comments here reveal a number of attempts to strike out on his own
but the realities of an increasingly market-driven publishing world, that he saw
dominated by the infamous “damned mob of scribbling women” who kept making
it impossible for him to support himself and his family as a professional writer. It
is not surprising that critics have drawn parallels between Hester’s defiant yet
complicit attitude to the Puritans and Hawthorne’s relation to the pressures of the
market. But if Hester represents Hawthorne’s more compliant model, Pearl
surely illustrates an uncompromising drive that has no regard for those reciprocal
relations that bind subjects to existing institutions and identities.
Did Hawthorne fear his own creation? Did Barnes? I ask these questions
in order to underscore how far from the transformative potential that these
characters represent both writers deviate from in their fiction. Perhaps Hawthorne
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and Barnes balked at pushing the drives these characters embody further
because they recognized that the iconoclastic energy Pearl and Robin represent
eerily replicates the dehumanizing discourses of slavery and fascism,
respectively. But while these characters seem to over identify with the very
dehumanizing processes that turn human bodies into flesh, the all significant
difference that should not be overlooked is that the actions of these agents of
good terror do not prop up exploitative and oppressive institutions. Unable to
subscribe to the radical potential embodied in Pearl, by making her mother the
subject of conscious agency in the novel and marginalizing Pearl to an impish
entity, Hawthorne backs away from what could be a revolutionary moment in the
text.
I am not interested in reading Hawthorne and Barnes’ bestial associations as
perpetuating the stereotype of woman as “savage” but rather as rejections of an
oppressive hierarchy. When such hierarchies and the institutions they engender
are rejected, one starts at the bottom, in the dirt like Robin, with the opportunity
to build something new from the ground up. Hawthorne gives voice to these
iconoclastic ideas in his main characters, Hester and Holgrave, yet they
ultimately cannot live up to that radical spirit. When contemplating whether it
would have been better for Pearl to never have been born, Hester goes even
further, and wonders if life was even worth living for any woman: “Indeed, the
same dark question often rose into her mind, with reference to the whole race of
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womanhood. Was existence worth accepting, even to the happiest among them?
“ (144). In order for social justice to be realized for women, Hester believes that,
“the whole system of society is to be torn down, and built up anew” (144).
Holgrave, the radical reformer from The House of Seven Gables, passionately
argues that, “in this age, more than ever before, the moss grown and rotten Past
is to be torn down, and lifeless institutions to be thrust out of the way, and their
dead corpses buried, and everything to begin anew . . .But we shall live to see
the day, I trust, when no man shall build his house for posterity” (128, 131). Yet
he ultimately sells out (or rather buys in) once he marries and acquires real
estate. It is Hawthorne’s minor characters, Pearl and Alice, who act rather than
make speeches.
II.
As her actions attest to, Pearl does not fit the fantasy of the blonde-haired,
blue eyed, angel-child (think Stowe’s little Eva here) around whom the social is
erected and who must be protected at all costs. Lauren Berlant has argued that
U.S. citizenship’s ideological infantilism installs childish naiveté and purity at the
center of national politics, fetishizing them as things to be enshrined and desired.
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impoverish the public lives of adults. As such, critics like Lee Edelman have
recently argued that today’s dominant politics are driven by reproductive futurity,
a politics of perpetual deferred hope for “tomorrow’s children” that discourages
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political action in the present.64 Edelman poses the following challenge to queers
in his defense of the unmarried, narcissistic Ebenezer Scrooge: “Why not
acknowledge our kinship at last with Scrooge who, unregenerate, refuses the
social imperative to grasp futurity in the form of the Child, for the sake of whom,
as the token of accession to Imaginary wholeness [which the subject can never
accomplish], everything else in the world, by force needed, must give way?” (49).
Not surprisingly, the figure of the child has been rightly critiqued as
instantiating disabling normative discourses. Yet despite these critics’ convincing
pedophobic arguments, does “the child” offer anything socially and politically
promising to an adult-centered politics? Although I argue against the dominant
forms and logics of what Berlant calls “infantile citizenship,” in throwing out the
proverbial baby with the bathwater, we might miss the disruptive/dissenting
energy associated with children’s selfish petulancy. Feminists and queer
theorists interested in dislodging the figure of the child from the center of politics
can paradoxically find in the notoriously weepy nineteenth century a rich,
unsentimental archive of young girls whose selfish acts symbolically destroy the
oppressive social institutions erected on behalf of children. Vain and antisocial,
Hawthorne’s girls redefine dominant cultural models of intimacy and belonging as
they reject the racialized passage to proper white femininity.
Infantilization obviously works against women, as patriarchy’s move to deauthorize female agency, yet the negative tendencies I identify in Hawthorne’s
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progenies actively resists the gendering of proper white femininity and the
practices and institutions that make it possible. The petulancy Alice and Pearl
enact offers an elementary critique of sanitized communities, thereby forcing us
to rethink the forms and logics that chart the passage to adulthood for women in
the U.S. Both characters’ selfish actions set in motion and make visible
disciplinary models that operate through the double articulation of infantilization
and feminization, while at the same time resisting these violent twin processes of
female subjectivation. The risk in this argument is in finding disruptive potential
in an infantilized femininity without being trapped within that patriarchal
articulation. Yet the dangerous feminization of subjectivity with its attendant
infantilization produces a surplus of enjoyment, over and against the dose
necessary to turn us into docile women that could potentially allow for a different
subjective formation and sociality.
For Edelman, different subjective formations and socialities that counter
heteronormativity come out of the negativity of the death drive, which “names
what the queer, in the order of the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity
opposed to every form of social viability” (9). Queers should embrace the
negativity that is ascribed to us, rejecting the disciplinary lesson of normalcy in
the name of and demanded by child figures that Edelman reads: Tiny Tim, Little
Orphan Annie, the waif from Les Mis, and I would add little Eva to the list. Yet
the fact that a rejection of reproductive futurity is present in the figure of a child in
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Hawthorne gives us pause. It is Pearl, not Hester, who embodies the negativity
“opposed to every form of social viability”; it is not the scapegoat, the literally
marked mother, but rather her young daughter who emerges as a figure of
radical dissent.
For instance, when the local children stop their vicious game of “scourging
Quakers” and “scalping Indians” to taunt Hester on one of her rare visits to town,
Pearl fights back, unlike her mother, hurling stones and chunks of dirt at the kids
who mock Hester, thereby redirecting outward the muted anger Hester
continually directs inward:
Pearl, who was a dauntless child, after frowning, stamping her foot,
and shaking her little hand with a variety of threatening gestures,
suddenly made a rush at the knot of her enemies, and put them all
the flight. She resembled, in her fierce pursuit of them, an infant
pestilence,--the scarlet fever, or some such half-fledged angel of
judgment,--whose mission was to punish the sins of the rising
generations. (Hawthorne 91)

Pearl’s threatening violence symbolically puts an end to the brutal social
injustices the children allegorically enact in their play, sending them running
away.65 Whereas the other children are merely imitating the crimes their adult
counterparts have committed, Pearl’s form of resistance has no adult correlative,
especially not in a mother who continually hopes to tame her daughter. Yet given
the option for community—the nasty kids and unforgiving women who thought
Hester should have been sentenced to death—it is no surprise that Pearl has no
65
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desire to belong. Instead, she “seemed always to be sowing broadcast the
dragon’s teeth, whence sprung a harvest of armed enemies, against whom she
rushed to battle” and pretending that the “ugliest weeds of the garden” were
Puritan children, “whom Pearl smote down and uprooted, most unmercifully” (85).
All her make-believe training for battle comes in handy when Pearl is faced with
real opposition that has to be met head on. What could be a better example,
then, of what Edelman describes as his “fuck the child” politics if not Pearl
whipping rocks at children?
Such great self-love, insistence on pleasure, and “toxic” antisocial behavior
may be considered immature and selfish by many. One might even say that by
refusing to grow up and become mothers who self-sacrifice for their children,
Alice and Pearl are doomed to a perpetual state of arrested development.
Drawing on Freud’s essay on infantile sexuality, “Civilized Sexual Morality and
Modern Nervous Illness,” Adam Philips makes a case for sustaining what is often
labeled as immature omnivorous childhood curiosity and appetite in the face of
the demand that adults settle for “realism” and “wanting sensibly” (2)66. For
Freud, infantile sexuality is all about curiosity, which is akin to appetite (qtd. in
Philips 15). Children are unimpressed by realism or adults’ explanations so they
go about their own sexual “theory-making,” what Philips describes as their art:
“Children live intensely; and their art—the making of sexual theories—makes life,
makes interest, makes importance” (29). Rather than taking the risk of going
66

See Philips, The Beast in the Nursery.

99
what Freud describes as “grotesquely astray” with theory-making, adults settle
for compliance to the ideals of dominant culture in order to achieve “civilized
sexual morality” (qtd. in Philips 16).
Children’s endless questions have sex as their end goal and they refuse to
sublimate and impoverish their desires through deferral (Philips 23). Yet adults
want them to know something else (what Freud terms “culture”) and here is
where education comes in. Education teaches the child to compromise or lose
what she is most interested in, sex, in favor of the ideologies of her culture
(Philips 29). Sexual interest has to be made acceptable via education and
sublimated into “civilized sexual morality” to turn us into productive and mature
men and women. The omnivorous sexual intensity and curiosity of the child gets
funneled into an impoverished notion of sex as solely reproductive and/or
between a monogamous couple. For instance, when determining whether or not
Hester is a fit mother to raise Pearl, Pastor Wilson examines the “elf-child,”
asking her, “‘Canst thou tell me, my child, who made thee?,’” a question Hester
had asked earlier, demanding that Pearl answer with “Thy Heavenly Father,” an
answer Pearl of course refuses to give her mother (88, 99). Instead, she
“positively” exclaims, “‘I have no heavenly Father!’” (88).
At first Pearl, who Hawthorne describes as having a “tenfold portion” of the
“perversity” manifest in all children, “ungraciously” refuses to engage the men
here to examine her. Earlier, the governor had tried to place Pearl “betwixt his
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knees”; sensing malice, Pearl almost jumps out of the window to get away—I will
return to this scene later (98). Deciding finally to answer Pastor Wilson, Pearl
engages in “theory-making” about sex, heretically replying that she “had not been
made at all, but had been plucked by her mother off the bush of wild roses, that
grew by the prison-door” (99). Rather than accept Puritanical mythmaking about
creation, Pearl rejects religious doctrine and instead offers an imaginative
counter-mythology about her origins, a more sensual theory, closer to passion
and enjoyment: she is “plucked” from a flaming red rose bush. Yet even Pearl’s
ontogenetic fantasy isn’t mere playful mythmaking; by pointing to the site of the
rose bush, next to her mother’s prison, Pearl intimates knowledge of the ways
that sex and the law inform her reality. As Philips makes clear via Freud, children
just don’t buy the theories adults tell them about the world, especially about sex.
Pearl’s counter-mythology stands in opposition to the Puritan ideology
perpetuated through gossip about her mother in the community.
Pearl’s rich imagination feeds on the kinds of things she encounters on a
daily basis. The erotic life of children transforms the mundane into powerfully
charged experiences. Dorothy Allison talks about how as a young girl she had
the kind of erotic imagination that enabled her to take “banal movies, hackneyed
best-selling romances, and the most clichéd television programs” and construct
same-sex S/M fantasies that were “invariably more effective than mass market
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stroke books no matter how explicit” (94).67 When taking on the anti-porn
feminists who attack sex-positive feminists like herself, Allison cleverly asks them
about what fantasies made them “breathe hard” as young girls (94)? Have they
simply deleted those “inappropriate” adolescent fantasies from their memories in
order to accept impoverished, “appropriate” pleasures and intimacies as adult
women? Self-righteous feminists lord their “maturity” over any woman who
refuses to surrender her curiosity and appetite to heteronormativity, pathologizing
her just as the men of church and state do Pearl.
It is infantile sexuality with its sole aim of multiple pleasures, not biological
generational transmission of sameness, which is the basis of our erotic lives. In
an anti-Darwinian move, Freud insists that sex is anti-reproductive (Philips 26).
Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality and Philips’ more specific argument that
infantile sexuality should be the basis for our social and erotic lives is in keeping
with much work done by radical feminist theorists/activists and queer
theorists/activists. Judith Halberstam, for instance, challenges us to break with
dominant culture’s narrative of maturity that upholds biological generational
transmission—monogamous couple form, parenthood, retirement, death—and
instead imagine alternative life narratives that break this cycle. Halberstam’s
challenge seems close to Freud’s notion of going “grotesquely astray” with
imaginative “theory-making.”68
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For Halberstam, dyke subcultures, like drag king troupes and the Michigan
Womyn’s Festival, become sites for developing queer temporalities and
counterpublics that break with the hetero timeline and its attendant gender and
racial hierarchy (i.e. the musicians at the festival refusing to grow up and
act/dress age and gender appropriate). Hawthorne’s rebellious “daughters”
refuse to grow up and sacrifice their pleasure, curiosity, and imagination to
become proper (white) ladies through “civilized sexual morality.” As the epigraph
to this chapter illustrates, both Pearl and Alice realize that civilized notions of
relationships and family obscure pleasure, curiosity, and “theory-making”—the
capacity to do something radically different from what every other “proper”
woman has done before. The persistence of a normative social matrix that
includes racist modes of kinship promoted by institutions like marriage,
conventional intimacies, and the idealization of motherhood continues to
impoverish the lives of people by privatizing their existence within increasingly
circumscribed spheres of social action.
In her discussion of the ways in which white, middle class American girls were
taught to identify with and desire to become self-sacrificing wives/mothers in the
nineteenth century, Kathryn Kent demonstrates “how the subject-forming
structure . . . the intense maternal-pedagogical system . . . compelled young
girls to internalize the mandates of bourgeois womanhood” (2).69 However,
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identification with the “maternal-pedagogical system” produced in some “lessnormative desires and identifications,” which Kent calls “protolesbian” and queer
(2). Taking Jo March’s declaration in Little Women, “Mothers are the best lovers
in the whole world,” Kent argues that identifying with mother’s love can produce
non-normative sexualities in young girls (1). Kent rightly points out that too many
studies of female friendship and “women’s culture” in the nineteenth century,
such as work by Caroll Smith-Rosenberg and Lillian Faderman, do not read
same sex interactions between and among women in sentimental culture as
queer.70 Kent’s work underscores the erotic dimension that informs homosocial
relations.
However, while for Kent alternatives to the dominant logics of gender
formation and acceptable forms of desire emerge from mother-daughter bonds,
this essay engages the ways in which non-normative desires and pleasures are
born in opposition to dominant forms of kinship. For Kent, queer, in all its
manifestations, is dependent on familial bonds and ties of affection. In contrast,
I’m interested in fictive moments in antebellum fiction where those bonds and
affects are undone.
Despite her attempt to model Pearl into a proper lady, Hester’s ambivalent
relationship to motherhood underscores the ways in which motherhood is
antithetical to the freedom to imagine and act on alternative life narratives.
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Hester’s fantasies connect her to Pearl’s defiant actions. Hester imagines that if
she hadn’t become a mother, “had little Pearl never come to her from the spiritual
world, it might have been far otherwise”; she may have been a “prophetess,”
“com[ing] down to us in history, hand in hand with Ann Hutchinson, as the
foundress of a religious sect,” perhaps “attempting to undermine the foundations
of the Puritan establishment” (144). When Hester leaves the governor’s mansion
after ensuring her custody of Pearl, Mistress Hibbins, the governor’s sister and a
rumored witch, asks her, “‘Wilt thou go with us to-night? There will be a merry
company in the forest; and I wellnigh promised the Black Man that comely Hester
Prynne should make one’” (103). Hester replies, “‘I must tarry at home, and keep
watch over my little Pearl. Had they taken her from me, I would willingly have
gone with thee into the forest, and signed my name in the Black Man’s book too,
and that with mine own blood’” (my emphasis, 103). Momentarily freeing herself
from the responsibilities of motherhood, Hester entertains the idea of a different
life for herself, one deeply at odds with the strictly legislated world she inhabits.
It is significant that Hester can imagine this racially transgressive, eroticized
homosocial space only if unburdened by motherhood.
But why can’t she bring Pearl with her? Why can’t both mother and daughter
dance with the witches in the forest? What kind of ridiculous, suffocating ideal of
sentimental mothering does Hester feel she needs to live up? It seems she may
be trying to right her “sin” through Pearl—this is why Pearl must become the
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proper adult woman Hester failed to be. As Serge Leclaire argues, this is a
destructive kind of parental narcissism: “the boy shall become a great man and a
hero in his father’s place, and the girl shall marry a prince . . . parental love,
which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents’
narcissism borne again”(13).71 The ideal of the perfect child whom we will never
be for our parents, who Leclaire describes as “His Majesty the Baby,” (Berlant’s
blonde haired, blue eyed angel), must be killed off. Hester uses her fantasy of
the angel-in-the-house she hopes Pearl will become as an excuse not to live a
different life. Hawthorne astutely uses Pearl as Hester’s buffer against her own
desire.
Hester has the chance to leave, to go off with the other outcast women, and
she doesn’t because of what she has internalized as her “parental
responsibilities.” Yet Pearl is not the impediment that Hester imagines her to be;
Hester’s unwillingness to act is what is holding her back, not her daughter. It is
telling that Hester is only willing to leave with Dimmesdale with the promise of
sanctioned heteroconventionality. Hester’s problem, what keeps her from acting
on her desire, is that she continually sees herself through the judging eyes of her
community. Hester is not Flaubert’s hopeless Emma, who has nowhere to go
and whose only choice is death. Hawthorne offers Hester another opportunity to
transgress her community’s strictures but he seems more invested in showing
how people submit to the injunctions of others. Hester can leave with Pearl, but
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waits for Dimmesdale, knowing with his weak track record that he will never
leave and therefore she will not leave either. In a representative moment of his
weakness, Dimmesdale pleas with Hester to help him make his Machiavellian
physician and Hester’s supposed long-dead husband, Roger Chillingsworth,
leave his home: “‘Think for me, Hester! Thou art strong. Resolve for me!’” (171).
Dimmesdale cannot even show Chillingsworth the door. Hester replies, “‘Wilt
thou die for very weakness? There is no other cause!’” (171). Hester’s sarcasm
shows that she is not above pointing out the weakness in others, yet she uses
this very weakness to justify her own inaction. Rather than act, Hester can only
impotently fantasize how else her life might be if it weren’t for Dimmesdale and
Pearl, an instance of bad fantasy that binds her to the law through self-pity,
unlike her daughter’s world-making fictions.
In the novel’s preface, Hawthorne describes the “vixenly . . enormous
specimen of the American eagle,” which hovers over the entrance to the Custom
House, as “apt to fling off her nestlings with a scratch of her claw,” even though
people seek shelter under her wing (9). A mother figure, the eagle prefigures
Hester’s fantasies of infanticide. Imagining what she might have done in the
world if she did not have the responsibility of the “education of her child,” a child
whose “own nature had something wrong in it,” Hester wonders, “whether it were
for ill or good that the poor little creature had been borne at all?” (144). Moving
from a fantasy born out of sympathy for a rebellious daughter who will have a
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difficult time in the “hostile world,” Hester moves to a fantasy of outright
infanticide: “A times, a fearful doubt strove to possess her soul, whether it were
not better to send Pearl at once to heaven” (145). Hawthorne follows Hester’s
daydreams with the line, “The scarlet letter had not done its office” (145). Hester
has not fully internalized the letter of the law. Motherhood has not fully
domesticated her. Yet unlike Pearl, who confronts impediments to her happiness
head on, Hester sublimates her desire for a better life by figuring in her daughter
her own frustrations.
For Hester, Pearl is both a saving grace and the chief impediment to her own
happiness: A saving grace in the sense that through her motherly devotion and
care Hester hopes she will be redeemed in the eyes of the community, for those
“unquiet elements,” Hester’s “enmity and passion” that she believed Pearl
inherited, had “begun soothed away by the softening influences of maternity”
(84-5). Yet daughter is a chief impediment to her mother’s happiness in the
sense that Pearl is the embodiment of Hester’s sin, a constant reminder that she
transgressed the law.
III.
In contrast to her mother’s constant self-berating, Pearl seems unwilling
to internalize authority. Always ready to redirect her rage outward to battle for
justice, it is no surprise that Pearl is fascinated with the armor on display in
Governor Bellingham’s mansion. As Hester waits to meet with the governor to
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keep custody of Pearl, the “elf-child” was “greatly pleased with the gleaming
armour” and “spent some time looking into the polished mirror of the breastplate”
(94). Pearl loves the larger-than-life ways in which her image is distorted in the
convex mirror of the armor: her “naughty merriment was likewise reflected in the
mirror, with so much breadth and intensity of effect, that it made Hester Prynne
feel as if it could not be the image of her own child” (94). Hester shrinks not only
from Pearl’s reflection but also from her own: “the scarlet letter was represented
in exaggerated and gigantic proportions” (94).
Pearl, on the other hand, finds both reflections to be wonderful. What
frightens Hester is the truth in the reflections. The images do not coincide with
the idea that she has of herself and her daughter. For Hester, the image has the
power to shatter her internal idealization of herself as a subject worthy of love.
For Pearl, the distorted images are a source of delight, not discipline. In her
large, distorted reflection, Pearl does not look like an obedient angel, looking
graceful or “good.” Rather, she delights in the imperfections. A narcissist through
and through, Pearl loves who she is, as her obsession with her reflection
suggests. Since Pearl rejects the models Hester and Dimmesdale mirror for her,
she has to be self-creating. That Hawthorne uses the surface of an armor and
the breast plate to underscore Pearl’s self love makes it clear that hers is an
embattled existence. Whereas Pearl, with kaleidoscopic curiosity, relishes
everything that the armor reflects, Hester can only focus on the glaring and
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magnified A. Hester’s sense of self is mediated by the symbolic order whereas
Pearl takes pride in her defiance. Hester shrinks back in shame, having
internalized the community’s judging gaze. In contrast, Pearl rejects the gaze of
the Big Other and therefore does not see herself as ugly or evil but perfectly
imperfect. If young girls’ play in the nineteenth century, as Gillian Brown argues,
encouraged “continuity between children and adults,” emphasizing futurity and
responsibility, Pearl’s narcissistic play opts for unregenerate pleasure in the
present thwarting the imperative to couple up and reproduce (89). 72
Disturbed by the fact that Pearl’s response to her own image lacks the
disciplinary shameful function that it has on her, Hester pulls her daughter away
from the armor and into the garden. Bored with the bland New England
gardening, Pearl spots a few red rose bushes and cries for a rose, and in
characteristic fashion, “would not be pacified” (95). She demands a bright red
badge like her mother’s. Hester of course is embarrassed as her repeated
attempts to hush Pearl fail: “[I]n utter scorn for her mother’s attempt to quiet her,
[Pearl] gave an eldritch scream” (95). As her demand for a red rose signifies,
Pearl take prides in her mother’s badge of dishonor, and is furious when Hester
removes the badge when meeting with Dimmesdale:
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At length, assuming a singular air of authority, Pearl stretched out
her hand, with the small forefinger extended, and pointing evidently
towards her mother’s breast. And beneath, in the mirror of the
brook, there was the flower-girdled and sunny image of little Pearl,
pointing her small finger too. . . As her mother kept beckoning her,
and arraying her face in a holiday suit of unaccustomed smiles, the
child stamped her foot with a yet more imperious look and gesture.
In the brook again, was the fantastic beauty of the image, with its
reflected frown, its pointed finger, and imperious gesture, giving
emphasis to the aspect of little Pearl. (my emphasis, 183)
While on the one hand, Hawthorne describes Pearl as the personification of
childish petulance, he qualifies his description of her as beautiful. Hawthorne
shows us Pearl not through the embarrassed eyes of her mother, but rather from
a perspective that finds in Pearl’s unconditional love for her mother a beautiful
image of self love. Pearl will not come over to her mother until her mother places
the letter back on her chest: “‘Bring it hither!’” said Hester. ‘Come thou and take it
up!’” answered Pearl (184). Demanding that Hester actually act, not remain in
the miserable state of tears that she usually witnesses her mother in, Pearl
schools Hester in the virtues of disobedience and pride in one’s shame. Having
pride in her mother’s big flaming red A represents a disregard for the
community’s moral strictures.
Pearl seems impervious to discipline, despite the community’s best
attempts at proper child rearing. The governor sees Pearl as a child of the “Lord
of Misrule,” and the community, along with Hester, considers her a “demon
offspring . . . from old Catholic times” (82). Dimmesdale describes his daughter’s
actions as having “the cankered wrath of an old witch, like Mistress Hibbins”
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(183). These epithets that brand Pearl an outsider she embraces as constitutive
of her oppositional identity. Heeding her daughter’s demand, Hester pins back
the letter, but it is clear that although it is in Hester’s best interest to take her
daughter seriously, she infantilizes Pearl and dismisses her as a source of
embarrassment in order to protect herself from the truth her daughter speaks.
Throughout the novel, Hester repeatedly protects herself from Pearl’s
insights by trying to mold her unruly daughter into a sympathetic, proper adult
woman. She reads Pearl’s “vigor” and “never-failing vivacity of spirits” as a
“disease,” hoping that, “a grief should deeply touch her [Pearl], and thus
humanize and make her capable of sympathy . . . there was time enough yet for
little Pearl!” (183). Yet Pearl, who Hawthorne describes as being “seldom
tolerant of emotion,” is unmoved by her mother’s exhortations to behave properly
(181). Rather than identify with, internalize and thus colonize another subject’s
suffering, Pearl directs her rage outward and does not hesitate to act violently in
defense of others. Hawthorne’s Pearl clearly stands in opposition to the passive
sentimental model figured by Stowe’s saintly Little Eva. What is described as
Pearl’s “hard, metallic luster,” serves as a kind of armor—the armor she was so
enchanted with—against the turn inward demanded by sentimental discipline
(183).
In an attempt to break his daughter’s defensives, Dimmesdale offers his
affections through a kiss. But Pearl won’t come near him. Ultimately Hester drags
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her over to Dimmesdale for the kiss. But no sooner does he kiss her than Pearl
runs to wash it off (185). In a parallel scene with Governor Bellingham, Pearl
squirms until she frees herself from between his legs and “escap[es] through an
open window and stood on the upper step, looking like a wild, tropical bird, of rich
plumage, ready to take flight into the upper air” (98). Fleeing both figures of male
authority, Pearl is clearly defensive in these moments, willing to jump out of the
window in order to escape the governor’s touch and running into the brook to
wash off Dimmesdale’s kiss. Whereas Hester pleads with Pearl, both the
minister and the governor come in physical contact with her in ways that she
finds constraining and threatening. Male authority encroaches upon her, as if by
controlling her physically and limiting her sphere of action she would rendered be
docile.
What these scenes illustrate are the ways in which patriarchal order relies
on disciplinary intimacy to infantilize subjects and render them more dependent
on patriarchal institutions. Karen Sanchez Eppler reads symbolic and enacted
father/daughter incest-rape as enabled by new notions of discipline through
“love” within the family: in temperance tales, for instance, alcoholic fathers are
often reformed through the daughter’s embrace, the daughter who they first
abused while drunk (74).73 The family structured around “love” masks its own
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See Sanchez-Eppler, Dependent States: The Child’s Part in Nineteenth Century Culture
(University of Chicago Press 2005). For Sanchez-Eppler, the redeeming power of the child’s
touch cannot be circumscribed outside an erotic sphere. She reads the male narrators in
Hawthorne’s children’s stories as taking inappropriate pleasures while in the company of little
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often times violent power dynamics, and symbolic and enacted incest-rape
ensures the construction and maintenance of patriarchal power (Sanchez-Eppler
80). Sanchez Eppler suggests that the incest taboo does not hold, a point further
underscored by Spillers. Reading literary representations of father-daughter
incest-rape in the context of New World slavery, Spillers argues that incest
upholds patriarchal power because there is no female body off limits to the
father/master; the idea that the daughter should choose another man invokes
fears of impotence in the father, who worries that “his cargo is hardly sufficient to
bring under permanent rein the sexual impulses represented (in his own febrile
imagination) by the silent and powerful sexualities of the females within his
purview” (234).74 Proving that he can have any female and that the “daughter
cannot want . . . to chose to say who and when she wants,” the father commits
incest-rape to bring the daughter back under his control (245). I will come back
to this discussion of patriarchal control of female sexuality in my discussion of
The House of Seven Gables in the next section of the chapter.

girls, yet at the same time reassuring readers that the girls make it home unharmed (#). Because
of its inherent intimate sensuality, these scenes of redemption engender paranoid reassurances
that nothing illicit is going on. The girl child is rendered all the more dependent because only her
touch and love, according to the logic of disciplinary intimacy, can ultimately redeem wayward,
downtrodden adults dissatisfied with the world (23).
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The history of New World slavery guarantees that the master’s daughter will end up in his bed
since the figure of the father in any context does not exist for the slave child: the slave father is
banished, having no rights to his children, and the master does not acknowledge that he is the
father, only the owner of flesh (234). See Spillers, “‘The Permanent Obliquity of an In(pha)llibly
Straight’: In the Time of Daughters and Fathers” (1988) and “Notes on an Alternative Model—
Neither/Nor” (1987).
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Because Pearl is the curious child who refuses to compromise her
pleasures, she is read as “perverse, ”“depraved” and in need of reform by the
men—the governor, minister, and pastor—who examine her (99). Although
Governor Bellingham—the authoritative father figure who has the power to take
the child away from her mother—does not rape Pearl, the governor’s attempt to
control her through his menacing touch (that sends Pearl running) is in keeping
with Sanchez-Eppler’s important analysis of the fine line between love and abuse
in attempts to discipline daughters through “affection.”
However, Sanchez-Eppler remains mostly concerned with representations
of young girls as dependent victims and does not consider their acts of
confrontational resistance. In fact, she reads Pearl as an embodiment of the
mandates of the Puritan community and overlooks the ways in which Pearl fights
against disciplinary intimacy (61). The scene that I discuss above wherein Pearl
demands that Hester pin back the letter is Sanchez-Eppler’s central example.
Her reading misses what Hawthorne describes as a moment of beautiful
confrontation: Pearl demanding that her mother not hide but take pride in her
shame and own it in the face of the community’s judgments.
Pearl represents the embodiment of failed parenting, and this is good for
her: Her mother’s attempts at modeling proper femininity only enrage her, and
she flees from the disciplinary intimacy embodied in the governor’s touch and her
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father’s kiss. 75 Pearl sees through the sham of parental authority and therefore
state authority has none of the coercive reality that parenting would have instilled
in her. Some critics claim that Pearl ultimately finds her way, marrying a foreign
nobleman. But it is important to remember that this is only a rumor, gossip
among townspeople for whom the idea of a brazen, independent Pearl disturbs
the foundation of the community. The community can reassure themselves that
how they choose to organize their lives has meaning and purpose.
IV.
In his second novel, The House of Seven Gables, Hawthorne links the
novel’s themes of lineage and property to the daughter’s passage to maturity.
Sabotaging her impending marriage arranged by her father to a European
nobleman, Alice Pyncheon allows herself to “fall” under the spell of her father’s
enemy, the carpenter Matthew Maule. An active agent in her own seduction,
Alice takes herself out of the triangulated traffic in women that leaves her with
few options: namely, marriage and motherhood. If women have traditionally
borne the responsibility of transmitting culture, nurturing and raising future
generations, then Alice’s actions, in a novel preoccupied with breaking out of an
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Advocates of “loving” one’s child into obedience such as Stowe argued that punishment only
inspired uprisings and dissent, whereas discipline inspired docility (Kent 20). For an analysis of
Stowe and child-rearing, see Kent, Making Girls Into Women. Pearl clearly resists being tamed
through “loving” acts of discipline, and the description of her as being from “old Catholic times”
places her in opposition to modern forms of discipline and the turn inward demanded of the
subject.
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oppressive generative cycle, represent a rejection of the very institutions and
traditions that women have been entrusted to perpetuate.
Alice’s father, the greedy Gervayse Pyncheon, contemptuous of vulgar
American culture and planning on spending the rest of his life in England as a
nobleman—if his daughter’s impending marriage is successful—allows Maule to
hypnotize Alice, using her as a medium to reveal the location of a lost Pyncheon
land deed that would provide the necessary dowry for his daughter’s marriage.
However, Gervayse’s permission is preempted by Alice’s agency, because it is
she who decides she wants Maule first, before he even knocks on her father’s
front door.
However, critics have traditionally read Alice’s function in the novel as that
of a flat character without agency. Walter Benn Michaels argues that Alice is
completely “empty of desire” (389).76 In retellings of Alice’s story, within the
world of the novel by Holgrave and by contemporary literary critics, Alice
Pyncheon plays the role of the hopeless girl who falls under Maule’s spell. Critics
fall for Holgrave’s patronizing narrative, reading Alice as the tragic victim of her
father’s ruthless greed, the object of Maule’s revenge against the Pyncheons, or
as a flat-footed lesson about the dangers of pride used to school young women
in the virtues of humility. David Anthony reads Alice as a victim of a rape
motivated by Maule’s “emasculated class status,” (454) and Amy Schrager Lang
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See Benn Michaels, “Romance and Real Estate.”
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describes Alice as a “victim of the men who exploit her” who is forced to live in a
“humiliating” bondage to Maule, which “excludes her from the office of woman”
(467). 77 In contrast to these critical positions, I read Alice, much like Pearl, as
exercising agency in order to avoid the limited options for women in heteroconventionality. By rejecting the racialized gender hierarchy through her active
desire for the “dark” Maule, purposefully taking herself out of what Schranger
Lang describes as the “office of woman,” Alice “ruins” herself for marriage while
simultaneously engaging in non-normative intimacies.
In order to substantiate these readings that de-authorize Alice, critics have
to overlook key instances where Hawthorne makes Alice into a subject, not an
object in the Pyncheon-Maule land feud. Consider the way that Hawthorne
frames the scene, using the simple act of looking to convey not passivity but an
agency on Alice’s part. As Maule approaches the house, Alice spots him from
her bedroom window and looks down on him (136). She fixes Maule in her gaze,
making him an object of desire before her father’s scheme is revealed to her.
From her vantage point, up in her room, Alice enjoys the power of seeing without
being seen. Hawthorne frames the scene by first establishing Alice’s
commanding presence but as the scene progresses, it is as if Alice’s agency
disappears in the ensuing contest for property between Gervayse and Maule for
whom Alice will figure only as a token of exchange.
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See Anthony, “Class, Culture, and the Trouble with White Skin” (2006) and Amy Schrager
Lang, “From Home, in the Better Sense: The Model Woman, the Middle Class, and the Harmony
of Interests” (2006).
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Having fixed her sights on Maule, Alice, despite her young age, does not
rush downstairs to make herself known to Maule. Very much in charge of the
scene, Alice lets her presence be known through music. Attentive to the cues of
the drama playing out downstairs, Alice begins to sing upon hearing name
mentioned by Maule, further insinuating herself into the scene: “ever since Alice’s
name had been spoken, both her father and the carpenter had heard the sad and
sweet music of her harpsichord, and the airier melancholy of her accompanying
voice” (143). Alice’s sweet, sad song has a seductive quality. It reveals a
vulnerable femininity, creating the illusion of passivity and availability for
patriarchal designs but at the same time her plaintive tone implies dissatisfaction
with her present condition at home alone with her father that seeks through
Maule delivery from her father and his marriage plot in order to fulfill his desire for
aristocratic entitlement.
Maule tells the latest Pyncheon patriarch that the location of the deed can
only be revealed if he is allowed to mesmerize Alice, using her as a medium to
contact the dead. At first the sensibilities of this wannabe aristocratic are
shocked, but Gervayse calls his daughter downstairs. As she enters her father’s
study, Alice is described as “beautiful” but with a “cold stateliness,” echoing an
earlier description of a female marble nude in the corner of the room (137). It
would be a mistake to take this not so subtle clue and read the implied
identification of the statue with Alice and turn it into a melodramatic scene where
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Alice figures as one more priced object in her father’s collection, even though as I
have suggested, this is how Alice is often read. I am interested in the way in
which Alice’s “cold stateliness” becomes animated, glowing with a desire
unmediated by patriarchy. That is not to say that Alice’s glacial exterior, like
Pearl’s coat of arms, are impediments to the expression of a truly warm interior.
Rather, these girls’ body armor act as buffers against the colonizing touch of
disciplinary intimacy. Hawthorne also describes Alice as having an air of
“witchery,” presenting us with a young girl who is not insecure or passive but
proud and maybe dangerous (136)..
With her eyes fixed upon Maule, Alice immediately notices the long pocket
for his carpenter’s ruler running down the side of his pants, “the end of which
protruded” (143-44). Hawthorne writes, “A glow of artistic approval brighten over
Alice Pyncheon’s face; she was struck with admiration—which she made no
attempt to conceal—of the remarkable comeliness, strength, and energy of
Maule’s figure” (144). Alice is visibly aroused; in an uncanny textual moment,
father and daughter’s desires initially line up in that they both want this act to take
place. Yet Alice soon senses her father’s misgivings about Maule’s plan, yet
unlike her father, she refuses to compromise on her desire and is therefore quick
to put herself in the hands of the wizard. With her haughty gaze, her desire
barely concealed, Alice asserts her position, topping the scene from the bottom.
Gervayse turns his back on the scene of penetration. Sublimating the greed that
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led him to pimp out his daughter, or so he thinks, Gervayse focuses on a
landscape portrait, “where a shadowy and sun-streaked vista penetrated so
remotely into an ancient wood,” only to be reminded of the “supernatural
endowments” of the Maule men (145). Gervayse hysterically orders Maule to
stop but Alice counter-mands her father’s order, “without changing her position,”
saying, “do not interrupt the young man!’”(145).
It is important to consider the significance of Alice’s alliance with Maule
against her father, who for some reason, not explicitly clear in the narrative,
backs away from his original plan. It might seem that Gervayse backtracks out of
some sense of guilt in exposing his daughter to Maule’s “supernatural
endowments.” But I would argue that Gervayse stops dead in his tracks because
he recognizes in his daughter, in her “air of witchery,” her own threatening female
desire, which Hawthorne links to Maule’s magic. What is important about this
passage is the way that Alice becomes progressively embodied from gaze to
voice to arousal, with the physicality of her desire acting as a disruptive force that
castrates her father, as in the scene where an impotent Gervayse tries to regain
possession of his daughter, embracing, kissing and violently shaking her: “It is
indescribable what a sense of remote, dim, unattainable distance, betwixt himself
and Alice, was impressed on the father by this impossibility of reaching her”
(146). A rageful and impotent Gervasye is unable to rouse his daughter, who is
unresponsive to her father’s voice and touch. What is important here is that Alice
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chooses a man who is not her father and one whose racial and class status mark
him as non-white.78 Alice effectively sabotages her father’s plans and in the
process reveals Gervayse’s bifurcated desire of wanting to acquire more wealth
yet not trade on what he feels is rightfully his, his daughter’s body.
Checking out Maule from her bedroom window, sizing up his long
yardstick and wanting him to penetrate her, Alice embodies a rare articulation of
female desire in antebellum literature. Another such instance appears in Uncle
Tom’s Cabin. Spillers reads Little Eva’s desire for Tom, ordering her father, “You
have the money enough, I know. I want him,” as a demand coming out of a
female mouth like no other in nineteenth-century fiction. Spillers argues, “‘Desire’
in any form for the female must be silenced, cut out, banished, ‘killed’ off, and in
particular reference to African male sexuality” (192).79 I would argue that Alice’s
open desire for the dark Maule is another rare expression of female desire. Yet
whereas Eva ultimately wants Tom as a disciple of her pastoral mandate of selfsacrifice, Alice rejects her own privileges as a white lady, which would be
guaranteed by a proper marriage, in order to imagine other identities and
possibilities not tied to an oppressive racialized gender hierarchy. What Alice
wants challenges the limited archive of female desire and pleasure put forth by
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In an earlier scene, the Pyncheon’s servant, Scipio, asks Maule, “‘What for do you look so
black at me?’” (134). Maule replies, “‘Do you think nobody is to look black but yourself?’”(134).
Maule’s racial joke at Scipio’s expense serves to underscore in the passage an affinity he shares
with the black servant as a result of his working class status and “dark” heritage (the Maules are
repeatedly described as a dark race).
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many antebellum scholars.80 Challenging our existing horizon of possibilities is
exactly what queer studies, according to Halberstam, should do: “make a mess,
to fuck shit up . . .to be loud, unruly, impolite . . . to speak up and out” (824). 81
A spectrum of queer pleasures and possibilities opens up for Alice now.
In total disregard for the couple form, Alice and Maule do not live together in a
shared domestic space. Alice repeatedly exhibits “wild laughter,” sometimes in
Maule’s presence but often in his absence, which attests to an ongoing pleasure
that is not tied to him (149). These “inappropriate” public outbursts (e.g. church)
of pleasure further underscore Alice’s refusal to participate in an institution like
marriage that impoverishes and privatizes intimacy, confining it to the limited
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I consider Kathryn Kent an ally in my endeavor to challenge and expand the existing archive of
female pleasure and desire in the nineteenth century, not only for hedonistic ends, but also as
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space of the home.82 In fact, Hawthorne writes that Alice would “have deemed it
a sin to marry” (149)!
Not surprisingly, Alice’s relationship with Maule comes to an end when he,
not she, exhibits a lack of imagination and succumbs to the pressures of
convention and marries. Their farewell, however, represents an alternative to the
hetero-couple form. In a striking scene, Maule and his new bride spend their
wedding night with Alice. Kissing them both goodbye, Alice leaves the
newlyweds and dies (149). It is as if there is no narrative for someone like Alice,
as Hawthorne does not seem to know what to do with her, except kill her off, with
her spirit lingering indefinitely in the Pyncheon house until the “proper” union
between Phoebe and Holgrave seems to resolve the conflict that informs the
novel. Yet Hawthorne does give us an example of a playful alternative to the
monogamous couple form in the Pyncheon’s rooster, Chanticleer, his two
“wives,” and one chicken (108). While one can read Hawthorne’s allegory as
replicating the same patriarchal model that informs the novel, Chanticleer and his
family represent an alternative polyamorous model that cannot be sustained by
their human counterparts.
In order to imagine new narratives, ones that do not demand that defiant,
imaginative, female characters be killed off, it is imperative to stop casting
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Christopher Castiglia reads the Pyncheon family garden (where Alice’s erotically-charged
posies grow) in a similar vein. With its “lawless plants,” the garden is in a liminal space in nature
for deviants, queers, and nonconformists outside the home but not in the public sphere. See
Interior States: Institutional Consciousness and the Inner Life of Democracy in the Antebellum
United States.

124
children as always already helpless victims in need of protection. The political
and social consequences of this hysterical parenting are detrimental to modes of
belonging and associating that fall outside institutions sanctioned by family
values. For an unsentimental look at children, according to Slavoj Zizek, one
need only look at Chaplin’s films where children are “teased, mocked, laughed at
for their failures . . . The question to ask here is from which point must we look at
children so that they appear to us as objects of teasing and mocking, not gentle
creatures needing protection? The answer, of course, is the gaze of the children
themselves—only the children themselves treat their fellows this way; sadistic
distance towards children thus implies the Symbolic identification with the gaze of
the children themselves” (107). 83 By shifting attention away from the figure of
the child at the center of the social, and focusing instead on the “negativity”
associated with children’s selfish petulancy, as embodied in Hawthorne’s
unwanted daughters, a different view of both children and antebellum American
culture emerges, one unsentimentally at odds with the institutions, identities, and
modes of association articulated on behalf of kids.

83

See Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology.

CHAPTER FOUR
NO MORE TEARS: SENTIMENTALISM AGAINST ITSELF IN UNCLE TOM’S
CABIN

I.
At worst, patronizing, sexist, racist, and imperialist; at best, a mess of
good intentions: discussions of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin
oscillate between these two critical poles. For James Baldwin, the novel’s
sentimental politics betrayed a “secret and violent inhumanity, the mask of
cruelty” (21). Hortense Spillers writes that one needs a stiff drink after reading
it.84 At the other end of the spectrum, Jane Tompkins famously recuperated the
novel from critical opprobrium by historicizing Stowe’s position without
apologizing for it. For Tompkins, Stowe’s moral vision “reorganizes culture” in a
more equitable way “from the woman’s point of view” (124).85 Stowe’s novel was
the most socially and politically influential text in the nineteenth century, with its
all-encompassing, individuating, heartfelt pleas against slavery. As Ann Douglas
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has argued, its message of Christian moral reform consolidated the displacement
of a rigorous critical tradition in favor of individual “right feeling” (13). Such right
feeling will result from readers’ identification with the proper characters. In the
case of Stowe’s best seller, the Christ-like Tom and Little Eva. Such sympathetic
fellow feeling promises to flesh out one’s interiority, intimating one’s affective
“depth.” The problem with “right feeling” is that sentimental sympathy locks the
reading subject in an ultimately ineffective, weepy masochistic cycle, orbiting
around an imagined object of suffering whose salvation, as well as the reader’s,
will be found across the Atlantic in Liberia.
Whether critics of antebellum American literature find socio-political
potential in sentimentality, or argue against its disabling moral imperatives, not
many move beyond the critical embrace or outright dismissal of this dominant
mode of literary expression. Critics, by and large, have not engaged the
“negative” dimension of sentimentality and its potential to bring down the
privatized domestic edifice that the genre’s “positive” side invites us to
inhabit. The unsympathetic and murderous Cassy has been overlooked in
readings of the novel, not allowing Stowe’s fantasy of a slave woman to work
against the author’s predominant interpellative, sympathetic logic. Yet Cassy,
though marginal, is a magnet of intensive energy. Her presence in the text is
electrifying. No wonder critics reduce her to a minstrel figure. By ignoring the
sadistic Cassy, critics overlook the transformative vision that the slave woman
embodies, a vision at odds with Stowe’s reformist program of change through
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right feeling. A contemporary rewriting of Uncle Tom’s Cabin from Cassy’s
perspective, however, enables us to come to terms with the text’s truly
transformative potential.
Robert Alexander turns Stowe’s matrix of self-abjection on its ear in his
play, I Ain’t Yo’ Uncle: The New Jack Revisionist Uncle Tom’s Cabin, returning
us to Stowe with a new perspective. In Alexander’s hands, Topsy, George, and
Cassy become guerilla warriors who clearly heed Malcolm X’s provocation of
political change: “By any means necessary.” Here is a scene from the final act of
Alexander’s play:
(Cassy enters, gun drawn—with Emmeline behind her.)
LEGREE (laughs). Nigger, you wouldn’t dare.
CASSY. I’m tired of hearing that word. (Cassy shoots Legree. On-stage
characters freeze.)
GEORGE. Cut, cut, cut. Who’s writing this? Harriet [Stowe]! Get in here!
Who said the women get to shoot him?
(HARRIET enters).
HARRIET. This is not the ending I wrote! Cassy . . .
CASSY. You wrote every word of the rage that’s in me! You just didn’t
give me a gun. (Alexander 67)
Here is a scene from Stowe’s novel:
It was not Sambo, but Legree, who was pursuing them with violent
execrations. At the sound, the feebler spirit of Emmeline gave way; and
laying hold of Cassy’s arm, she said ‘O, Cassy, I’m going to faint!’ ‘If you
do, I’ll kill you! said Cassy, drawing a small, glittering stiletto, and flashing
it before the eyes of the girl. (413)

128
A gun may have been substituted for a knife in Alexander, but in both instances,
the slave woman Cassy seizes (phallic) power, not just in the obvious form of a
weapon, but in arrogating to herself the power over life and death.
The similarities between Alexander’s and Stowe’s depictions of Cassy’s
threatening violence are striking, and Alexander does acknowledge the fact that
Stowe has given us a rebellious figure in Cassy long before his incarnation of the
freedom fighter. Cassy calls Stowe on the murderous role she is made to play
within the novel’s racist imaginary: “You wrote every word of the rage that’s in
me! You just didn’t give me a gun.” On the semantic level, as a meaningful
figure in Stowe’s fiction, Cassy functions as an impediment that eventually
facilities the author’s transformative vision of antebellum America. However, what
I am proposing here for a critical project is that we rewrite Stowe’s novel, as
Alexander does, at the syntactic level (what Cassy represents beyond Stowe’s
intentions) so that the fantastic dimensions in Stowe’s universe can be redefined.
Stowe’s problem is how to convince the resisting object of punishment to
internalize the law and assimilate into disciplinary institutions. In other words,
Stowe creates Cassy in order to turn the intransigent object into a subject of
disciplinary institutions. It is not Tom who is at the center of the novel because
he is already the docile subject of sentimental discipline. Rather, it is the marginal
Cassy who is Stowe’s central example, the true object of reform in need of her
proto-feminist brand of sentimental discipline.
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II.
Sentimental abolitionism, deployed by writers like Stowe, often requires a
racialized Christ-like figure to suffer so that people can construct an affective
interiority that becomes the fictive marking of their soulful depth as human
beings.86 The fiction of one’s interiority is the effect of subject formation through
which one is constantly disciplined through various institutions (e.g. the family,
marriage, workplace) where one is taught to internalize the law and self-regulate,
becoming what Foucault terms a docile body. As Christopher Castiglia argues,
this project of subject formation originates in the nineteenth century in the
discursive practices of various reform movements (33). The self-defining matrix
Castiglia analyzes excels in the discourse of abolitionism, where affective
alliances between white women and slaves bypass racial difference in favor of
color-blind, liberal interiority. So what happens when the object around which
discourse is constructed resists being articulated by abolitionism? What happens
when the object authorizes its own discourse and acts without aspiring to liberal
subjectivity/interiority? What is significant here is that Stowe is that she imagines
a voice completely at odds with the sentimental logic and political vision of her
novel. As the object-turned-subject authorizing her discourse, Cassy
complicates the idea that Stowe has created a character designed to ultimately
justify her endorsement of colonization as the desirable political solution to
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See Christopher Castiglia’s “Abolitionism’s Racial Interior and the Making of White Civic
Depth.”
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emancipation. A more nuanced reading needs to engage the contradictions in
Stowe and reconceptualize the function of minor characters.87
Feminist critics of antebellum American literature often focus on implicit
acts of resistance by women, overlooking unsympathetic and aggressive female
figures like Cassy, thereby perpetuating the traditional feminist strategy of
disavowing power by ignoring the negative tendencies of women who redirect
their aggression outward against the institutions that impoverish their lives.88 For
instance, in her study of women’s representations of anger in antebellum fiction,
Linda Grasso only considers acts that are directed inward: self-starvation and
illness as resistance to oppression. However, outbursts represented by figures
like Cassy that threaten to tear down oppressive institutions that perpetuate
structural and social inequalities fall by the wayside in contemporary feminist
analyses. Theresa Goddu, for example, neutralizes Cassy’s violence by
describing her as a minstrel figure in contrast to what she reads as the real
resistance of the authentic black body found in Harriet Jacobs’ narrative.89 The
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On reading through minor figures, see Alex Woloch, The One VS. The Many: Minor Character
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Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature, and Theresa Goddu’s Gothic America:
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limited horizon of feminism today. See Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America (1997).
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problem with Goddu’s historicist reading of Cassy is that it fails to account for the
real effects of fiction. Goddu insists that in Cassy’s gothic staging of Legree’s
superstitious fears, Stowe “spoofs the gothic to play the scene for laughs rather
than fear” (144). If Cassy is successful against Legree, readers, according to
Goddu, get the message that nothing truly subversive has taken place here.
But isn’t the distinction that Goddu wants to uphold between fantasy and
the social precisely what the novel invites us to short-circuit? In other words,
aren’t the conventions that define social relations and the larger framework that
makes those relations meaningful ultimately fantastic? And isn’t Cassy, arguably
Stowe’s most fabulous creation, the agent who traverses the social fantasy and
puts an end to Legree’s rule? What Stowe dramatizes for us is not the
pathological dynamic between two benighted subjects caught in a cycle of
superstition but rather her readers’ pathological attachment to a social fantasy
that structures their existence, and in the face of which they feel helpless to act.
90

So far from escapist, Cassy’s “gothic machinations” confront the reader with

the real of history. From Cassy, readers learn that if they alter the fantasy, they
can change history.
I want to make a case for the social potential that the Romance brings to
bear on Uncle Tom’s Cabin. As I hope is clear by now, the transformative power
of Stowe’s novel lies not in the author’s moral vision, which as critics have shown
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is freighted with personal and social biases, but in fugitive moments throughout
the text that bear the stamp of that rich, imaginative moment in mid-nineteenthcentury America conventionally known as the American Renaissance. What is
dismissed in Uncle Tom as minstrel or gothic is akin to what Hawthorne referred
to as the “marvellous” in Romance.91 But whereas Hawthorne only flirts with the
possible social consequences of romance, almost apologizing for invoking its
potential, Stowe inflects the romantic moments in her text with the zeal of the
reformer. It is important that I differentiate between the zeal behind the main line
of her novel—moral suasion, interiority, colonization—and the zeal that informs
the fleeting romantic moments that concern me here.
It is as if, in creating Cassy, Stowe were turning against the form and logic
of her own narrative and social project. Too often critics read sentimentality in
Uncle Tom’s Cabin as “too monolithic, too static” (Lee 78). Andrew Riss makes
the case for “Stowe’s belief that racial homogeneity can provide the only secure
foundation for either a familial or political community” (59). Only “after the
stunning but painfully incomplete success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin,” argues
Maurice Lee, did Stowe question “in Calvinist terms the coherence of her
sentimentality” (78). In contrast to Lee’s and Riss’ characterizations of what they
perceive to be Stowe’s totalizing affect, I am arguing that what Stowe comes to
realize years later about sentimentality is already at work as an inherent tension
in Uncle Tom’s Cabin.
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Cassy functions for Stowe as an necessary impediment that cannot be
fully subsumed or incorporated into the narrative or the reform project, yet
without which the narrative or project could not function. Whereas the narrative
desperately “needs” her, she does not “need” it. Cassy does not ask for anything
or plead with anyone. She simply acts. When her indecisive sister-in-thestruggle Emmeline is hesitant to steal Legree’s money, the money that they will
need once they escape from his plantation, Cassy instructs her against a
politically disabling Christian morality and forces her to recognize the economic
and social system that render such morality bankrupt:
“Money will do anything, girl.” And as she spoke, she put the money
in her bosom. “It would be stealing,” said Emmeline. “Stealing!”
said Cassy, with a scornful laugh. “They who steal body and soul
needn’t talk to us.” (Stowe 415)
While Stowe creates passages like this one in order to show how low Cassy has
sunk, it is hard not to recognize the truth she speaks over and against
Emmeline’s moral platitudes. This exchange contrasts an earlier scene in which
Eva teaches her cousin Henrique a lesson in kindness. After his striking his
slave across the face, Henrique gives him money out of guilt. Eva is enraged,
and soothes the slave with sympathetic words. Stowe writes, “One had given
him money; and one had given him far more,--a kind word, kindly spoken” (275).
In Stowe’s world of benevolent discipline, the slave prefers politeness over
money. Yet Cassy’s theft represents a small-scale attempt to redress political
and economic inequality, not the band-aid-and-tears reform of sympathy.
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By overlooking the defiant Cassy, critics do not allow Stowe’s fantasy of a
slave woman to work against the author’s predominant interpellative, sympathetic
logic. In a strike against the turn inward demanded by sentimental sympathy,
Cassy directs her rage outward: she “hates and curses,” commits infanticide, an
act she does not regret, refuses to commit suicide, stabs the man who sold her
children, repeatedly emasculates Legree, steals his money and scares him to
death. Her agency is further underscored by her constant “scornful smile” and
“wild laughter,” both of which attest to her pleasure. For instance, her elaborate
fantasies of killing Legree are followed by a “wide, long laugh” (Stowe 376).
Cassy’s sadistic pleasure, constantly reconfigured within the plantation’s libidinal
economy, forces us to move beyond literary analyses that simply rally against the
victimization of slave women. Without equating Cassy with real slaves, I do,
however, want to evoke again the relation between fantasy and the social: that is,
if in order to effect social change one has to alter the underlying fantasy, then
Stowe has created in Cassy a powerful figure in excess of her own narrative. In
the context of Nat Turner’s and other abortive rebellions, the ever-present
example of Haiti, not to mention random acts of violence against slave owners,
Cassy’s existence and actions are not out of the realm of the real.92 In each of
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as the “sexualized, pathologized black woman,” the “source of transgression,” exercises a
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these examples, we have acts of resistance against what seemed to some as
unthinkable. My contention is that rather than acting as an escapist, sublimating
form, art (yes, Uncle Tom) abstracts from the social without severing its ties to it.
Art calls attention to its own artifice, allowing for critical interventions that can
have social consequences. What I have in mind here is akin to what Laura
Kipnis describes as art’s potential to disrupt psychic structures and therefore alter
social structures:
If selves are constituted through networks of institutional, symbolic,
and material everyday practices, then given the homologies
between psychic and social structures, sufficiently disrupting the
first, must, in some corresponding way, rattle the latter . . .at the
very least, shaking things up emblematizes the possibilities of
subjective dissidence from symbolic law. (30-1)

Politically and socially neutral, the force of fantasy is rife with interventionist
potential. Disabling fantasies of racial identification that work to subjugate
people or uplift them trade on the same coin of subjectification, on the need for a
racialized body to precede discourse. As Hortense Spillers argues, black women
have historically served as the interstice, the empty space in the Symbolic Order
(i.e. the social) that enables the production of discourse, the absence with
shaping force around which narrative revolves. One could argue that Cassy is

“criminal” agency, like Celia’s, that is circumscribed in the law (14). While I agree that the
language of reform and the law worked to emplot resistance, my reading of Cassy tries to engage
the thing, that unnamable, unthinkable quality in their actions, both Cassy and Celia’s, that brings
the law and the reform novel into being. Rather than obsess over the logic of containment, I am
concerned with the fictive and social possibilities that the mingling of romanticism and reform in
Stowe’s work yield.

136
that for Stowe, but Cassy’s radical potential does not lie, as the novel bears out,
in a fetishized black insurgency. As the novel shows, Cassy comes to see
herself as black only after she left the convent where she was raised. Her racial
identity becomes meaningful only within the space of the plantation and her
radical reaction against that world has less to do with a sense of injury
perpetrated against the race than a wrong against her. Cassy is fiercely
individualistic. The racialized biopolitical fictions of species being do not apply to
her. Blackness is not for her to identify with. When Cassy says, “I’d always
known who I was, but never thought much about it” she is not making an
ontological affirmation about her being. What she does acknowledge is her
status as a racialized social construct, a quadroon, but she resists the
interiorizing imperative necessary to suture skin color to the fiction of identity.
Spillers addresses the function of the interstice as a generative space of
subject and social formation:
Slavery did not transform the black female into an embodiment of
carnality at all, as the myth of the black woman would tend to
convince us, nor, alone, the primary receptacle of a highlyrewarding generative act. She instead became the principal point of
passage between the human and nonhuman world. (“Interstices”
76)

Not only does the slave woman become the “primary receptacle” for the
reproduction of labor after the slave trade is abolished in 1808, but she becomes
the flesh around which a discourse is developed and the flesh against which
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others, most often her own “issue,” were classified as human or nonhuman (76).
Not content to remain within critique, the moments in which the flesh becomes
the subject who speaks for herself rather than being spoken of, the moments in
particular when black women are in charge of their own discourse when it comes
to their sexuality against a history of silence and invisibility, are central to Spillers.
Placing her argument in the context of Michele Russell’s work on the
female blues singer’s social and political vision, Spillers looks to the female blues
singer for positive articulations of black women’s sexuality, not so much
interested in song lyrics like Russell (mostly heterosexual torch songs) nor
biography (often tragic: drug abuse) but rather in the form of the performance
itself: the singer on stage, being there in the moment, cutting a figure and
separating herself from the audience with all eyes on her: “We lay hold of a
metaphor of commanding female sexuality with the singer who celebrates,
chides, embraces, inquires into, controls her womanhood through the eloquence
of form that she both makes use of and brings into being” (my emphasis,
“Interstices” 87). The power and control she displays over the song, giving it
form, has an “ontological edge” (87). Through her control of the performance,
the singer etches herself onto the world, making herself felt and heard as she
comes into being as a subject who speaks for herself. 93 In Spillers’ terms, the

93

Spillers writes, “Whatever we might ultimately think of the message of [Bessie] Smith’s
inversions and its quite heterosexual leanings, as in most of the discography of black female
vocalists, we are interested in the singer’s attitude toward her material, her audience, and
ultimately, her own ego status in the world as it is interpreted through form” (87).
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singer hijacks the space of the interstice, figuring the historical contradictions of
subjective embodiment.
The function of the performative as venue for subjective agency also
finds articulation in the work of Fred Moten, who, like Spillers, engages a history
of resistance given form in music, from slave spirituals to jazz. Shifting the focus
from scholarship that solely analyzes the history and ongoing reality of racism in
the U.S., and countering Marx’s claim that the commodity cannot resist, Moten
examines the ways in which the object does indeed resist: the phonography of
Aunt Hester’s screams opened “the way into the knowledge of slavery and the
knowledge of freedom” for a young Frederick Douglass, for juxtaposed with the
slave spirituals, we find the “happy and the tragic possibilities embedded in
passionate utterance and response” (21-22).94 For Moten, where there is
enslavement there is always resistance: constitutive of Douglass’ consciousness,
Aunt Hester’s scream reverberates in the spirituals of the field slaves, in
Douglass’ fight with Covey, in James Brown’s wails and Adrian Piper’s
performance pieces.
In his deployment of what he calls “unorthodox essentialism,” Moten
upholds the fiction of racial difference in a tortuous definition that dialectically
commingles essence and performance as improvisatory elements in the openended construction of blackness: “blackness, in its irreducible relation to the
structuring force of radicalism and the graphic, montagic configurings of tradition,
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and, perhaps most importantly, in its very manifestation as the inscriptional
events of a set of performances, requires another thinking of identity and
essence” (255). Both Spillers and Moten ontologize identity, in the sense that
they both racialize resistance in the black body.
However, these fantasies of identity, while objectively defined, which is to
say that they find symbolic integrity and social currency, are not in and of
themselves subversive, as some critics would have us believe. In contrast to the
metaphysics of racial identity, and whatever sophisticated forms it might take,
Robert Reid-Pharr asks:
Why, indeed, have Black Americans not allowed the demise of the
black family, the site I have nominated as a central if not the central
location in the production of American racial difference and thus a
primary site in the production of racial assault, racism? (Black Gay
Man 78)

Both black and white bodies are normalized and regulated through institutions
like the family that uphold race as a biological given that cannot be transcended.
The “family” strives for insularity and the reproduction of racial sameness that
must be protected at all costs. For Reid-Pharr, it is specifically the mulatto/a
figure that challenges the “separate but equal” mandate of racial distinction
continually sanctioned by dominant models of kinship (Conjugal Union 5). It is
then necessary for the biracial figure, who Reid-Pharr reads as queer against the
hetero-normative, “truly” black bourgeois family, to be interpellated by submitting
to this familial model lest our nation’s racial ambiguity be revealed.
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Specifically, “female” and “male” lose their symbolic integrity under New World
slavery; according to Spillers, slavery has undone what deconstruction—
specifically Judith Butler here—claims to inaugurate: the deformation of gender
identity. 95 The title of the essay, “Mama’s baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American
Grammar Book,” plays off the false conclusions of the infamous Moynihan
Report, which makes the mother and daughter responsible for the destruction of
the “black family.” In the context of slavery, the black father is banished and the
white master/rapist is the father who refuses to acknowledge the child as his
own. According to Moynihan, in post-emancipation twentieth-century America,
the black family is under the matriarchal rule; yet Spillers claims that this is
impossible because we do not live in a society that allows women the power to
name and bequeath property (204).
The goal should not be to reproduce (white) institutions like the family, for
as Reid-Pharr argues, the destruction of the institution of the family—black and
white—is necessary for us to reimagine the social from the ground up and end
the perpetuation of racial difference, which only serves to perpetuate racism (78).
As feminists Pat Parker and Cheryl Clarke have been arguing since the 1970s,
the institution of marriage is akin to the institution of slavery and needs to be
rejected if we are ever to truly effect deep structural change. For Clarke,
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Spillers argues: “First of all, their New World, diasporic plight marked a theft of the body—a
willful and violent (and unimaginable from this distance) severing of the captive body from its
motive will, its active desire. Under these conditions, we lose at least gender difference in the
outcome, and the female body and the male body become a territory of cultural and political
maneuver, not at all gender-related, gender-specific” (“Mama’s Baby” 206).
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Sexual politics, therefore, mirror the exploitative, class-bound
relationship between white slave master and the African slave—
and the impact of both relationships (between black and white and
woman and man) has been residual beyond emancipation and
suffering. . . .the white man learned, within the structure of
heterosexual monogamy and under the system of patriarchy, to
relate to black people—slave or free—as a man relates to a
woman, viz. property. (131)

Unafraid of being prescriptive, Parker matter-of-factly calls on us to give up the
nuclear family, “the basic unit of capitalism” (242).
Less prescriptive, Spillers also argues that we must reconceive the social
through a rejection of the family and its attendant racialized gender hierarchy
(white ladies/biracial women/black females). Race and gender buttress one
another, creating an oppressive hierarchy that determines who is a “real” woman,
a hierarchy feminism often upholds when we consider the fact that the white,
middle class heterosexual woman has remained the unspoken subject of
feminism. The mythic prostitute figure Sapphire becomes Spillers’s central
example in the rejection of proper (white) femininity: Sapphire, “monstrous,”
“castrating” and hence a “female subject with the power to name,” a product of
the “peculiar institution” that legally turned blacks into not just bodies but flesh,
cannot be a wife, mother, or woman. She is considered inhuman, and as Spillers
argues, rather than force Sapphire into the “ranks of gendered femaleness,” we
do well to heed Sapphire’s lesson of claiming that monstrosity her culture
mistakenly assigns to her (i.e. Moynihan) as a subject with the power to name

142
and “rewrite after all a radically different text for female empowerment” (“Mama’s
Baby” 229).
In Sapphire, Spillers moves from her earlier engagement with the
sensuous physicality of the blues singer and into the fantastic potential of the
stereotype, but ends her powerfully suggestive essay with a gesture that remains
unfulfilled. In doing so, Spillers is not rejecting the corporeality of the blues
singer for mythic Sapphire but rather shifting our attention to the social fantasy. If
black women are to blame for the demise of the black family, even though, as
Spillers points out, they never possessed that kind of power, what would it mean
for them to act as if they did? This is what the myth of Sapphire does for Spillers.
Rather than realign the social coordinates to reinstate a proper nuclear family,
Spillers suggests that we reimagine the social beyond an oppressive racialized
gender hierarchy perpetuated by institutions like the family.
Like the stereotypical Sapphire, Cassy, the prototypical quadroon, throws
the monstrosity assigned to her back in the face of her oppressors, for there is no
desire in her to effect a kind of upward mobility toward proper (white) femininity.
Cassy, a slave, and therefore not a woman, is already beyond gender. She
embodies a negative energy, perhaps the negative energy of the interstice that
props up the social and the very energy that might be used to dissolve the
symbolic order she makes possible.
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Perhaps what is truly radical about Stowe’s novel is not so much what she
models for us in her characters but her conviction that literature can change the
world. Lauren Berlant engages the world-making potential found in literature in
her critique of Stowe’s ideological message. Berlant overlooks the
unsympathetic and murderous Cassy in her reading of the effects and uses of
the Uncle Tom’s Cabin archive. Cassy’s unsentimental negativity complicates
and challenges her analysis.96 In Stowian, world-making fashion, Berlant
engages literature’s radical potential in her analysis of what she calls “diva
citizenship.” By diva citizenship, Berlant means a mode of being and belonging
that occurs when “a person stages a dramatic coup in a public sphere in which
she does not have privilege. Flashing up and startlingly the public, she puts the
dominant story in suspended animation . . .diva citizenship takes on as a national
project the need to redefine the scale, the volume, and the erotics of ‘what you
can do for your country’” (“Diva Citizenship” 223-4). Influenced by Berlant’s (and
Stowe’s) work, I am also interested in literature’s radical potential and its relation
public discourse. Yet Berlant’s divas (Harriet Jacobs and Iola Leroy), while out
of place in the public sphere, behave like proper subjects. Anything that violates
the protocols of civility does not register in Berlant’s reading: Jacobs’ vexing
sexual pleasure, as well as her redeployment of culturally dominant modes of
association and generic forms against her “sympathetic,” abolitionist white
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readers and editor, are transformed in Berlant’s analysis into the pedagogical
register of the injured subject.
Yet figures who reject the terms of upward mobility and proper citizenship
would most likely make different demands. Whereas Spillers advocates a
strategic embracing of the power blindly assigned to black women, Berlant
engages “divas” who act in “a scene of teaching and an act of heroic pedagogy,
in which the subordinated person feels compelled to recognize the privileged
ones, to believe in their capacity to learn and to change” (“Diva Citizenship” 222).
Berlant has faith in the Habermasian model of affective communicative action.
The problem with Berlant’s model is that she takes her cue from literary
figures that buy into the fantasy that props up the social. If we are going to take
our cue from literary figures and are truly invested in reimagining the institutions
that organize the social, don’t we want a figure who is not enthralled by the
language of civility? Having said that, I am not saying that Cassy is a model to
simply emulate. In fact, the mimetic logic that informs Berlant’s reading is
something I am taking issue with. What Cassy represents does not fit within the
parameters of possible sociality. Her monstrosity lays bare the disciplinary
conventions that authorize Stowe’s worldview. Let us not forget that Cassy is
after all Stowe’s intractable creation, that enabling impediment that brings social
reform into being and keeps it running. My fanciful reading (following
Alexander’s lead) makes it seem as if Cassy gets away from her creator. In
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contrast to Berlant’s well-behaved “divas,” Cassy does not buy into the
contractual logic of civic participation. It is hard to picture Cassy holding hands
with Berlant’s triad: Jacobs, Leroy, and Anita Hill. Unlike her camera-friendly
(pardon the anachronism) “sisters,” Cassy acts without concern for an audience.
Who does not belong in this picture?
Cassy’s anti-sociality accords less with injured identity and more with
aggressive subjectivity. Perhaps an understanding of Cassy’s function in the
narrative can be illuminated via a reading of Gilles Deleuze’s master/slave
dynamic. As Deleuze explains, the sadist/master is not interested in persuasion,
but rather in demonstration: the sadist “may put on an act of trying to convince
and persuade . . . But the intention to convince is merely apparent, for nothing is
in fact more alien to the sadist than the wish to convince, to persuade, in short to
educate" (18). Remember, Cassy refuses to persuade the hesitant Emmeline to
flee with her, instead giving her a simple choice. The sadist instructor stands in
contrast to the masochist educator, not needing the subject-object relation. She
will take what she wants and will not beg or plead or try to override differences in
an effort to get her audience to relate to her experience of suffering. How could
an audience of middle class, white women, for example, identify with the
castrating Cassy, who certainly does not desire to pass on Tom and Eva’s lesson
of self-sacrifice? In contrast to the abolitionist figure who either hectors or
harangues her readers, Cassy’s hermetic narcissism requires only the flattery of
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her own gaze. If Eva draws readers’ attention to her lesson of self sacrifice,
offering a sense of community, allowing us to participate as we cry for her,
Cassy’s gothic narrative keeps sympathetic readers at arm’s length, daring us to
try even to relate to the sexual and physical violence she is subject to. Although
Stowe may have written this flat character to distance and thus “protect” readers
from the violence of Legree’s plantation, the figure of Cassy instead turns this
protection for the delicate ears of white (mostly female) readers into a warning, a
“don’t you dare identify/colonize” moment of textual distancing, working against
Stowe’s program of fellow feeling.
We might read Stowe’s vilification of Cassy against itself as a
deconstructivist critic does. She may not have given her a gun, but Stowe does
give Cassy a knife and has her threaten Emmeline. Such a representation is
designed to highlight Cassy’s absence of sympathy and heartfelt regard for
others. In contrast, reading this scene from Alexander’s revisionist perspective,
we could ask ourselves, why does Cassy threaten Emmeline with death?
Couldn’t she simply leave her behind? Leaving Emmeline behind will not do: her
moralism will sooner or later get them caught. Such a model of self-sacrifice
would have to be killed off because, as Tom’s example attests to, turning the
other cheek will only keep the slave bound to the master. The threat of death
should not be read as Cassy’s way of urging Emmeline to action, but rather as a
threat against the ethics learned by rote that will not serve them well on their
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escape. This kind of ready-made ethics recalls scenes where Tom is confronted
with Cassy and Prue’s atheism. Rather than participate in debate with the two
women, Tom can only quote random bible passages. As Prue talks about
committing infanticide and asks Tom how can there be a God, he can only
thoughtlessly attempt to convert her: “‘O, ye poor critter! Han’t nobody never
telled ye how the Lord Jesus loved ye, and died for ye?’” (225). To which Prue
smartly answers that rather than be converted and risk going to heaven where
there could be white folks, she’d rather “go to torment, and get away from Mas’r
and Misses’” (225). Emmeline represents, much like Tom, what is wrong with
the main line of Stowe’s social vision. Not willing to survive on pious platitudes,
Cassy’s dictates her ethics through her actions.
In order to survive Cassy must strategize within an outmoded, premodern
system of punishment, Legree’s plantation, where structures of power are laid
bare unlike the invisible logics of disciplinary intimacy, which as calculating and
invasive forms, are far more durable than the horrors of slavery.97 Making
Legree’s plantation a place of horrendous abuse and cruelty not only allows
Stowe an opportunity to imagine alternative sites like the home in the Quaker
Settlement, but Legree’s plantation itself becomes a space of fictive resistance.
As such, I read Legree’s plantation as what Foucault calls a heterotopia.
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Heteropias are spaces “in which the real sites, all the real sites that can be found
within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted”
(239). These sites function at full capacity when subjects break with traditional
time operating in dominant culture, presupposing “a system of opening and
closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable” (243).
Legree’s plantation is a space not of “benevolent” discipline, like St.
Clare’s plantation, but a space of punishment. Legree’s plantation exists out of
time, evoking an imminent historical shift with punishment on its way out:
“Legree, like some potentates we read of in history, governed his plantation by a
sort of resolution of forces” (354). It is precisely in this space of naked power that
Cassy can exploit the premodern, fantastic superstitions and fears that haunt
Legree and turn them against him. For instance, Legree is terrified of his garret,
which he believes is haunted by his dead mother, so Cassy keeps up the ruse,
opening the garret window so “the wind had drafted down and extinguished the
light . . .This may serve as a specimen of the game Cassy played with Legree,
until he would sooner have put his head into a lion’s mouth than to have explore
the garrett” (412). Cassy stores provisions there, knowing that the garrett will be
the perfect space to hide in plain sight when she and Emmeline “escape” (412).
Cassy does not simply kill Legree with her knife. As the historical case of Celia
lays bare, this might have simply led to her arrest and execution. Rather, she
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outwits Legree by orchestrating a “haunting.” Stowe describes her plan as a
“stratagem,” something that requires thought.
It is important to remember that Cassy was educated in a New Orleans
convent, itself a heteropic space like Legree’s plantation that Stowe imagines on
its way out. Within the space of the convent, Cassy “never thought much” about
the fact that her “black blood” could take away her freedom (371). Much like in
Maria Monk’s narrative, the convent exists in opposition to dominant time and
operates under a different logic, one in which slavery does not exist and where
Cassy can unlearn the facile humanism of love thy neighbor (373). After her
(white) father dies and Cassy must leave the convent because there is no money
in his estate to continue paying for her education, she considers herself a free
person and is shocked to find out that the man she fell in love with actually “paid
two thousand dollars for me, and I was his property” (371). Rather than mourn
her social death, Cassy resists a suicidal urge, saying, “the sisters told me things,
when I was in the convent, that make me afraid to die” (385). Even she is when
overcome with cholera and everyone in her household dies, her will to live allows
her to survive (375). Unlike those figures who equate death with freedom, Cassy
refuses the empty promise of liberal citizenship.
By the time we meet Cassy in the novel, she has rendered Legree a man
who lives in fear of her. Unlike the slave Babo in Melville’s Benito Cereno, Cassy
is openly running the show: she “had always kept over Legree the kind of
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influence that a strong, impassioned woman can ever keep over the most brutal
man” (378). Her influence extends beyond Legree. All on the plantation think
she is a “witch,” a ruse she maintains by speaking Creole, which all believe to be
the devil’s language (379). Every time Legree attempts to dominate Cassy, she
reminds him: “You’re afraid of me, Simon . . .and you’ve reason to be! … for I’ve
got the devil in me!” (378). Assuming familiarity with Legree, Cassy verbally
levels the unequal dynamic that informs their relation, only to subvert that
equality by preying on his fears of her. This is a recurring dynamic that animates
the master and slave relation that allows Cassy to experience something akin to
freedom.
III.
It came to me when I was fifteen, and that man came after me with
a belt for perhaps the thousandth time and my little sister and I did
not run. Instead we grabbed up butcher knives and backed him
into a corner. And oh, the way that felt! For once we made him
sweat with the threat of what we’d do if he touched us. And oh! The
joy of it, the power to say, ‘No, you son of a bitch, this time, no!’ His
fear was sexual and marvelous—hateful and scary but wonderful,
like orgasm, like waiting a whole lifetime and finally coming . . . I
know I’m not supposed to talk about sex like that, not about
weapons or hatred or violence, and never to put them in the context
of sexual desire. Is it male? Is it mean? Did you get off on it?
Dorothy Allison, Two or Three Things I Know
For Sure

What I want to work through in this section is obvious in the novel yet
remains mostly untouched by critics. Simply put, Cassy experiences great
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pleasure in making Legree suffer. In this cast of sentimental masochists, she is a
true sadist. In contrast to the subservient piety that Stowe typically foregrounds
and bathes in sentimental tears, Cassy’s haughtiness stands in sharp opposition:
“There was a fierce pride and defiance in every line of her face, in every curve of
the flexible lip, in every motion of the body . . . scorn and pride [were] expressed
by her whole demeanor . . . she was erect and proud” (360). Whereas the
novel’s sentimentalism works to interpellate the reads as a caring subject in the
act of witnessing unspeakable acts of injustice, Stowe’s Cassy turns in the table
on this spectatorial model of right feeling, complicating how an audience
programmed and conditioned to associate the slave with an object fo suffering,
might respond to the slave as a subject of sadistic pleasure. Erect, proud, and
defiant, despite her “white blood,” Cassy is beyond proper femininity. Masculine
in bearing, Cassy reduces Legree to a quivering girl in her phallic presence.
Mocking Legree for not producing as much crop as his neighbors, Cassy
taunts, “ If your crop comes shorter into the market than any of theirs, you won’t
lose your bet, I suppose? Tompkins won’t lord it over you, I suppose,--and you’ll
pay down your money like a lady, won’t you? I think I see you doing it!” (my
emphasis, 386). In this inversion of the Hegelian master-slave dynamic, Cassy
makes use of her imagination to picture a sissified Legree at the mercy of his
(male) neighbors. This is not some private fantasy where the injured subject
steals in isolation from her master the freedom to which she is entitled. Instead,
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Cassy’s flaunts her imagination in public, and rubs Legree’s face in it. In this
scenario, Cassy becomes one of Legree’s neighbors, with the master beholden
to the slave in a tableau designed to shame and ridicule Legree. Cassy’s
pleasure, in her fantasy of Legree’s abjection before his neighbors, hinges on an
element of spectatorship wherein the scene of debasement is witnessed by
others. In this, Stowe anticipates Cassy’s more elaborate manipulation of
Legree’s beliefs. An able manipulator of belief and fantasy, Cassy terrorizes her
captor by exploiting his anxieties about his public persona. What makes this
scene subversive is the way that Stowe upends the text’s masochistic logic,
intending to pin the reader in a model of identification wherein the slave’s body is
there solely to mobilize the white reader’s sympathetic feelings. In contrast, this
scene redirects the flow of sympathetic identification from the reader’s interior
space to the market place where Legree is symbolically castrated before his
neighbors.
In moments like these it is easy to see what inspired Alexander’s I Ain’t
Your Uncle. Indeed, Stowe did give Cassy that rage, that power, which is to say
that Stowe’s sympathetic universe is deeply informed by a power dynamic that
cannot be neatly subsumed under the logic of sentimental masochism. Yet in
turning Cassy into a freedom fighter, Alexander simplifies a complex relation
wherein oppositions cannot be ranged neatly on opposite sides of the color line.
Rather, Cassy’s dynamic with Legree, informed as it is by a sense of (sadistic)
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pleasure, is absent in Alexander’s text. Here Cassy is a humorless, holier than
thou militant whose actions antiseptically sever the entangled enjoyment that
shapes her dynamic with Legree in Stowe. Yet Cassy manipulates the
outmoded plantation along with its superstitious master in order to organize her
pleasure, which ultimately renders her dependent on Legree. What Stowe
gothicizes as Cassy’s vengeance is what she imagines will happen after slavery
is abolished. Like Jefferson, Stowe believes that blacks and whites will never be
able to live together. Racism and resentment, both imagine, would keep
Americans locked in the trauma of slavery.
Stowe’s motivation to establish a clean break between the races is
predicated on her own fantasy of racial contact between master and slave, an
elaborate process she draws out throughout the novel. 98 On this point, ReidPharr’s analysis of the eroticism informing the Hegelian master/slave dynamic is
useful here. Although Reid-Pharr is ultimately interested in the representation of
masochistic resistance that is engendered by an eroticized master-slave dynamic
consisting of black male “bottom” and white male “top,” the underlying logic
informing his argument is relevant to my analysis. Reid-Pharr argues that
neither master nor slave is “innocent” within this dynamic. What is shocking
about the cross-racial eroticism he analyzes in contemporary poet Gary Fisher’s
work is not the S/M sex acts per se but the idea that “the black is not inculpable,
98

Another example of cross-racial contact is Eva’s desire for Tom. Eva orders her father, “You
have the money enough, I know. I want him.” Spillers read her demand as an expression of
desire by a female character like no other in nineteenth-century fiction. See “Changing the Letter.”
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that she is as much perpetrator as victim” (139). Reid-Pharr insists that we
confront the “erotics of slavery” and the fact that “the black is always an active
and potent agent within these erotics” (139). This narrative of complicit
resistance stands in sharp contrast to the perpetuation of the narrative of
freedom modeled on Frederick Douglass’ fight with the slave breaker Covey
(136-7). In his protracted struggle with Covey, Douglass emerges triumphant in
more ways than one. Not only does he learn that he can take on Covey, but he
emerges from the struggle clean from any entanglements, entanglements that
would define his identity as anything other than separate from his master.
That Cassy’s dynamic with Legree is pleasurable to her (and maybe
Stowe) is evident in the novel’s depiction of her laughter. Consider the following
moment when Cassy tells a scandalized Tom, who desperately tries to convert
her to his program of passive resistance, what she will do to Legree: “‘I’ll send
him where he belongs,--a short way, too—one of these nights, if they burn me
alive for it.’ A wild, long laugh, rang through the deserted room” (376). Beyond
redemption, Cassy mocks Tom’s religious superstition and exploits Legree’s.
Her laughter haunts Legree even in his sleep. In one recurring nightmare,
Legree stands over an abyss and Cassy pushes him to his death while laughing
(386).
Cassy’s laughter, an ongoing metonymy of pleasure erupting in the face of
oppression and the masochistic mandate of turning the other cheek, echoes in
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Dorothy Allison’s description of the pleasure that floods her when she threatens
her stepfather, a dynamic that is affectively akin to the pleasure Cassy
experiences in tormenting Legree. Historical differences notwithstanding, what
these two scenes share in common are instances of subjects coming to terms
with their own agency in a relation of pleasure and power. As with Allison and
her stepfather, it is Legree’s rape of Cassy when she first arrives on his
plantation that sets in motion her ongoing revenge drama. Allison refuses to be
victimized by the cycle of rape and abuse. However, her agency is troubling to
many—“we’re not supposed to talk about this—“ because it has pleasure built
into it, operating as an excess, in her but more than her, within her control yet
beyond it, informing who she is and who she can be: “hateful and scary but
wonderful, like orgasm, like waiting a whole lifetime and finally coming.” Allison
poses some very difficult questions: what does it mean to get off on a violent act
or fantasy? Is one simply replicating patriarchal structures of power? The
dismissal that comes from labeling sadistic resistance as a patriarchal fantasy of
corrupt femininity avoids grappling with the complexity of act and affect, race and
gender, and the structures of power that condition our existence.
To be sure, Allison’s is the case of “if it feels good, it’s got to be right.”
That is to say, her act of coming to power through self-consciousness is tied to
that euphoric, almost orgasmic moment of self-authoring. For her the body’s
pleasurable response is confirmation enough that the act of resistance, in this
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case against her abusive stepfather, is on the side of justice. In this, she is not
unlike the conventional Stowe we have come to know, the Stowe of “right
feeling.” But as I have been arguing, Stowe’s text complicates foregrounding the
body and its sensations as the seat of ethics.
Read with Eva as the focal point, the novel invites readers to equate
sentiment and injustice through “right feeling.” But how do we know “right” from
“wrong” feelings? Stowe insists that we trust our feelings, but she assumes a
correlation between morality and affect that readers already possess. In order
words, Stowe believes there are good and bad people in the world. The good
ones intuitively know that slavery is wrong. But if this is so, why does she need
to write a novel cataloguing the evils of slavery? The problem is that despite
there being many good Americans who feel right, slavery persists. The novel is
not so much designed to convert people to right feeling but to action. However,
this text functions in a culture primed to absorb calls to action into privatized
structures of feelings. This is the ridiculous contradiction in Stowe’s text, its
circular logic.
That is why Cassy is such an anomaly. She is the anti-Eva/Tom. The
agency Stowe has imagined for Cassy is neither patient nor passive. If the book
is a call to action, what does it mean that a slave takes action? This is the other
contradiction in the novel. If we are to feel right about Tom and Eva, how are we
to feel about Cassy? That critics have not engaged Cassy’s function in all its
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complexity suggests that we do not quite know how to feel about her. Her
presence signifies the way that the novel vectors the interplay of violence,
pleasure, and subject formation. The sections of the novel where she appears
dramatize elaborate scenarios, draped in gothic melodrama, that nonetheless get
at the core of the erotic tangle of agency and enjoyment. Stowe relies on the
body’s response as a moral barometer, and in the case of readers’ reactions to
Tom and Eva’s deaths, the novel’s call to action remains trapped in masochistic
sentiment. However in Cassy and in Allison, we get not internalized rage but its
outward manifestation. Both refuse inaction and the disabling agency of
victimhood. What these examples show is that these moments of agency and
resistance never result in a simple detachment from larger structures of power.
That is not to say that agency is always already circumscribed within a
transgressive logic that “crosses the line” in order to provoke the law.99 The
transgressions that concern me here are not of an archival nature, fugitive
historical manifestations of redressed injustice, but rather as I have been insisting
those of a figural nature, operative within fantasy and as such capable of social
consequences.
Cassy does not just haunt Legree but her author as well. Stowe’s
fascination with her own creation, with her fantasy of black agency is what
motivates her Abolitionist support of for removal and colonization of freed slaves.
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Hartman’s work articulates the processes through which agency and enjoyment are bound
within a structure of power elastic enough to allow the illusion of freedom to persist (85-87).
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Cassy confirms for Stowe that cross-racial conviviality, after slavery, is an
impossibility. With Legree’s money and her knife, Cassy makes it north but once
she reaches her destination, Stowe disarms her. Cassy’s violent defiance must
be contained in the North around “civil” white ladies like Stowe. Stowe’s ultimate
motive is revealed as Cassy is reunited with her daughter Eliza, whose
evangelical moral example attempts to transform Cassy into a loving mother in a
scene that mirrors Eva’s taming of the unruly Topy, who comes to assume Eva’s
pastoral mandate by identifying with the racialized fetish object, Eva’s golden
lock, that makes “blonde ambition” the passage to docile, white subjectivity.
Yet does the lesson Stowe ministers in sentimental sympathy really take
hold in Cassy? Does the “monstrous” slave woman now desire proper
femininity? Eva Cherniavsky argues that Stowe fails in her mission: “For as much
as Stowe seeks to reinscribe Cassy’s face with the tender expression of white
motherhood, and engineers that altogether implausible return of Cassy’s children
to her, Cassy stands out, apart, in the scenes of familial reunion that follow, a
strange, unsettled figure” (137). Outside of a heterotopic space, Cassy still exists
out of time against an emerging disciplinary culture as she fails to connect to her
daughter’s Christian model of love and self-sacrifice. It is precisely because of
her resistant temporal dislocation that we should not back away from Cassy’s
cruel example just because it seems incongruous with Stowe’s worldview.
Through close readings of the function of marginal characters and unsustained
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moments of aggression that break with politically correct notions of resistance,
we can think more imaginatively about the period thought about viable and
sustainable models for organizing the social. Such figures embody traces of
enjoyment that the official historical narrative cannot account for yet whose
existence call for a remapping of the coordinates that define the Symbolic Order.
It is in literature, the providence of the imagination, where such symptoms
become legible to us in fantastic forms.

CHAPTER FIVE
HOME IS WHERE THE HURT IS: RE-IMAGINING SOCIALITY IN
ELIZABETH STODDARD’S THE MORGESONS
They’re home, making dinner for their boyfriends, and that’s as
united as they’re going to get.
Michael Warner, The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, and the
Ethics of Queer Life
I.

Masquerading as a domestic novel, concerned with recording a family’s
internal dynamic, Elizabeth Stoddard’s The Morgesons (1862) demolishes the
sanctity of the home and its attendant myths of harmonious kinship and
fulfillment for women by exposing domesticity’s primary function of producing
socially docile, gendered subjects. The rage that animates the novel, what one
critic refers to as the text’s rendering of “the strange viciousness of life,” I will
argue, emanates from a dissatisfaction with the social models, filtered through
the domestic in the novel, for being and belonging in the world (Feldman 216).
Building on what Stoddard’s father referred to as his daughter’s “talent for the
disagreeable,” I am particularly concerned with the negative affects that pervade
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the text, not as antisocial behaviors that need to be domesticated but as
alternatives to the dominant life narrative and the institutions that perpetuate it.
Informed by a nasty sensibility, this female bildungsroman enacts an antipedagogy against the domestic novel’s lessons of romantic love, conventional
family life, and private property. Stoddard foregrounds her heroine Cassandra
Morgeson’s life, from childhood to adulthood, as beset with frustration at the
limitations that the prescribed passage to maturity entails.
In contrast to Stoddard’s short story “Lemorne v. Buell” (1863), which ends
with the heroine literally awakening to the fact that her dear aunt has prostituted
her in order to secure a favorable ruling on a real estate deal, Cassandra knows
what the deal is from the very beginning. In the end, the scales do not fall from
her eyes revealing the truth of how the world really works. Her father’s
precarious business sends Cassy on extended stays at friends’ and distant
relatives’ homes, in order to turn the wild child into a proper lady so that she
might attract a rich husband. This early itinerancy from home to home exposes
her to a hell of the same for both men and women, namely marriage and
parenthood. This sameness manifests itself in the linkage between familial
stability and property.
Recently, critics have read the Morgeson’s unstable finances as
representative of Stoddard’s own precarious situation, arguing that Cassandra’s
desire for real estate ownership betrays Stoddard’s aspirations for middle class
161
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stability.100 While I agree that Stoddard’s novel reveals anxieties about the
precarious nature of ownership in a market economy and women’s
dispossession of property, The Morgesons, in contrast to recent critical opinion,
short circuits the connection between subjectivity and ownership, transforming
domesticity from an imagined sphere divorced from market forces into a space of
contested power dynamics. The novel disrupts the association of subjectivity with
agency and property, making self-possession narcissistically self-reflexive.
Stoddard rewrites the Emersonian fantasy of self-reliance, where the male
subject constantly yearns for the regenerative power of nature in isolation, and
gives us a world where subjects are, while fiercely antisocial, formed in close
contact with strangers. Emerson, of course, owned his house and could criticize
“the reliance on property, including the reliance on governments which protect it
[as] the want of self reliance” (1637). But for Cassandra, owning her father’s
house is ultimately a limited means to autonomy. Without discounting the great
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See Elizabeth Stockton, “‘A Crusade Against Duty’: Property, Self-Possession, and the Law in
the Novels of Elizabeth Stoddard” and Louise Penner, “Domesticity and Self-Possession in The
Morgesons and Jane Eyre.” Stockton argues that in her writings, Stoddard “doggedly rejected
the cultural claim that women were motivated primarily by emotion, and she affirmed instead that
every person was driven by a desire for self-ownership . . .Stoddard explicitly connected women’s
lack of self-possession and their subjection to duty with their inability to control property” (416).
Penner is more ambivalent about Cassy’s empowerment through ownership at the novel’s close,
arguing that although Cassy “does voluntarily seclude herself within the domestic sphere, that
decision is neither entirely positively nor negatively valenced. Her position as family caretaker
restores domestic order at the cost of her realization that she will never fully control her own life”
(143). Ayse Celikkol places Stoddard in an impossible position. For Celikkol, “In a setting where
the market economy shapes not only economic but also social exchange, those who attempt to
evade the logic of the market economy may find themselves secluded and lonely. Stoddard’s
novel allows us to witness a poignant aesthetic predicament in which either the endorsement or
the rejection of the market economy’s influence on aesthetic sensibilities has dire social
consequences” (30).
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historical importance of women being able to own property, I would argue that
the novel ends on a sad note of the careful-what-you-wish-for variety: because
subjectivity and social agency remain tied to property, Cassandra, in the end, is a
prisoner in her own house. The mobility she longs for throughout the novel, as
her childhood obsession with reading travel narratives attests to, is never fully
realized. Cassandra sojourns from house to house to finally find herself stuck in
her own. Hence, while critics are right to emphasize the drive to self-possession,
they are wrong to suture agency and ownership. What is ultimately important to
Cassy is not the stability real estate ostensibly offers, but rather the unscripted
sociality she experiences while finding herself a stranger in someone else’s
home.
Anticipating Virginia Woolf’s edict that women must choke the life out of
“the angel in the house” (their mothers), Cassandra dis-identifies with her passive
mother and overly identifies with her father’s phallic power and ability to leave the
home and be in the world. Sometimes enabling models are found in unlikely
places: in this case, in patriarchy. As a young girl, Cassy fantasizes about being
her father by snapping his riding crop at their dog, like he does to the horses, and
imagining a suit for herself “to match his,” thinking “how well we should look
calling at Lady Teaze’s house in London” (12). Because she is not allowed her
father’s mobility in the world, all Cassandra can do is read books set in faraway
places (like Sheridan’s comedies, hence the Lady Teazle in London comment)
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and fantasize about her possible travels if she were a subject with power like her
father. His suit signifies the masculinity that affords such agency and his riding
crop implies not only the horses and carriage necessary for mobility but also the
sadism attractive to Cassy that empowers her to act on others rather than being
acted upon. Unlike her mother, whom Cassandra sees as a permanent,
decorative fixture in the home, her father is a transient figure in the house.
Cassandra does not incestuously desire her father but rather what she perceives
to be his power.
Cassy’s parents model for her not equality between the sexes but an
unequal relation of power. Instead of experiencing a proto-feminist sense of
outrage at this imbalance, Cassy refuses the empty conventionality that posits
equality as the healthy norm of human relations. Unless she is on top,
Cassandra won’t play. As an embodiment of Nietzschean will to power,
Cassandra represents a sadistic energy that allows her to experience erotic
pleasure when her romantic love interests are killed (her first love, her cousin
Charles) or symbolically castrated (her future husband Desmond). Cassy’s
identification with phallic power has noting to do with her father’s gender. She
rejects him when he loses his wealth and redirects her admiration to his second
wife, the wealthy woman who bails him out.
Cassandra puts this early lesson of identification to work when she leaves
her house and visits the homes of others. These visits are marked by intense,
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intimate relations borne out of Cassy’s disregard for social etiquette. Cassandra
neither has a sense of proper measure, nor does she know her place. She
makes her way in the world with a sense of entitlement that clearly does not fit
her position, which puts most people off who see her as combative and
obnoxious. Refusing to fetishize the privatized space of the family as sealed off
from intruders, Stoddard disrupts the domestic by turning her heroine into an
interloper who upends the lives of others by making “inappropriate” attachments
that redefine the norms of intimacy.
There is an act of rebellion against domesticity and privacy, sometimes
minor, sometimes major, on every page of The Morgesons.101 Its honesty about
family life and the limited options for people—both men and women—is brutal yet
breathtaking. The ways in which the frankness of the novel finds expression,
however, has caused critics to remark on its strangeness in terms of both form
and content. Christopher Hager writes, “The Moregsons simply is not what we
thought fiction of this period, by women or men, was like. It does not take aim at
the coarseness and competition of a male public sphere, not does it valorize the
antidotes of hearth and home” (699). Julia Stern describes the novel as “gnomic
and elliptical in style, gothic in characterization and plot, and presciently
modernist in form” (107). With its staccato dialogue and fragmented style which
break with the familiar pattern and script of the sentimental, domestic novels
101

My reading of The Morgesons is indebted to my conversations with Christopher Castiglia,
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the novel.
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Stoddard writes against, The Morgesons has no telos, no end toward which it
progresses. It is often hard to discern the plot, in that Cassy moves from house to
house, as if the narrative consisted of nomadic episodes with no discernable
objective. The flatness of the dialogue underscores the fact that the intimacy
between the characters is not based on full disclosure or the sameness of
sympathetic fellow feeling we see played out in sentimental novels.102
Cassandra’s actions recall that of the Mother Superior in Awful Disclosures. Her
narcissism and lack of fellow feeling evoke the mode of the Sadean heroine who
instructs her charges through demonstration, not persuasion or sympathetic
identification. If identification is at work here, it is not with the identity of
characters, their charm or physical attributes, but with the coldness and cruelty of
power relations.
Stoddard uses Cassandra to question her society’s norms of intimacy and
kinship. Cassy’s bitter outbursts, often directed at those closest to her, are
symptomatic of what Stoddard recognized as her society’s foreclosure of public
life. These scenes that may strike us today as incomprehensible and
pathological, which critics are quick to aesthetize as stylistic faults or innovations,
might in fact point to our inability to recognize different ways of being and
belonging in the world that break with dominant life narratives. Cassandra’s “bad
102
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behavior” manifests itself in sadistic acts of aggression that make non-standard
intimacies and socialities possible, allowing for those she has contact with to
experience pleasures that break with the stifling script of proper gender identity.
This is not the family-as-redeeming sentimental story, where the home
heals all wounds of the nasty public sphere. This is also not the sentimental
story of the harmonious family with each member fulfilling his or her proper
gender role. The novel’s oblique prose and gnomic style reflect the lack of
disclosure and fragmented nature of the relationships that make up The
Morgesons. Of her mother, Cassandra says, “I never understood her, and for
that reason she attracted my attention” (17). While the logic of sentimentality
would posit same-sex and blood identification as ready-made conditions for
intimacy, Cassy and her mother are radically different in character and
temperament, and neither wants to close those unbridgeable gaps between
them. Whereas sympathy requires imagining relations with people based on
sameness, at times collapsing differences, the unconventional intimacies that
structure Stoddard’s novel leaves difference intact, thus creating conflict. In The
Morgesons, we have constant eruptions that allow for a re-imagining of
conventions of love, family, and intimacy. The novel shows us ways to have
pleasure and intimacy without surrendering mystery and secrecy. Intimacy, for
Stoddard, is possible without deep knowledge.
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Cassy allows the people in her life to stay other. In a culture where, as
Richard Brodhead has argued, people are rendered docile not through
punishment but through forms of disciplinary intimacy where structures of power
are made invisible and internalized, ministered in the name of love, Cassy resists
the lesson of disciplinary intimacy that would render her submissive and prefers
to lay structures of power bare through her actions.103 This kind of honesty about
who has the power and how power works allows Cassandra and the people she
has contact with to negotiate the power relations structuring their lives.
Their differences engender interest in one another. Veronica tells her mother,
“We are all so different; but I like you mother” (64). Cassy’s best friend Helen tells
her, “What is the use of talking to you? Besides, if we keep on we may tell
secrets that had better not be revealed. We might not like each other so well;
friendship is apt to be dull if there is no ground for speculation left” (151). Helen
never “invaded” Cassy’s sentiments, and for this she is grateful (151). Cassy
corrects one of her early love interests, Ben Somers, who assumes the sisters
don’t love one another, telling him “I think I love her [Veronica]; at least she
interests me” (101). Stoddard finds full disclosure repellent. Just like we cannot
befriend our therapist precisely because we tell her everything, Cassy prefers to
maintain distance in her intimacies. For her, it is the unknown known that make
the other a subject worthy of company. What critics have identified as
psychological pathologies are in fact necessary impediments for the continuation
103
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of sociality, insofar as intimacy for Cassandra is dependent on the impenetrable
kernel at the heart of social contact. What Cassy finds attractive to people is
their lack of transparency. Her rage and antisociality are her way of keeping
others at arm’s length yet simultaneously within her sphere. Not surprisingly, not
everyone sticks around and the body count is high.
Queer theory can be of use in understanding the dynamic in the novel
between marginality and antisociality. The antisocial-turn in queer theory allows
us to make legible what critics of the novel obscure by relying on the language of
pathology and/or making dubious claims about the novel’s avant-garde qualities.
What I am suggesting here is not so much that we read the novel through the
lens of contemporary queer theory, but rather that we recognize in Stoddard’s
anti-social turn, her “talent for the disagreeable,” a sensational affinity with
contemporary discourses and practices that have the transformation of
conventional forms of community and pleasure as their aim.
Why do we tend to couple up and live only with that person? Queers who are
interested in fostering other ways of being and belonging that do not involve the
dominant life narrative of maturity, namely the couple form and parenthood, feel
a sense of defeat in the face of what Leo Bersani calls, “the rage for
respectability . . .in gay life today” (qtd. in Caserio 819). As Robert Caserio
argues, Bersani’s influential work on queer negativity, the ways in which sex is
not future-bound and redemptive but rather self-shattering and destructive has
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greatly influenced queer scholarship. For example, Lee Edelman argues that
different subjective formations and socialities that counter heteronormativity
come out of the negativity of the death drive, which “names what the queer, in
the order of the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity opposed to every
form of social viability” (9). For Edelman, queers should embrace the negativity
that is ascribed to us, rejecting the disciplinary lesson of normalcy in the name of
saving the children. The death drive is a cultural and political fiction that we
should identify with, for embracing the death drive’s negativity enables one to
reject the discourse of deferral in the name of future generations. We can then
reject, rather than acquiesce to, the hetero-normative terms under which debates
are set and public spaces shut down. Also arguing for the socio-political
potential of negativity, Judith Halberstam challenges us to refuse dominant
culture’s narrative of maturity that upholds biological generational transmission
and instead imagine alternative life narratives that break this cycle. Dyke
subcultures, like drag king troupes and the Michigan Womyn’s Festival (albeit a
problematic space for its often lack of acceptance of femmes, BDSM and trans
folks), become sites for developing queer temporalities and counter-publics that
break with the hetero timeline.
The intimacies and counter-publics borne out of negative affects and acts
disrupt the coherency of the dominant life narrative, showing us that we are
clearly not married to only one way of being in the world. Queers have built
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communities and spaces around negative affects like shame for decades. Tim
Dean argues, “the shattering of the civilized ego betokens not the end of sociality
but rather its inception . . . the movement of coming together only to be plunged
into an experience of the nonrelational represents the first step in Bersani’s
account of relationality. The second, correlative step is to trace new forms of
sociability, new ways of being together” (827).
The work of sex-positive feminists like Pat(trick) Califia, Gayle Rubin, and
Dorothy Allison on temporality, space, pleasure, and BDSM in many ways
prefigures queer theory’s anti-social turn. All three participated in the infamous
1982 Pleasure and Danger Conference at Barnard College that was boycotted
and nearly shut down by the National Organization of Women because it
objected to the conference’s focus on non-normative sexualities. Not only
provocative in its foregrounding of “queer” sex acts, Pleasure and Danger
unsettled the class and racial homogeneity of mainstream feminism. I find that
recent scholarship by queer theorists is critically affiliated with this radical
feminist tradition. Both radical feminism and queer theory work aims to dismantle
a normative social matrix that perpetuates racist modes of kinship, class
hierarchies, and conventional intimacies. In the spirit of the ’82 conference and
the work it inspired, I read Stoddard’s novel as an exhortation for us to imagine
alternative models of being and belonging beyond traditional forms of kinship and
intimacy that mediate (and regulate) our relation to the social.
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Dean’s joyful call to make the abject work for us finds its less exuberant
counterpart in a branch of queer theory that in the words of Cassandra’s
contemporary “would prefer not to.” From the potential of the abject, for instance,
to bring people together to form counter-publics for pleasure and coalitionbuilding (Michael Warner, Douglas Crimp), we seem to find ourselves in
theoretical/political slump borne of defeat in the face of the overwhelming triumph
of pride over shame, the valorization of the respectfully private over the luridly
public, and celebrations of monogamy over shameless promiscuity.
Anne Cvetkovich’s work on lesbian depression, Heather Love’s pre-Stonewall
accounts of “ruined and failed sociality,” and Lauren Berlant’s “slow death” all
check Dean’s optimism in the transformative power of the abject. 104 Yet far from
resigned to concede defeat to the liberal strain of the gay and lesbian movement,
these critics acknowledge not only that the “political landscape is bad but that it
also makes you feel bad, and that it make you less capable of taking action”
(Love 159). Rather than focusing on reclaiming public space for adults to
engage in sex and talk, queers are home feeling sad that the project of queer
world making never materialized on a grand scale.105 This is not to say that
these sad sisters would not want to see a turn away from the single focus on gay
marriage in queer politics, for instance. There is a desire in their work for more
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queer counter-publics. But the focus on depression and failed sociality
underscores a kind of melancholy and defeat that is palpable in queer studies
now.
The two strains in queer theory that I have traced here—a public, worldbuilding negativity and a negativity centered on depression and isolation—are
affectively intertwined in Stoddard’s novel. The first we locate in Cassy’s youth,
in her adversarial relationships with her younger sister, Puritanical grandfather,
catty classmates, humorless teachers, and male lovers. The second we find later
in life, when Cassandra marries into old money and secures her position as
mistress of the house. Although Cassandra moves toward that fateful end that
all Victorian heroines must inevitably confront, she inhabits a “now” temporality
that has no business with the future, the deferral of pleasure, or the strictures
regarding gender and intimacy.
The requirements of proper gendering demand that people, particularly
women, lose their bodies and get caught in a loop of continually deferring their
pleasure. We are trained to think and move in a narrow trajectory that takes us to
a very fixed notion of gender and intimacy. Cassy pushes the bounds of this
trajectory. She rejects the image of docile femininity her mother represents.
Cassandra’s sadism enables her to form relationships with people, particularly
men, on her own terms. Sadism is synonymous with activity in the novel and
allows Cassy and her male partners to feel their bodies. Charles Morgeson, her
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first love interest and older, married cousin, loses his life by taking a carriage ride
with Cassandra lead by a wild horse. Both Cassy and Charles know the horse is
dangerous and yet choose to take it for a ride. Are Cassandra and Charles
suicidal? Are these Byronic figures doomed by their incestuous desire for each
other? Or does the ride represent a symbolic break with the mandates of
“mature” adult sexuality prescribed by dominant institutions that structure and
limit intimacy? Cassandra survives the ride but Charles dies, attesting to the real
dangers of stepping outside social norms.
Yet Charles’ death is structurally significant in the novel in that it allows
Stoddard to resolve easily a conventional romantic entanglement. Stoddard
frees her heroine but not without first allowing her to get close to the phallic
power she first associated with her father. Stoddard completes Cassandra’s
lesson in the disentanglement of phallic power from gender identity by having her
father marry Charles’ widow. We might think that Stoddard is engaging in a
perverse game by having Cassy’s father slide into her lover’s position, but
Stoddard’s endgame is far more subversive. Cassy’s father is symbolically
castrated through marriage. Not only is Locke Morgeson’s financial situation
saved by the marriage, but his new wife Alice assumes ownership of her
deceased husband’s business and becomes actively engaged in its day-to-day
operations. From then on, the allure that men held for Cassy dissipates. No
longer enthralled by the power she imagined men possessed, she realizes she
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can avail herself of power at a relational and transactional level, that is rather
than being something men inherently possess, the kind of authority that Cassy is
draw not stems from the power in ownership, something her Alice models for her
when she takes over her deceased husband’s business.
As she ages, the multiple possibilities for association and pleasure
become foreclosed. This is first evident in Cassy’s reservations about her life.
Although Cassandra longs to break with tradition, she remarks that generations
of Morgesons all did the same thing, and were not “progressive or changeable . .
.no tradition of any individuality remains concerning them” (8). The family
practice of naming simply involves choosing a name from the tombstones of
deceased Morgesons. Cassandra’s paternal great grandfather Locke refuses to
do this and chooses original names for the Morgesons sisters. If the Morgesons
had previously entered life under the sign of death, Cassandra and Veronica
begin theirs under more auspicious terms. But no sooner does Cassy begin to
think and act for herself than her mother sends her to her maternal grandfather to
be broken as she was when she was a young girl. The move in The Morgeons,
from endless possibilities and the energy to do things differently than previous
generations to a defeat wherein one’s power comes from managing one’s house
and husband resonates in the fiction of another antebellum writer, Harriet
Beecher Stowe.
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Not disregarding the fact that many critics, including myself, read Uncle
Tom’s Cabin’s ultimate colonial goal as clearly racist and unjust, the
transformative power that informs the novel is astonishing. Writing to inspire
Americans to work to end slavery, Stowe’s concerns went beyond the domestic.
Ann Douglas describes Stowe’s masterpiece as, “ a great book. Not because it is
a great novel, but because it is a great revival sermon, aimed directly at the
conversion of its hearers” (245). With Uncle Tom’s Novel, the “little girl whose
father had complimented her by wishing she were a boy grew up to be a woman
and an artist whose achievement was to beat daddy at his own game, and, more
important, to realize far more fully than he the meaning of the religious
vocabulary they both employed” (245). One of Stowe’s goals was to take to task
weak clergymen like her father who, in her eyes, failed to realize the full potential
of their evangelical mission to end slavery.
Yet the drive to re-imagine the socio-political context that informs one of
the most popular works of U.S. fiction is not present in Stowe’s later novels. The
lack of change in dominant culture, specifically its ongoing unjust treatment of
women, turned Stowe “bitter” (Douglas 244). The “little girl” whose work
surpassed that of her minister father (Lyman Beecher) and brother (Henry Ward
Beecher) abandons her ethical work to write novels that center on “the scene of
man abject under feminine rule” (244). Her horizon of possibilities narrows as her
characters become solely concerned with domestic tyranny rather than effecting
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change on a large scale. In novels like My Wife and I and We and Our
Neighbors, women’s lives are whittled down to shopping, decorating the home,
and (symbolically) castrating their husbands. Douglas reads the circumscribed
sphere of action of Stowe’s later heroines as indicative of Stowe’s own feelings of
impotence borne of defeat and disgust at the economic and political
marginalization and disenfranchisement of women in her culture. Douglas writes,
“Stowe’s disintegration is evident in the New York novels [of the 1860s and
1870s]; and her curious relish at the thinness, the mediocrity of these stories is
equally apparent . . . Stowe’s failure of insight seems almost deliberate; she
could not be making it clearer that her own days of great achievement are
triumphantly over. . . her heroines are average with a vengeance” (247).
Leaving her own brand of sweeping, nonconforming Byronic Romanticism
behind, Stowe defends her friend Lady Byron against her philandering exhusband in Lady Byron Vindicated. Byron, a hero of both Lyman Beecher and
Stowe’s, represented a creativity and nonconformity that inspired her early
writings, but as she came to align herself with the figure of the “wronged wife” via
Lady Byron, Stowe rejected Byronic nonconformity and creativity to the detriment
of her work (Douglas 246). In Stowe’s later work, we see the domestication of
Romanticism, from world-making to house-making.
Stoddard, like Stowe, has an affinity with Romanticism—Cassandra
devours Byron’s Don Juan—and much like her contemporary, she chronicles the
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narrowing of Romantic possibilities, not in the same panoramic sense as Stowe,
but in a professional sense as writer. Stoddard’s preoccupation with property
betrays a desire for financial stability and rage at the conditions that make that
preoccupation central to her life. By the end of The Morgesons Cassandra is
reduced to ruling her father’s home and her reformed alcoholic husband,
Desmond Somers. They live with her catatonic yet once fabulously masochistic
sister Veronica and her child. Veronica’s husband and Desmond’s brother, Ben,
has died from complications due to alcoholism. Both Somers brothers are
afflicted by the family curse: their tyrannical mother, Bellevue Pickersgill Somers,
who gets off on withholding their inheritance until the youngest male heir reaches
maturity. Their bed-ridden father has no money and relies on Bellevue’s wealth.
In one of the novel’s many acts of “perverse” maternity (refreshingly, maternity is
only represented as something unnatural in The Morgesons), Bellevue has a son
when she is close to fifty years of age with her chronically ill husband. This
rather impossible act keeps her children from their inheritance and hence their
freedom until the youngest is of age (I will come back to this later). Although
there are important differences between Cassandra and Bellevue, both women’s
sphere of influence is reduced to the home, representing a defeat of the (literary)
imagination and a reflection of social limitations.
The Morgesons is set in Surrey, an isolated New England seaport town,
where Cassy finds herself completely cut off from the world. The cold weather
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keeps her indoors, bored and obsessed with reading travel narratives that betray
a desire to break out of the house. Not content with staying home to “read the
bible and sew,” Cassandra, from a very early age, shows no signs of paying her
mother any mind (64). Intractably active, Cassandra is unsuited for domesticity.
The novel’s opening lines give voice to feminized frustration with her impish
determination: “‘That child,’ said my aunt Mercy, looking at me with indigocolored eyes, ‘is possessed.’ When my aunt said this I was climbing a chest of
drawers, by its knobs, in order to reach the book-shelves above it, where my
favorite work, The Northern Regions, was kept” (Stoddard 5). “Possessed”
certainly does not describe someone who is “normal” and content with the
domestic, like a docile young girl should be. Cassandra is possessed with a
drive for constant action and movement, made evident as she climbs the drawers
like an animal, as if trying to escape her aunt’s judgmental gaze. The
overdetermined qualifier conflates supernatural and economic registers,
foreshadowing the conflicts that will define the book, both aesthetically and
politically. Cassy soon realizes that she owns her self, and not much else.
Possession becomes a metaphor for the fact that she and no one else is in
control of her life. Her attempt to escape her aunt’s critical gaze illustrates a
feminized version of Huck lighting out for the territory, except Cassy really has no
place to go between her travel books and the desolate view from her window.
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Fleeing to the top of the dresser telegraphs her future sad position as mistress of
all things domestic.
As I stated earlier, at a young age Cassy defines herself against her mother,
the proto-typical angel in the house, who has abstracted herself almost to the
point nonexistence. Mary does not bother to tie her shoes and when she wants
exercise, she watches the sea from her window: “her eyes roved over it when
she wanted a little out-of-doors life” (24). Mary has no sense of self. She does
not so much live in the house as haunts it like a ghost. Her unlaced shoes are a
sign that she is not going anywhere. Mary’s sole function is to model for her
daughter the virtues of femininity, which involve internalizing the violent process
of making girls into women. Stoddard illustrates the result of this process in her
picture of Mary: “her hand was pressed against her breast, as if she were
repressing an inward voice which claimed her attention . . . I thought she wished
me to believe she could have no infirmity in common with me---no temptations,
no errors—that she must repress all the doubts and longings of her heart for
example’s sake” (53, 64).
Intimacy between mother and daughter cannot be based on shared feelings
of rebellion, what Cassy describes as the “infirmity” that Mary is repressing, that
girlhood passion that is read by dominant culture as incongruous with her role as
wife and mother. When Cassandra is sent to stay with her maternal grandfather
to be tamed, or to use her word, “crushed,” she learns that her mother was once
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somewhat like her. Stoddard repeatedly evokes the times that Mary “rode the
white colt bare-back round the big meadow, with her hair flying” to convey who
Mary once was as a young girl, or to put it more precisely, the independence
Mary tried to cultivate before being crushed by her own father (39).
If Cassandra dis-identifies with her mother by over-identifying with her
father, her younger sister Veronica does the exact opposite. Veronica is a
caricature of their mother, a drag version of the angel in the house. Starving and
infantilizing herself, Veronica subsists on a baby’s diet of milk and toast (51). A
masochist, “Verry was educated by sickness; her mind fed and grew on pain, and
at last mastered it . . .upon each recovery a change was visible” (59). Veronica
states that she “need[s] all the illnesses that come,” for she “acquired the
fortitude of an Indian; pain could exhort no groan from her” (67, 59). Veronica
performs the role of the proper white woman who is supposed to be weak,
helpless, homebound, and desexualized. Veronica’s over-the-top performance
actually undoes and reveals the artificiality of all gender identities.106 She
exaggerates femininity to such a degree that it no longer passes as natural. I
mentioned that Veronica is Mary in drag, but with an important difference. Her
staged performances of illness telegraph the ways that Veronica is actually in
control of her body. Through her masochism, Veronica is able to actively
perform an identity that allows for her empowerment. As Marianne Noble
counter-intuitively argues, the Victorian angel in the house lived in a state of
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subservience she manipulated in order to feel the (masochistic) pleasure denied
the evanescent self she was supposed to be.107 Veronica tells her mother and
aunt Mercy, “I believe that Grand’ther Warren nearly crushed you and mother,
when girls of our age. Did you know that you had any wants then? or dare to
dream anything beside that he laid down for you?” (64). As her statement makes
clear, Veronica is keenly aware of the structures of power that govern and limit
women’s lives. Her masochism allows her to avoid losing her own body and
being “crushed.” She is fierce and powerful: “I feel evil still. You know, that my
temper is worse than ever; it is like a tiger’s” (52). Veronica’s anger, which she
expresses in masochistic acts, is a negative affect that enables her to actively
maintain control over and feel her body. Her choice of animal, the tiger, shows
that herself-abjection has a powerful dimension.
Masochism, as Noble argues, and sadism, which I have made a case for
throughout this project, are important erotic modes for women. Sadism and
masochism allow Cassandra and Veronica to take control of their bodies, albeit
differently, in opposition to the cruelty and violence the process of proper
gendering entails. Sadistic and masochistic relations affectively structure the
novel: one sister’s action arouses the other, allowing them to break out of the
monotony of their lives by eroticizing the quotidian. For example, as a young girl,
Cassandra is kicked out of school for her bad behavior. Cassy comes home to
report the news and doesn’t get much of a reaction from her parents. In
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response, she takes her father’s whip and strikes their dog (12). Cassy’s violent
action arouses a climactic reaction in Veronica, who smashes a pitcher of milk on
her own head in response (12). The sisters’ actions cause Mary to finally wake
up, and in an uncharacteristic manner, stamp her foot, clench her hands and ask,
“What have I done, to be so tormented by these terrible children?” (12-13). Now
all three women are finally acting (out); it is telling that Locke Morgeson simply
leaves the room as the women take over. With the father gone, the scene is set
for relations between women unmediated by the law of the father. “At the right
moment,” Veronica delivers the scene’s final lines, “Help Verry, she is sorry” (13).
As Stoddard’s language suggests, there is something tellingly rehearsed about
what we just witnessed. Even Veronica’s self-referential lines in the third person
illustrate a meta-fictional comment on their routine. By neutralizing parental
authority, the sisters can temporarily disrupt domesticity and reclaim that space
as a site of pleasure where the conventional rules of the domestic do not apply.
The subversive limitations of this early ludic scene are highlighted later in
the novel when the sisters, now much older, reenact their routine and find it
lacking, even though they have included their servant Fanny in the theatrics.
After one of her last extended stays away from home, Cassandra returns
indefinitely, lonely and depressed with her lack of options: “I must be my own
society . . . what a dreary prospect! The past was vital, the present dead! Life in
Surrey must be dull” (131). No longer in the company of strangers, Cassandra
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finds herself isolated and homebound, face to face with a future not unlike her
mother’s. Her only reprieve, as when a child, involves accompanying her father
on business. Cassy’s trips outside do not last, though, when her mother
reproaches her father “for allowing me to adopt the habits of a man” (142). Like
a heroine out of a late Stowe novel, Cassy now fills her days with shopping and
decorating her bedroom, for she claims that, “I had a comfortable sense of
property, when I took possession of my own room” (129). Her only sphere of
influence is her room and she can only have a public life through consumption, in
that shopping is one of the few ways for her to be out of the house. Her public
self is certainly limited to commodity consumption for the ends of redesigning
“private” space.
After months of decorating, Cassy unveils her new bedroom to the family.
Veronica’s response is that the only “reality” in the room is the fire in the fireplace
(a remnant of Cassy’s once strong passion), because the room simply seems
filled with pointless commodities (145). Veronica’s perception of the
pointlessness to Cassy’s room and vanilla life now spent buying stuff to decorate
arouses Cassy’s anger. She responds to Veronica with, “What if I should say you
provoke me, perverse girl?” (145). To which Veronica replies, “I wish you would;
I should like to hear something natural from you” (145). Disappointed with her
sister’s newfound interest in middle-class diversions, Veronica prefers the
aggressive, nasty Cassy to this faux version of her sister. The bedroom décor
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drama comes to a climax when the servant girl Fanny, overhearing the sisters’
exchange, exclaims, “with an expression of enjoyment,” that the “sisters don’t
love one another” (145). What starts out as Cassy’s proud Martha Stewart
moment begins to disintegrate into a cat fight. The passion that the fire
symbolizes, the only “reality” in the room, according to Veronica, is now
embodied in the intensity between the women:
Veronica’s eyes shot more sparks than the disturbed coals, for
Fanny’s speech enraged her. Giving her head a toss, which swept
her hair behind her shoulders, she darted at Fanny, and picked her
up from the wood, with as much ease as if it had been her
handkerchief, instead of a girl nearly as heavy as herself. I started
up. “Sit still,” she said to me, in her low, inflexible voice, holding
Fanny against the wall. “I must attend to this little demon.” (145)

No longer about showcasing middle class taste, the scene in the room becomes
charged with violent intensity. By lifting Fanny off the ground, Veronica’s show of
force rouses Cassy out of her Stepford wife existence, and brings the sisters in
close, interclass contact with Fanny, thus reinforcing the reality of economic
inequality while also acknowledging Fanny’s presence, not as a invisible menial
but as someone who dares to enter the sisters’ perverse game. The “fourth wall”
is broken as Fanny insinuates herself in the sisters’ conversation, and Veronica,
rather than ignore the help, pulls Fanny into the scene.
Frustrated with their limited options as women, all three lash out at each
other rather than at patriarchy. Yet what the routine played out by Veronica,
Cassandra, and Fanny produces actually works against the process of
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feminization. By acting up and experiencing their bodies, the women are not
docile, desexualized subjects. Fanny responds to Veronica with, “I do believe,
Miss Veronica, that you are going to be sick, I feel so in my bones.” Fanny
affectively identifies with Veronica’s masochism, for her bones ache too (145).
Fanny does not, “express any astonishment or resentment at that treatment she
had received,” hinting at the fact that Fanny is just fine with Veronica’s violent
outburst, perhaps experiencing some pleasure from the contact that is an excess
of an abusive moment (145). Knowing that Veronica experienced pleasure from
the scene she set up, Fanny predicts that Veronica will now have a masochistic
release through one of her “illnesses,” which is indeed what happens next.
Veronica dramatically exclaims, “It is winter that kills little Verry,” which
causes Cassy to erupt in laughter, soon followed by Veronica (147). Their
laughter embodies the pleasurable release their performance enabled. Fanny
adds that she likes Veronica because she is “fond of people who have their ups
and downs”: such a range of affect produces sensation which brings bodies
together and engenders contact, not pathology or weakness (147).
Although they do not have a conventional relationship, Veronica’s words
and actions make it clear that she loves both Cassandra and Fanny. Veronica
tells Fanny, “Are you, with your small, starved spirit, equal to any judgment
against her? I admire her; you do, too. I love her, and I love you, you pitiful,
ignorant brat” (145). What may be read as the mistress’s angry scolding of the
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servant becomes in Stoddard an honest expression of love across class
differences. This is not to say that the Morgeson sisters are socialists, but, within
the socially compromised conditions in which their lives unfold, the expressions
of rage that punctuate the novel temporarily suspend the normal rules of society
and at least affectively a different way of doing things is experienced. When
Mary Morgeson worries that Fanny is not “grateful” for her job as a servant,
Veronica responds with “why must people be grateful?” (129). Veronica accepts
Fanny the way that she is and does not expect her to act like the humble, selfdeprecating servant. What angers Veronica is not Fanny’s pride, but that Fanny
(purposefully) misreads the unconventional intimacy between the sisters.
The affective connection among the women would not have been possible
if they “knew their place” and behaved properly according to the strictures of
nineteenth-century femininity. The pleasure resulting from the over-the-top acts
of aggression—unsanctioned intimacies fighting their ways into expression—is a
release of the tension and pain in a body forced into a straight jacket of proper
femininity. Freud’s construction of femininity allows us to better understand
society’s impact on the formation of feminine subjectivity. According to Freud,
young girls have to let go of the aggressivity and active desire associated with
clitoral stimulation in order to remap and limit their erogenous zones to the
passive vagina, preparing the way for proper adult sex via penetration (resulting
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in the baby-penis-substitute from the daddy-substitute).108 Despite the many
problems (I don’t even have enough room here to work through these) with
Freud’s essentialist formulation, what I want to limn from his theory is that all
adults, especially women, have to forgo the polymorphous pleasures of infantile
sexuality in order to become mature adults. Whereas children find their entire
bodies to be possible sites of pleasure, adult sexuality requires that we reduce
that pleasure to the genitals and according to Freud, women have to go the extra
step of reducing pleasure from the active clitoris to the passive vagina. This
results in a lot of repressed tension and rage. It’s no wonder that Veronica throws
Fanny against the wall and both seem to enjoy it. The body is not reduced to one
possible site of pleasure, but, as Veronica’s chronic masochism attests to, an
entire site of eroticism.
The Morgesons effectively neutralize the presence of their father in their
play, allowing a kind of “promiscuous sociability,” to borrow Tim Dean’s phrase,
to come into being “unconstrained by Oedipus” (827). The intensity of their
rough housing aims to negate identity and foreground a plane of intensity
charged with transformative possibilities. If, as Deleuze has theorized, sadism
negates the ego in an attempt to transcend secondary nature (the world of
experience—the Symbolic) and reach primary nature (a plan of transcendence
where identity does not exist—the Real), then Cassandra’s repeated acts of
aggression enable her to work against the fiction of a coherent self and the
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constraining mandates of the ego, opening her up to a promiscuous sociability
beyond the couple form and conventional domesticity.109 She can engage in
pleasures and intimacies free from the restraints of proper femininity, which
would require her to reject her mother (the female) as a possible love object,
accept her “castrated” sexuality, and find a man-just-like-daddy to give her the
penis/baby.
Foucault takes Deleuze’s philosophical understanding of the work of Sade
and Masoch and develops a pragmatic model of sociality, theorizing the ways in
which BDSM allows for people to remap their bodies beyond genital sexuality110
BDSM requires a kind of bodily communication predicated upon affective
response, not necessarily verbal disclosure. Foucault explains that “S/M is not a
relationship between he (or she) who suffers and he (or she) who inflicts
suffering, but between the master and the one on whom he exercises. What
interests the practitioners of S/M is that the relationship is at the same time
regulated and open . . . The idea is to also make use of every part of the body as
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See Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty.”

Feminists like Dorothy Allison and Lynda Hart have written about the ways in which BDSM
allows survivors of rape and sexual abuse to reclaim and actually feel their bodies. Hart writes
eloquently about how BDSM is a way for survivors to replay the trauma with a difference, to
traverse the fantasy and “go into the abyss” with one’s partner(s), only out stronger. Drawing on
Butler’s work on gender performativity and Eve Sedgwick’s work on performing shame, Hart
argues that the repetition entailed in working through trauma changes the trauma and allows
survivors to take control of and resignify their bodies as sites of pleasure through trust,
communication, control, routine, and an understanding of the power dynamics that structure all
relationships. See Hart, Between the Body and the Flesh: Performing S/M, and Allison, Skin:
Talking About Sex, Class, and Literature and Two or Three Things I Know For Sure. While it is
clear that Veronica and Cassy are not survivors of sexual abuse, I think their actions are informed
by an S/M logic allows for them to work through the violence of proper gendering and take control
of their bodies.
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a sexual instrument” (“Sexual Choice, Sexual Act” 132). In The Morgesons,
sadism and masochism represent ways to recombine pleasure and power that
work better and offer possibilities for intimacy that are not based on sameness
and equality. Foucault’s construction of modern day BDSM practices is similar to
the theatricized, aggressive intensity in The Morgesons. Rather than forgo their
bodies and get caught in the loop of desire constantly deferring pleasure, the
sisters take control of their bodies as surfaces of multiple pleasures, and engage
in relationships with others on their own terms, rather than those prescribed for
them by dominant culture. In Stoddard’s novel, sadistic and masochistic acts
involve something one body does to another, therefore returning the erotic to a
body in a familial and cultural setting that tries to take everything out of the body,
especially for women. BDSM floods the body with intense, diverse sensations.
Veronica’s frequent, self-induced bouts of illnesses, for example, allow her to
master her body, not to necessarily suffer. Veronica’s future husband, Ben
Somers, describes her as “master of herself . . .she is an extraordinary girl;
independent of kith and kin” (100).
The structures of power and their attending violence that make up the
domestic are laid bare and manipulated by the Morgeson sisters for their own
empowerment, however limited or unsustained. Cassy does not desire to make
the men in her life suffer; rather, she will not participate in conventional romantic
relationships that require the woman to forgo the active dimension of her power.
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To return to Freud: if woman must be symbolically castrated (reject the clitoris
and renounce the possibility for ongoing pleasure) in order to be come docile
feminine subjects, Cassandra is going to reverse that formulation and
symbolically castrate her beaus. Rather than accept the impoverished notion of
mature adult sexuality, Cassy’s sadism allows her (and her male partners) to reimagine their bodies. It is telling that there is no allusion to a traditional sexual
consummation of any of Cassandra’s relationships with men. Elizabeth Stockton
argues that Stoddard, “like conventional novelists, condones sexual
consummation only within marriage” (429). While true, this is a very narrow
understanding of what constitutes sex. The eroticism in The Morgesons
manifests itself differently, in far more compelling ways. This novel absolutely
sizzles with passion. This is a sex-positive book. My students are always
shocked that it was written in the 1860s, imposing their own repressive
hypothesis on antebellum America as they first want to read the period as
sexually repressed. This novel challenges their assumptions about the
nineteenth-century as well as their own assumptions about how intimacy and
pleasure work today.
If women are supposed to lose their bodies, deny themselves pleasure, if
inter-class intimacy, for instance, is prohibited, what might such contact, such
sensation, look like? These intimacies have no script. Why does only one way of
being and belonging in the world count? As Michel Foucault argues, friendships,
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unlike conventional relationships like the couple form, allows for individuals to
define their relationships on their own terms. Friendships have no script, no “love
plot,” and are relationships not necessarily based on full disclosure, equality, or
sexual consummation. Foucault explains that friends, “face each other without
terms or convenient words, with nothing to assure them about the meaning of the
movement that carries them toward each other. They have to invent, from A to Z,
a relationship that is still formless, which is friendship: that is to say, the sum of
everything through which they can give each other pleasure” (“Friendship As A
Way of Life” 136).
The drive that motivates Veronica’s and Fanny’s actions is still formless
yet powerful. The affect that women are required to suppress in order to be
proper feminized subjects comes out as Veronica throws Fanny against the wall.
This eroticized act, grounded in negativity (violence), allows for new forms of
contact to begin to come into being. Berlant terms these unconventional
intimacies not sanctioned by dominant institutions “minor intimacies,” arguing that
Desires for intimacy that bypass the couple or the life narratives it
generates have no alternative plots. Let alone few laws and stable
spaces in culture in which to clarify and to cultivate them. What
happens to . . .the glances, gestures, encounters, collaborations,
or fantasies that have no canon? As with minor literatures, minor
intimacies have been forced to develop aesthetics of the extreme to
push these spaces into being by way of small and grand gestures.
(5)
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The over-the-top acts of aggression and self abjection that inform the novel
represent Berlant’s “aesthetics of the extreme,” which bring minor intimacies into
being. Through her feminized figures, especially her heroine, Stoddard pushes
against the love plot, one of the few narratives available to women writers of her
time. Non-standard intimacies in The Morgesons become occasions for
rethinking the social beyond the predictable conventions most sentimental
domestic novels give us. For example, when Charles buys her roses and
declares his love for her, Cassandra loses interest in him since she refuses to be
trapped in the love plot. The outbursts of rage, cruelty, and passion take us out of
the conventional narrative of desire and its deferral: pining away for prince
charming until the novel’s concluding act of marriage where the relationship is
finally consummated in the most vanilla way imaginable. Stoddard’s jagged,
abrupt style is best suited to convey non-standard intimacies and pleasures not
easily articulated.
Cassandra’s flirtation with her married cousin Charles becomes an
instance where her play-acting with her sister and servant finds expression in
everyday life. Stoddard is not just rehearsing the standard tragic plot of doomed
love. Neither is she saying that if Alice were not in the picture, Cassy and
Charles could live happily ever after. The point of having these two together, of
creating illicit friction between them, is Stoddard’s way of having her readers
confront compromised passion. Charles’ and Cassy’s affair is not just some
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cheap, titillating trick. Rather, Stoddard mines this romantic convention to
scandalously subversive ends. Cassy does not want to take Alice’s place and
end up miserable like her; she enjoys the minor intrigue, the pleasures of
thwarted desire, and violating the sanctity of marriage.
Laura Kipnis writes about the ways in which adultery, what many consider
antisocial behavior, actually engenders new feelings of possibility in people who
have given up, who have been miserable going through the motions of the
conventional love plot: “Among adultery’s risks would be living, even briefly, as if
you had the conviction that discontent wasn’t a natural condition, that as-yetunknown forms of gratification and fulfillment were possible” (42). Adultery allows
“space for new forms to come into being” (42). Kipnis cautions that she is not
being prescriptive—hers is not a “go out an commit adultery” argument—nor am I
arguing that engaging in sadistic or masochistic behavior will remedy one’s life or
the social. But what these “bad behaviors” represent affectively is the possibility
for “inappropriate” intimacies and minor gestures that can transform our everyday
lives. Such possibilities are trying to force themselves into being, “like tiny,
delicate sprouts struggling up through the hard dirt,” against “an array of sharpbladed mechanisms stand[ing] ready to mow them effectively into mulch before
they manage to take root!” (Kipnis 43).
II.
Crushed flowers are a recurring image in The Morgesons. An obvious
symbol of budding sexuality, flowers are cultivated only to be trampled. Young
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girls are sent off to stern patriarchs and cruel schoolmistresses to be instructed
into docile womanhood. At school, Cassy is bored with the routinized exercises
of learning by rote, lessons which do not encourage the use of her imagination.
When the town minister visits the school, her teacher, Mrs. Desire, praises
Cassy’s work even though she has done her lessons with “dignified inaccuracy”
(11). Cassy is angered by the false praise. Miss Desire, as her name implies,
misses what Cassy really wants. Thinking that praise will make Cassy a better
student, Miss Desire hopes that her comments will compel Cassy to see herself
through the eyes of an authority figure. Miss Desire woefully misrecognizes that
Cassy has no interest in seeing herself as an object worthy of love. The young
Cassy is the self-reliant Emersonian subject par excellence. She is “determined
to punish Miss Desire for the undeserved praise” and stomps on a loose
floorboard (12). Cassy is permanently kicked out of school for her actions, and
marches home with the “air of a conqueror” (12).
Her defiant behavior leads her mother to send her away to Grandfather
Warren’s to be “crushed”: “It was because she wished me to comprehend the
influences of her early life, and learn some of the lessons she had been taught”
(27). When modern scholarly discipline fails, the old patriarchal, Puritanical order
is called in to finish what benevolent suasion could not accomplish. A “puritan,
without gentleness or tenderness,” Grandfather Warren keeps his home cold,
does not allow Cassy to eat much, talk much, or read any book other than the
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bible. She must sit on an “oak chair, whose back of upright rods was my nightly
penance” (33). Since the structures of power at her grandfather’s house are
rendered visible, Cassy figures out how things work and avoids being crushed.
When feeling pained, bored, and isolated, Cassy redirects her rage outward
rather than internalize and suppress it. For instance, she stomps on the bed of
chamomiles, pinches the cat’s tail, and crushes a cricket during a church service
(31-33). Grandfather Warren’s strict policies do not work on Cassandra. If he
managed successfully to crush his daughters through these practices, his
granddaughter mimetically applies what is done to her onto things that she can
exercise control over. In a sense, she does not become subservient to her
grandfather but simply imitates him.
Cassandra’s only escape each day is her new school for girls, run by Miss
Black. Miss Black’s school, which operates under the logic of cruel discipline,
stands in stark contrast to Grandfather’s Warren’s house, where power is
ideologically bare. Her schoolmates and teacher unite against her and are mean
to her in a passive-aggressive way. Miss Black tells Cassandra that her name is
too “extravagant” and attempts to strip her of her individuality by calling her “Miss
C. Morgeson” (37). Through cruel stares and whispers about her appearance
and family, the girls at first bring down the usually proud Cassy. The wealthy girls
who come from old money (from the slave trade), not new money like
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Cassandra, ask her questions like, “Is your father a tailor,” meant to bring about
class shame in her (40).
However, Cassy will take no more passive-aggressive abuse and brings
her grandfather’s lessons to the classroom. After one of the girls makes a
comment about her mother, Cassy, “struck her so violent a blow in the face that
she staggered backward (40-1). Cassy throws a book at another girl and hits her
in the head (41). Miss Black, of course, sides with the girls whose bullying of
Cassy she has ignored. Cassy will not ask for her pardon and Miss Desire tells
her she is a “bad girl,” to which Cassy tells her that she is “a bad woman, mean
and cruel” (41). Miss Black makes a motion to strike Cassy but does not. Rather,
she calls her a “peculiar case” (41). Cassy takes control of the situation and lays
the disciplinary violence of the classroom bare with her acts of aggression.
According to the logic of discipline, Cassandra becomes a “peculiar case” as she
is pathologized for her behavior. There is something wrong “inside” of her that
must be addressed by her surrender to institutional discipline. In Cassandra’s
world of punishment, there is simply an injustice that needs to be remedied, for
acts are not meant to reveal the secrets of one’s interiority.
Sending Cassandra away to be civilized/feminized backfires. Rather than
internalize discipline and produce an obedient subject, Cassy mimics her
grandfather’s punitive strictures, resisting discipline’s inward turn and choosing
instead to remain on the flat surface of punishment. Her stubborn pupilage
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refuses identification with the disciplinary gaze of the other; instead, she is
fascinated with the naked aggression of her grandfather’s puritanical will.
Meaner and leaner, Cassandra returns to her father’s house having honed
her cruelty at the proverbial school of hard knocks. Cassandra “makes her debut
as a grown girl” at a Surrey bible class, where she is the center of attention. Her
old girlhood beau, Joe Bacon, offers to walk her home. After not having seen Joe
in a long time, she is “disappointed in how young and shabby he looked!” and
finds that “the suspicion that he had a serious liking for me was disgusting” (55).
Her disgust of course implies that she realizes that she can do much better
socially and economically than this “shabby” son of a “sea-going father” (54).
Each of Cassy’s subsequent male love interests will rise in social and class rank,
from new money Charles Morgeson to old money Desmond Somers. Growing
annoyed as she and Joe walk home, Cassy pulls her hand from his arm, but
when she sees that his face “looked intelligent with pain” at her rejection, Cassy
feels bad and lets him open the door for her as consolation (55). Cassandra’s
walk home with Joe Bacon is representative of her dynamic with men throughout
her life: her cruelty towards them binds them to her, and their ongoing courting of
her signals the sealing of a contract, with phallic authority transferred to
Cassandra.
Cassy is not easy to love and her weaker suitors often do not survive the
early stages of the romance. For instance, the unfortunate Joe Bacon dies,
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allowing Cassy to move on to a more difficult conquest in her married cousin
Charles. Cassy is drawn to self-destructive men. She recognizes in their death
drive a desire for the undoing of proper masculinity and an inversion of existing
sexual relations consistent with her own enjoyment. This is not always apparent
to them and their courtship is marked by the internal conflict they exhibit when
what they want clashes with what they do. For instance, Charles starts out
courting Cassy in conventional ways, which flatters her at first, but she soon
grows impatient, and begins to resist his romantic attentions. These gestures, in
her mind, lead to the kind of relationship he has with his wife Alice, which Cassy
has no interest in pursuing. Her rejection of conventional advances prompts him
to meet her challenges in increasingly self-destructive ways. Their relationship
becomes a fort da game, a give and take of erotic power that is momentarily
enjoyable for both of them but tragically unsustainable.
Charles’ brooding character attracts Cassy. Uncertain of what he is
thinking or wants, Cassy enjoys “guessing each day whether I [she] was to
offend or please him” (74). Not content with merely pleasing Charles, Cassy
prefers to engage him in contests of “resistance and defiance” (74). With each
romantic gesture—a ring, roses, proclamations of love—Cassy responds by
prodding Charles to take her on a carriage ride with his wildest horse, rejecting
his silly tokens of affection (103,106). Whereas Alice worries that it is Charles
who tempts Cassy into taking the carriage ride, Charles sets her straight:
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“Tempted! Cassandra is never tempted. What she does, she does because she
will. Don’t worry yourself, Alice, about her” (98). Charles recognizes in
Cassandra, not a passive subject, but someone very much in control of her life
who knows what she wants, as daring and passionate as he is and not content to
remain a spectator of his actions but an active participant in them.
It is important to note that Cassy’s relationship with Charles is not an
instance of the Freudian family romance. It is not that she wants to consummate
her relationship with her father through her cousin. What I have been tracing
throughout this chapter are the ways in which Cassy identifies with phallic power.
She initially wants to be treated as an equal but eventually seeks to surpass the
men in her life. Cassy does not want her relationship with Charles to be properly
consummated because then she will become like Alice and the multiple
pleasures her acts of aggression afford her will be reduced to conventional sex.
When trying to explain to others her relationship with Charles, she finds that she
cannot because there is no script for their intimacy (101).
Their relationship is defined by Cassy’s initial resistance to Charles’
attempts to make her a part of his life. He sees her as both a flower to be
cultivated and a horse to be tamed, the two favorite activities that occupy his life.
Her resistance to this process is what turns him on. Charles treats her like one of
his possessions, but she refuses to be another object that he uses to sublimate
his passions and cope with his constrained existence. All of the gift giving
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culminates in Charles’ proclamation of love for Cassandra, to which she
responds, “Never say those frightful words again. Never, never ” (109). Charles
attempts to force Cassy into a conventional romantic script, one that she upends,
liberating them both from heteronormative conventions.
Stoddard does not give her characters many options. Not drawn to
flowers, Cassy’s passion is mirrored in Charles’ wild horses. She keeps asking
him to take her on carriage ride with his newest brute, a dangerous, untamed
horse. But what appears at first a predictable metaphor for their frustrated love,
the wild horse is actually Stoddard’s critique of the suicidal Byronic hero, who,
unable to break with convention, chooses death. Out on the fatal ride,
Cassandra notices the agitated horse, but decides to ride on even though
Charles tells her, “If you are afraid, you must not come with me. I can have you
sent home” (120). To make matters worse, it starts to rain, and Charles, clearly
working out his death wish, insists on putting the top up on the carriage knowing
it will scare the horse (121). Startled, the horse throws them from the carriage,
injuring Cassy and killing Charles. A femme fatale, Cassy incites Charles’s
desire for something other than heteroconventionality, but all he can do is flirt
with the idea of reimagining his life. Unable to act on his desire, Charles is of no
use to her and dies. One by one the novel disables the myths that make up the
romantic sentimental tradition, hollowing them out from within the shell of this
strange narrative.
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When she awakes from the accident, Cassy feels no guilt. She “laughed
loudly” upon learning that Charles was indeed dead, and does not cry (121).
Stoddard thwarts sentimental identification by having the heroine show no
remorse or guilt for her part in Charles’ death. Once she returns to her father’s
home after the accident, depressed over her lack of options, Cassy is haunted by
a “specter” of the deceased Charles (131). Rather than avoid facing
responsibility for Charles’ death, Cassandra chooses to confront the ghost (131).
The specter asks if she feels “remorse and repentance” for Charles’ demise, to
which Cassy answers, “Neither!” (131).
We must be mindful not to make too much of Cassandra’s agency here. After
all, as Charles’ counterpart, Cassy is often ridiculous in her Byronic postures. It
is Alice who benefits most from Charles’ death. Yet again deflating conventions
of Romanticism, Stoddard is not ready to dispatch her heroine. Rather, she uses
Cassy to highlight, in Alice’s assumption of her husband’s business, where power
in a capitalist economy truly lies. Alice does not shrink from power and
responsibility but steps out of the home and becomes a successful
businesswoman, much to Cassandra’s surprise. Alice makes Charles’ death
work to her advantage in that she will now run the mills. Cassandra says of Alice
that, “it was no longer society, dress, housekeeping, which absorbed her, but a
larger interest in the world. None of her children were with her; had it been three
years earlier, she would not have left home without them” (153). Alice’s new
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found independence enables her to voice her affinity with Cassy, noting that she
understands her former rival ‘to the bone and marrow’” (429). Yet Stoddard is
careful to check this deep connection by having Alice marry Cassandra’s
financially ruined father, thereby thwarting the possibility of sisterhood and
burdening her heroine with the proverbial mean stepmother. Alice is too involved
in reproducing the hierarchy at the center of the family romance, where
Cassandra seeks ways to divorce kinship from power. Stoddard’s protracted
analysis of these characters allows her to explore the limitations of romanticism
(i.e. Cassandra’s and Charles’s) in a society where kin and wealth are intricately
intertwined, as suggested by the novel’s title and the incestuous nature of
Cassandra’s mature love interests.
III.
With Charles’s death, Stoddard signals an end to Cassy’s passionate
romanticism. The symbolic appropriation of phallic power that defines her youth
becomes associated in the later part of the novel with the generational
transmission of wealth, as evidenced in Cassy’s final visit to her distant rich
relations, the Somers and the erotic possibilities that ensue thereof. In Bellevue
Pickersgill Somers, Stoddard creates Cassy’s most formidable rival and ideal
ego. Mother to Ben and Desmond Sommers, both of whom Cassy considers
prospects, Bellevue lords her wealth over her family, going so far as having a son
late in life to maintain control of the family’s wealth: her father, Simon Pickersgill,

204
“tied up the main part of his money for his grandchildren. It was to be divided
among them when the youngest son should arrive at the age of twenty-one”
(169). In an incredible scene at a Somers’ dinner party, Cassy narrates, “With
the walnuts, one of the ladies asked for the baby,” prompting Bellevue to serve
both on the table (169). Bellevue metaphorically serves her young to her other
children, taunting her older sons to devour the impediment to their financial
freedom.
Stern argues that the baby on the table, “swallowing its fists and fretfully
crying,” is “the most heart breaking dimension of the entire episode: he is the
novel’s youngest victim of motherly feeling gone to hell” (121). For this New
England Medea, family ties are stronger when wealth is involved. But in this
monstrous gesture it is not just motherhood that is emptied of sentimentality, but
family life in general given that the brothers wish the “brat dead” (191).
Stoddard’s critique of family is devastating in that a woman in her fifties has to
have a child in order to secure her financial position, pitying every member of the
family against each other.
Stoddard follows this scene of domestic cannibalism with one of spinsterhood
bliss. In contrast to the Somers’ barbarous conflict, Stoddard offers Cassy a view
from the other side of family hell. On a visit to the unattached and intellectually
impressive Miss Hiticutt, Cassy and Mrs. Somers are confronted with economic
privilege devoid of familial attachments: even Bellevue finds herself in silent awe
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of Miss Hiticutt, for she was “of the real Belem azure in blood as well as in brain .
. . she was rich and would never marry.” In her company, Cassy experienced a
“new pleasure” (170). By having the dinner party scene followed by the visit with
Miss Hiticutt, Stoddard juxtaposes two models of sociality, both predicated on
wealth and privilege, the second, a same-sex fantasy that sublimates the
recrimination and violence of the first. Contra Stern, I am arguing that Stoddard
does not inject a dose of maternal sentimentality into the dinner party scene: the
poor baby swallowing its fist and crying as representative of maternal neglect.
Stoddard’s description of the scene is clinical, uninvolved: “With the walnuts one
of the ladies asked for the baby . . .Mrs. Somers took it from her, and placed it on
the table; it tottered and nodded . . .When Murphy announced coffee in the
parlor, the nurse took it away” (169). She is not interested in reforming Bellevue,
making her a more loving mother. The juxtaposition of the scenes is designed to
offer Cassy two fake choices. They are fake because, given her current
situation, Cassy is cut off from any access to wealth. She is not born into it like
Miss Hiticutt and Bellevue. The best that she can do is mortgage herself to the
Somers family via marriage to Desmond.
To get to Desmond, Cassandra has to get past Bellevue, who sees Cassy
as a social climber, an aspirant to her family money. Bellevue continually
reminds Cassy that Desmond will break her, and not the other way around: “he
has played with such toys as you are, and broken them” (193). Not content to
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play the submissive role to Bellevue’s domineering matriarch, Cassy stands up to
Bellevue in a way neither Desmond or Ben can, for Desmond is all bravado but is
really weak. Cassy warns Bellevue that, “If you touch me it will rouse me. Did a
child of yours ever inflict a blow upon you?” (193). Stripped of any form of
symbolic authority, when confronted, Cassy resorts to the threat of physical
violence. She seems incapable of compromising, of going along to get what she
wants. Imposing in their own ways, Cassandra and Bellevue are two of a kind.
Not surprisingly, the Somers brothers are drawn to Cassy. In this contest, it is
Cassy who has everything to lose.
Bellevue presides over Desmond and Cassandra’s romance. In violent
manner, typical of Stoddard’s depiction of the relation between the sexes, Cassy
and Desmond engage in naughty flirtation, of the “would you light my candle”
variety. Offering to light her candle before she goes to bed, Desmond takes it
from her and begins “thrusting it between the bars of the grate,” causing Cassy to
grow “chilly” (185). Surrendering the obvious symbol of desire does not sit well
with Cassandra. Desmond must stoop to conquer, and he does, banging his
head on his way up on “the edge of the marble shelf” (185). Visibly flushed with
excitement over Desmond’s accident, Cassy shuts the door, and “leaned against
it” for support (185). Cassy is turned on by Desmond’s failure at gallantry. This
accident is a defining erotic moment for Cassandra. At the novel’s conclusion,
when the now reformed and weak Desmond comes back to her, Cassy tells him
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that she has loved him since “you struck your head under the mantel” (251). But
before she can resume her courting, this time enjoying the upper hand, Bellevue
thwarts Cassy’s plans.
Fiercely protective of her wealth, Bellevue, who has been listening at the
door, forces her way into the parlor. Having short-circuited her son’s liaison,
Bellevue disrupts Cassy’s play with Desmond, setting Cassy off: “Anger raged
through me—like the fierce rain that strikes flat a violent sea. I laid my hand on
her arm, which she snapped at like a wolf, but I spoke calmly: ‘Allow me to light
my candle by yours!’ I picked it from the hearth, lighted it, and held it close to her
face, laughing” (186). Cassandra is back in control of the token of phallic power,
the candle, which she uses to neutralize Bellevue’s attempt to control the scene.
Even after Cassy has gone to bed, her candle’s wick still “glowed in the dark like
a one-eyed demon” (187). But this symbol of Cassy’s ongoing passion is cold
comfort as her options become more limited. No match for Bellevue in her own
home, Cassy exits the parlor and leaves the Somers’ home shortly there after. In
this last confrontation with Bellevue, Stoddard has her heroine realize something
about herself and the society that she lives in that was not apparent to her when
she played with her sister. Whereas Cassy’s mastery of the earlier scene was
predicated on the financial stability her father’s business afforded, her now
precarious situation hinges on her ability to secure a wealthy husband. Stoddard
highlights the similarities between Cassandra and Bellevue, telegraphing her
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heroine’s path to maturity. Cassy loses this particular battle but eventually gains
the upper hand when the baby dies and Desmond and Ben inherit the fortune. It
is telling that with the death of her youngest son, Bellevue loses her power and
vanishes from the narrative. The exuberant, passionate, and inarticulate
outbursts that early on defied conventions of intimacy Stoddard now reduces in
the novel’s conclusion to a different kind of inarticulacy, one defined by romantic
conventions and the desire for real estate.
Some critics read the conclusion of the novel with Cassandra’s marriage
to Desmond and ownership of her father’s house as Cassy’s “descent into
ladyhood” (Alaimo 35). Stacy Alaimo argues, “Though Cassandra’s inheritance
of the house should empower her, the close identification between Cass and her
house suggests that she has internalized her external entrapment within the
domestic realm” (35). In keeping with Alaimo, Penner claims that, “Cassy
realizes the impossibility of ever ‘leaving the confines of [her] own life’ and
resigns herself to the notion that she will ‘reign, and serve also’ in her home, a
paradox that suggests both her self-possession and subordination of her own
wants to the needs or desires of others” (144). Cassandra may (or may not) own
her house but her life is in some ways similar to Bellevue’s, in that her financial
situation is dependent on men, Desmond and Ben.111 The possibilities for
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Stockton argues that, “It is striking, for example, that the novelist fails to mention who actually
owns the Morgeson house after the two [Cassy and Desmond] marry” (429).
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intimacy with strangers that define the first half of the novel comes to an end
when she marries and takes over her father’s house.
Throughout the novel, Cassandra has found intimacy with men like
Charles and Desmond who bring out her strength, who make her sadism
possible, the sadism which allows for them to be broken. Cassy’s destitute father
must be rescued by Alice, and Charles lives out the limited plot of the Byronic
hero. Yet Desmond comes back to her a shell of a man but stays. Pale, weak,
and crying, Desmond returns, wanting to assume a submissive position (251).
However, the cycle of sociality and the intimacy it makes possible comes to an
end. Desmond stays and so does Cassy, but no one else comes or goes. No
new contacts are made. At the novel’s end, the Morgesons find themselves
incestuously under one roof: the foursome of Veronica and Ben and Cassandra
and Desmond embody the limits of promiscuous sociality. Stoddard strikes
against this already bleak picture, killing off Ben by having him drink himself to
death, sending Veronica into a near catatonic state: her “eyes go no more in
quest of something beyond. A wall of darkness lies before her” (252). Desmond
is practically a ghost, for he simply appears of out nowhere at the novel’s end. He
speaks to Cassy “in a voice deathly faint,” and is described as “spare” and “gray”
(250). In this scene, the once powerful Cassy tells Desmond that she wants to
“cry by myself,” to which Desmond responds, “cry here then, with me” (251).
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Wait a minute. Has Stoddard’s beautifully cold and cruel novel warped
itself into a sentimental tale? We now have a crying circle as Cassy and
Desmond let their tears roll and Desmond proposes marriage to her (251). How
conventional. It ends in the usual way with marriage, not freedom. These are not
tears of joy, however. I read the tears as a symbol of mourning for the death of
the once powerful Cassandra who wanted to be in the world differently, the
Cassy who never cried. Her pleasure is confined to the institution of marriage,
and the activity, pleasure, and contact with others her sadism made possible is
gone. She now wonders if “death is not a welcome idea to those who have died”
(252).
This is not her first suicidal thought. After her mother’s death, Cassandra
considers throwing herself into the ocean rather than take on the role of
caretaker. Looking down at the ocean, she hears its call, “Hail, Cassandra! Hail!”
and contemplates drowning herself (214). But Cassy marches back inside the
house and redirects her rage outward, turning over the dinner table, bringing
food, plates, and glasses crashing to the floor. Then, in an uncharacteristic
moment, one anticipating Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wall Paper,”
Cassy immediately redirects that rage back inward and swallows her bitter pill of
domesticity, resigning herself to her role as caretaker she gets down on the floor
and eats the meal of rice, ham, and glass shards (215). The glass she ingests
foretells the painful life she has chosen, to use Berlant’s term, her “slow death.”
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She imagines that “a wall had risen up suddenly before me, which divided me
from my dreams; I was inside it, on a prosaic domain I must henceforth be
confined to” (216). Cassy’s antisocial sadism that made different forms of
intimacy possible becomes static and unproductive once she is homebound.
IV.
The truth for me, however, is that there is no real disconnection in
my mind among the political, the sexual, and the discursive, no real
distinction between the particular and the universal . . . I have
attempted to refuse the easy distinctions between the political and
the personal that continue to exist in so much of our work long after
feminists presumably cleared the left intellectual environment of
such odd notions. The disheartening thing for me is that although
so many of us are inspired by the mundane, ever-present ache of
desire . . . so few of us allow knowledge of that fact to seep into our
writing.
Robert Reid-Pharr, Black Gay Man

As I stated earlier, there is an important tradition in queer theory that
engages the socio-political potential of negativity, a negativity manifest in those
who refuse to lead proper adult lives via monogamy, home ownership, and the
rearing of children. Rather than live for the future, queer theorists have been
interested in those who live actively in the present, building counter-publics in
opposition to the fictions of privacy that keeps us apart. Whether our current
isolation is directly related to the loss of public spaces (e.g. Old Times Square,
the Catacombs) and the absence (lack) of any meaningful alternatives, many of
us find ourselves looking backward. Here I’m thinking of the Old Times Square
Samuel Delany writes of, or the San Francisco BDSM clubs that Gayle Rubin
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and Pat(trick) Califia describe.112 Beyond the lack of space, I also find myself
looking backward to the world-making potential of queer theory in the late 1990s,
boldly articulated in Berlant and Warner’s “Sex in Public,” but which now seems
focused on depression and failed sociality. The ways in which Cassandra’s
sociality and its attendant pleasures are diminished as her depression sets in is
akin to a similar trajectory in recent queer studies and activism. What would it
take to make Delany and Califia’s romance of the not-so-distant past real? To be
sure, there is no going back, but what is important about this work is less the
nostalgia of what was and more the allure of the narrative for the possibility of a
better sociality.
While I find that the recent work on “negative affects,” “ugly feelings,” and
depression accurately diagnoses the foreclosure of sociality, this work is also
symptomatic of a lack of daring inventiveness when it comes to living. Many of
my students express a similar frustration. They want to talk to strangers. They
don’t want to rush home at 5:00 pm. They teach me about the queer groups
they’ve formed, in the spirit of ACT UP, that “invade” straight bars and clubs once
month. They’ve brought such great energy and sociality to these spaces that
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See Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, Rubin, “The Lesbian Menace:
Comments on Politics and S/M” and “The Catacombs: A Temple of the Butthole,” and Califia,
Public Sex: The Culture of Radical Sex.
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they’ve made these nights the most popular each month for straights and queers
alike. Delany puts in best: we need more spaces for sex and talk.113
If we are going to re-imagine the present, we perhaps should look to the
past and seize those moment of possibly, however unsustained. Cassandra
says, “I began my shore life again in a mood which made memory like hope”
(229). Here it is not the future that gives Cassy hope but the past. As she returns
home and resigns herself to take on her mother’s role, it is memories of past
sociality and pleasure that she clings to, not hope for the future. As Christopher
Castiglia argues, new sex publics come out of an engagement with sex
memories of the past.114 The best way to honor those we have lost to AIDS is to
keep alive the spirit of “inventive pleasure” that their creation of multiple sexual
and social publics embodied (10).115 Engaging “others in a collective invention of
the present, of creativity and care, in the context of pleasure” ensures that we
continually create new spaces for sex and talk, building on, rather than watching
crumble, what those who have come before us ended up giving their lives for.
In keeping with the necessary turn backward for queer-world making,
Heather Love’s focus on pre-Stonewall moments of failed and impossible love in
Modernist literature encapsulate what she describes as “feeling backward,” a

113

See Times Square Red, Times Square Blue and The Motion of Light in Water: Sex and
Science Fiction Writing in the East Village.
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See Castiglia, “Sex Panics, Sex Publics, Sex Memories.”
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See Castiglia, “The Post-Traumatic Possibilities of Post-Queer Memory”
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“disposition toward the past—embracing loss, risking abjection . . .the importance
of clinging to ruined identities and to histories of injury . . .resisting the call of gay
normalization means refusing to write off the most vulnerable, the least
presentable, and all the dead” (30). Just as Love wants us to look back to and
not disregard as embarrassing or irrelevant representations of queer intimacy, I
want us to look to queers like Cassy in nineteenth-century American novels as
we figure out how to re-imagine the social today. Embracing Cassanda’s
example means embracing her eventual loss and failure. Yet her failure comes
out of her having tried to live a different life from all of the Morgesons who have
come before her. Such invention and risk are incongruous with the drive for
normativity in contemporary America. 116Stoddard’s lesson is not the one of
having tried and failed. We do not have to become like Cassandra, stuck home
and isolated, with only our memories of past contact. In our fine tradition of
negativity, queers can refuse such a future, and accept the uncertainty of the free
fall and its demand for invention, rather than the slow death of privacy and
domesticity.
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On this point, I am inspired by Karma Lochrie and Carolyn Dinshaw’s work on queer
sexualities in the Medieval period. Instead of imposing the “repressive hypothesis” on the past,
Lochrie and Dinshaw’s readings of the Lollards, female sexualities unfettered from a
heterosexual/perverse binary, virginity, and sodomy challenge our often times limited horizon of
possibilities today when it comes to pleasure, intimacy, and identity. They are allies in the critical
strategy that Judith Halberstam terms perverse presentism, “the application of what we do not
know in the present to what we cannot know about the past” (53). See Halberstam, Female
Masculinities.
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